While
quantifying
case
importance
is
a
subjective
art
at
best,
there
are
some
measurable
elements
that
provide
deeper
than
a
gut
impression
as
a
basis
for
comparison.
Some
possibilities
include
dollar
value
or
companies
involved,
case
complexity,
differences
of
opinion
between
judges,
firms
involved
in
litigating
the
cases,
and
interests
or
implications
for
those
beyond
the
immediate
parties
to
the
matter.
With
these
layers
in
mind,
I
started
out
by
examining
opinions
where
the
following
firms
which
are currently
around
the
top
revenue
generators in
U.S.
law
were
counsel:
Gibson
Dunn,
Skadden,
Latham,
Morgan
Lewis,
White
&
Case,
Ropes
&
Gray,
Allen
Overy,
Kirkland
&
Ellis,
DLA
Piper,
and
Sidley
Austin.
The
sample
of
written
opinions
with
at
least
100
words
(a
way
to
attempt
to
exclude
summary
decisions)
based
on
these
parameters
was
136.
Here
are
a
few
ways
to
break
down
the
numbers.
First
based
on
law
firm:
There
is
quite
a
range
from
37
to
three
decisions
and
large
drops
from
the
first
four
firms
to
the
next
four
and
finally
to
the
last
two.
To
get
a
sense
of
the
lay
of
the
land,
below
are
the
courts
that
issued
these
opinions.
Here
we
see
the
impact
of
the
coasts
as
the
four
courts
with
the
most
decisions
are
SDNY
(New
York),
NDCA
(California),
the
Ninth
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
(west
coast),
and
the
appellate
divisions
of
the
New
York
Supreme
Court
(the
intermediate
appeals
tribunal
in
New
York).
Next
is
a
quick
way
to
break
down
some
of
the
significant
issues
in
the
cases
based
on
a
dictionary
approach
looking
for
multiple
times
these
terms
arise
in
a
decision.
Many
of
these
cases
(perhaps
not
surprisingly
for
big
firms)
deal
with
financial
implications
and
deals
that
broke
down.
There
are
still
a
nontrivial
number
of
cases
where
the
immediate
concerns
are
not
financial
or
at
least
are
not
predicated
only
on
business
interests.
Lastly
a
look
at
opinion
count
based
on
a
distribution
of
majority
word
counts.
Most
of
these
opinions
are
fairly
short
although
only
six
were
excluded
from
the
analyses
due
to
fewer
than
100
words
in
them.
I
ordered
this
list
of
five
cases
based
on
relative
importance,
mainly
on
dispersed
impact,
but
also
based
on
the
other
factors
I
described
above.
Decision
Link
Court:
United
States
Court
of
Appeals,
Fifth
Circuit
Decision
Date:
December
11,
2024
Majority
Opinion:
Oldham; Dissent:
Higginson
Issue
Areas:
{housing,
financial,
commerce,
employment,
liability,
fraud,
contracts}
Majority
words
count:
11,351; Dissent
word
count:
2,460
Amicus
briefs:
14
What
it’s
about:
This
case
centers
around
a
legal
challenge
to
rules
set
by
the
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
(SEC)
and
Nasdaq
regarding
the
disclosure
of
certain
demographic
information
about
directors
of
public
companies.
Specifically,
the
rules
required
companies
listed
on
Nasdaq
to
disclose
data
about
the
race,
gender,
and
sexual
characteristics
of
their
directors.
The
plaintiffs
AFBR,
argued
that
these
disclosure
requirements
went
beyond
what
is
allowed
under
the
law
and
violated
certain
legal
principles.
At
its
core,
this
case
is
about
whether
government
regulators,
like
the
SEC
and
Nasdaq,
can
require
companies
to
disclose
sensitive
information
about
their
directors
for
the
purpose
of
promoting
transparency,
even
if
such
disclosures
aren’t
directly
related
to
financial
performance
or
investor
protection.
The
Positions
of
the
Two
Sides:
AFBR
(Petitioner):
AFBR,
a
group
representing
certain
companies
affected
by
the
Nasdaq
rule,
argues
that
the
SEC
and
Nasdaq
have
overstepped
their
authority
by
mandating
disclosures
of
information
that
are
not
required
by
law.
The
main
claim
is
that
these
rules
go
against
the
intent
of
the
securities
laws,
which
were
created
to
protect
investors
from
fraud,
manipulation,
and
speculation,
not
to
mandate
social
or
demographic
disclosures.
The
group
argued
that
requiring
such
disclosures
doesn’t
align
with
the
goals
of
the
Securities
Exchange
Act,
which
was
primarily
designed
to
prevent
financial
fraud
and
market
manipulation,
not
to
force
companies
to
reveal
demographic
information
unrelated
to
financial
performance.
SEC
and
Nasdaq
(Respondent):
The
SEC
and
Nasdaq
argue
that
their
rules
are
within
their
authority
and
are
in
line
with
the
objectives
of
the
Securities
Exchange
Act.
They
believe
that
forcing
companies
to
disclose
such
information
is
beneficial
for
investors
and
markets
because
it
improves
transparency
and
could
potentially
enhance
corporate
governance.
They
argued
that
the
rules
are
related
to
the
Exchange
Act’s
goals
of
providing
transparency
and
protecting
investors,
and
that
disclosing
demographic
data
about
company
directors
might
help
investors
make
better-informed
decisions
about
the
companies
they
invest
in.
Key
Legal
and
Policy
Issues:
-
Jurisdiction
and
Standing:
One
threshold
issue
in
the
decision
was
determining
if
AFBR
had
the
right
to
challenge
the
rule
in
court.
Since
AFBR
represented
companies
that
were
affected
by
Nasdaq’s
rules,
they
had
the
legal
standing
to
bring
this
case.
