Never
before
have
borders
been
blurrier.
Goods,
services,
and,
relevant
here,
art
freely
circumnavigate
the
globe
with
little
regard
for
where
one
nation
ends
and
another
begins.
When
I
listen
to
a
song
in
my
office
in
New
York
City,
the
singer
may
be
Italian
and
the
producer
may
be
Colombian
and
the
song
may
be
streaming
via
a
Swedish
platform.
That
song
recording,
though,
has
a
single
copyright,
one
that
attaches
as
soon
as
it
is
created.
Yet
courts
applying
Sections
203
and
304
of
the
Copyright
Act
to
such
songs
have
heretofore
foregrounded
national
borders
to
create
a
sprawling
multiverse
where
one
song
recording
has
as
many
copyrights
as
there
are
countries
in
the
world.
Sort
of
like
“Interstellar,”
but
for
copyrights.
We
may,
however,
be
shuffling
toward
clarity
with
a
new
ruling
out
of
Louisiana
in
the
case
styled
Vetter
v.
Resnick.
Sections
203
and
304
of
the
U.S.
Copyright
Act
relate
to
the
termination
right,
which
was
written
into
the
Copyright
Act
to
allow
artists,
who
often
receive
unfavorable
terms
when
they
first
transfer
the
copyrights
in
their
artwork,
to
recover
those
copyrights
once
35
years
have
passed
and
the
initial
recipient
has
had
the
opportunity
over
those
three-and-a-half
decades
to
exploit
the
copyrights
to
their
heart’s
and
wallet’s
content.
Cyrvil
Vetter
is
an
artist.
He
and
a
co-author
created
a
song
entitled
“Double
Shot
(Of
My
Baby’s
Love)”
that
rocked
so
hard
that
no
less
an
authority
than
Bruce
Springsteen
extolled
it
as
one
of
greatest
tunes
of
all
time.
Vetter
transferred
his
worldwide
rights
in
“Double
Shot”
to
his
label
and
those
rights
eventually
ended
up
owned
by
a
company
named
Resnik
Music
Group
(RMG).
Vetter,
35
years
after
his
transfer,
exercised
his
termination
right
to
recapture
the
“Double
Shot”
copyrights.
RMG,
though,
fought
the
notice,
claiming
among
other
things
that
the
termination
would
apply
only
to
the
U.S.
copyright.
In
other
words,
RMG
would
concede
the
domestic
portion
of
the
“Double
Shot”
copyright
but
claimed
that
it
also
had
a
massive
number
of
discrete
“Double
Shot’
copyrights
that
arose
under
the
law
of
every
non-U.S.
country
in
the
world
and
those
rights
were
not
subject
to
Vetter’s
termination
notice.
Notably,
Vetter
entered
into
a
single
“worldwide”
transfer
of
the
“Double
Shot”
copyright.
Once
that
transfer
was
terminated,
the
single
copyright
returned
to
Vetter.
But
RMG
argued
that
despite
“worldwide”
transfer’s
termination
only
the
U.S.
copyright
returned
to
Vetter.
RMG
claimed
that
it
thus
maintained
ownership
of
the
Brazilian
copyright,
the
Danish
copyright,
the
Estonian
copyright,
and
so
on,
despite
there
not
being
any
copyrights
other
than
the
one
that
came
into
being
when
Vetter
created
the
song
in
the
U.S.
RMG
was
attempting
to
exploit
the
“principle
of
territoriality,”
which
holds
that
copyright
laws
generally
do
not
have
extraterritorial
application.
This
principle
was
historically
applied
to
acts
of
purely
extraterritorial
copyright
infringement,
which
are
generally
not
actionable
under
the
U.S.
Copyright
Act.
For
example,
if
an
infringer
sold
without
your
consent
hoodies
bearing
your
original
surfing
llama
artwork
in
Portugal,
you
would
have
to
sue
them
in
Lisbon
because
those
acts
are
beyond
the
U.S.
Copyright
Act’s
purview
But
Vetter’s
copyright
case
addressed
not
infringement
but
ownership.
Courts
regularly
embrace
different
approaches
to
these
two
types
of
copyright
cases,
such
as
when
applying
the
statute
of
limitations.
The
Second
Circuit
recognized
this
in
Itar-Tass
Russian
News
Agency
v.
Russian
Kurier,
Inc.,
explaining
that
“the
nature
of
a
copyright
interest
is
an
issue
distinct
from
the
issue
of
whether
the
copyright
has
been
infringed.”
The
law
is
relatively
settled
that
issues
of
copyright
ownership
are
decided
by
the
laws
of
the
country
in
which
the
work
was
created.
Vetter
brought
an
ownership
case
for
a
work
that
he
created
and
owned
in
the
U.S.
and
the
rights
for
which
he
recaptured
in
the
U.S.
Vetter
thus
enjoyed
one
copyright
in
the
“Double
Shot”
recording
under
U.S.
law
and
that
copyright
was
recognized
in
other
countries
around
the
world
per
the
terms
of
the
international
treaty
known
as
the
Berne
Convention.
Members
of
Berne,
which
include
many
of
the
world’s
largest
markets,
must
treat
authors
from
other
member
countries
as
well
as
they
treat
their
own
so
if
an
author
terminates
a
transfer
to
recapture
ownership
under
U.S.
law,
that
ownership
must
be
recognized
by
all
Berne
countries.
Vetter’s
ownership
right,
arising
as
it
did
under
U.S.
law,
must
thus
be
recognized
by
other
Berne
nations.
RMG
argued
otherwise,
relying
on
language
in
Section
304(c)(6)(E)
of
the
Copyright
Act
that
says
that
“[t]ermination
of
a
grant
under
this
subsection
affects
only
those
rights
covered
by
the
grant
that
arise
under
this
title”
and
do
not
apply
to
“rights
arising
under
any
other
Federal,
State,
or
foreign
laws.”
This
language,
coupled
with
the
“principle
of
territoriality”
meant,
per
RMG,
that
there
is
a
universe
of
separate
copyrights,
each
living
its
own
life
in
each
country
around
the
world,
and
as
such
must
be
treated
individually.
But
the
domestic
rights
and
foreign
rights
in
“Double
Shot”
“arise
under”
the
Copyright
Act,
at
least
in
Berne
countries,
because
Vetter
created
and
reclaimed
ownership
of
the
copyright
in
the
U.S.
and
that
ownership
must,
per
Berne,
be
recognized
by
those
foreign
nations.
Indeed,
one
of
the
driving
forces
behind
Berne
was
to
avoid
a
system
where
each
foreign
nation
would
be
forced
to
separately
address
and
apply
its
laws
to
a
copyright.
RMG
further
averred
that
the
Copyright
Act’s
effect
hit
a
hard
stop
at
the
U.S.
borders
and
thus
had
no
application
anywhere
else
in
the
world.
But
the
Supreme
Court
had
already
addressed
and
rejected
such
a
contention
in
Kirtsaeng
v.
John
Wiley
&
Sons,
Inc.,
where
it
considered
whether
the
words
“lawfully
made
under
this
title”
in
the
Copyright
Act
included
a
geographic
restriction.
It
found
it
did
not,
ruling
that
the
phrase
“lawfully
made
under
this
title”
means
made
“in
accordance
with”
or
“in
compliance
with”
the
Copyright
Act.
The
language
reviewed
in
Kirtsaeng,
like
the
language
in
Vetter,
includes
“nothing
about
geography.”
And
as
in
Kirtsaeng,
it
would
be
improper
to
inject
a
geographic
restriction
into
Sections
203
and
304.
Vetter’s
copyright
ownership
rights
“arose”
under
the
Copyright
Act
because
he
created
the
work
in
the
U.S.
and
his
reclaimed
ownership
is
not
subject
to
any
geographic
restriction.
The
Supreme
Court
also
addressed
the
termination
right
in
Stewart
v.
Abend
and
that
time
too
did
not
set
out
any
geographic
restriction
on
the
artist’s
ability
to
reclaim
their
rights.
Considering
the
holder
of
a
transferred
right
that
was
terminated,
the
Court
concludes
that
“the
assignee
of
all
of
the
renewal
rights
holds
nothing
upon
the
death
of
the
assignor
before
arrival
of
the
renewal
period.”
The
Court
did
not
say
the
assignee
“holds
exclusive
rights
in
all
countries
other
than
the
United
States,”
the
Court
said
that
the
assignee
holds
“nothing.”
In
the
end,
the
Vetter
court
adroitly
found
there
to
be
one
copyright,
granted
by
the
country
in
which
the
work
was
created,
and
which
must
be
recognized
by
the
international
community
pursuant
to
treaty
obligations.
This
result
furthers
the
intent
of
Sections
203
and
304,
which
is
to
allow
artists
to
fully
recapture
their
rights.
There
will
likely
be
an
appeal,
as
record
labels
never
relinquish
rights
without
throwing
up
every
possible
obstacle,
but
this
a
very
positive
first
step
for
artists
everywhere.
Scott
Alan
Burroughs,
Esq.
practices
with Doniger
/
Burroughs,
an
art
law
firm
based
in
Venice,
California.
He
represents
artists
and
content
creators
of
all
stripes
and
writes
and
speaks
regularly
on
copyright
issues.
He
can
be
reached
at [email protected],
and
you
can
follow
his
law
firm
on
Instagram: @veniceartlaw.