-
Authority
and
Scope
of
the
SEC
and
Nasdaq:
The
main
legal
issue
was
whether
the
SEC
and
Nasdaq
had
the
authority
to
require
companies
to
disclose
personal
demographic
information
about
their
directors.
AFBR
argued
that
this
wasn’t
within
the
scope
of
the
securities
laws,
while
the
SEC
and
Nasdaq
argued
that
the
rules
were
related
to
their
duties
to
ensure
transparency
in
the
market.
In
this
decision,
the major
questions
doctrine (a
current
hot
topic)
plays
a
central
role
in
limiting
the
scope
of
the
SECs
regulatory
power
over
corporate
governance,
particularly
regarding
the
imposition
of
diversity
requirements
on
corporate
boards.
Major
Questions
Doctrine:
The
doctrine
asserts
that
when
an
administrative
agency,
like
the
SEC,
seeks
to
exercise
power
over
a
matter
of
significant
economic
or
political
importance,
it
must
have
clear
and
explicit
authorization
from
Congress.
This
is
because
such
power,
if
implied
or
unclear,
could
lead
to
significant
changes
in
the
nations
economic
landscape
or
government
structure
without
proper
democratic
oversight.
In
this
case,
the
SEC’s
attempt
to
impose
diversity
requirements
on
corporate
boards
is
seen
as
a
“major
question”
due
to
its
massive
economic
and
political
implications.
In
this
case,
The
SECs
action
of
requiring
Nasdaq-listed
companies
to
adopt
board
diversity
policies
is
characterized
as
a
“major
question”
because
it
affects
the
internal
structures
of
large
corporations,
including
those
with
a
combined
market
value
greater
than
the
GDP
of
the
United
States.
The
court
argues
that,
while
the
SEC
has
broad
powers
under
the
Exchange
Act,
it
cannot
claim
authority
to
reshape
corporate
governance
based
on
vague
statutory
provisions
without
clear
congressional
approval.
The
court
also
highlights
that
this
kind
of
regulation—pertaining
to
diversity
on
corporate
boards—is
traditionally
handled
by
other
agencies
(like
the
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission)
or
state
laws,
not
the
SEC.
Therefore,
applying
the
major
questions
doctrine
here
requires
skepticism
of
the
SEC’s
action,
as
no
clear
congressional
mandate
for
such
regulation
exists
in
the
Exchange
Act.
Holding:
Ultimately,
the
court
concluded
that
the
SEC’s
power
to
regulate
corporate
governance
did
not
extend
to
imposing
diversity
requirements
on
corporate
boards,
as
such
a
measure
lacks
the
clear
congressional
authorization
required
by
the
major
questions
doctrine.
Main
points
in
the dissent:
-
Nasdaq’s
Role
and
SECs
Limited
Authority:
Nasdaq,
as
a
private
company,
proposed
a
rule
(the
“Disclosure
Rule”)
requiring
companies
to
disclose
their
board
diversity.
The
dissent
argues
that
the
SEC’s
role
is
limited
and
that
it
is
not
authorized
to
override
Nasdaq’s
judgment
unless
the
rule
violates
the
Exchange
Acts
requirements.
The
SEC’s
approval
of
the
rule
aligns
with
the
purpose
of
encouraging
market
efficiency
and
investor
transparency.
-
Investor
Demand
for
Diversity
Information:
The
dissent
highlights
that
there
is
substantial
evidence
showing
that
investors
sought
information
about
board
composition,
despite
inefficiencies
in
how
such
data
was
previously
reported.
Nasdaq
responded
to
this
demand
with
a
rule
that
standardizes
board
diversity
disclosures,
aiming
to
address
information
asymmetries
between
large
and
small
investors.
-
Disclosure
vs.
Quota:
The
dissent
emphasizes
that
the
Disclosure
Rule
is
focused
on
providing
information,
not
imposing
a
quota
system
for
board
diversity.
This
aligns
with
SEC’s
finding
that
the
rule
is
designed
to
remove
barriers
to
market
efficiency
rather
than
mandate
hiring
practices.
-
Private
Experimentation
and
Limited
SEC
Intervention:
The
dissent
defends
the
concept
of
self-regulation
by
exchanges
like
Nasdaq,
which
can
refine
their
rules
based
on
market
demands.
The
SEC’s
review
should
be
limited
to
ensuring
the
rule
doesn’t
violate
the
principles
of
the
Exchange
Act,
rather
than
imposing
its
own
policy
preferences.
-
Consistency
with
Existing
Regulatory
Practices:
The
dissent
notes
that
Nasdaq’s
rule
aligns
with
existing
disclosure
requirements,
such
as
those
enforced
by
the
EEOC
and
SEC,
demonstrating
consistency
with
broader
regulatory
practices.
Decision
Link
Court:
Supreme
Court
of
Montana
Decision
Date:
December
11,
2024
Opinion
Author:
Justice
Baker;
Concurrence:
Justice
McKinnon;
Concurrence
and
Dissent:
Justice
Rice
Areas
of
Law {employment,
hearing,
insurance,
unconstitutional,
evidence}
Majority
word
count:
8,211; Concurrence (McKinnon):
1,579; Concurrence
and
Dissent
in
part (Rice):
661
Amicus
Briefs:
2
What
it’s
about:
This
case
addresses
the
constitutionality
of
Montana
Senate
Bill
99
(SB
99),
a
law
enacted
in
2023
that
restricts
specific
medical
treatments
for
minors
diagnosed
with
gender
dysphoria.
The
Plaintiffs
argued
that
the
law
violates
Montana’s
constitutional
rights,
including
privacy
and
equal
protection.
Here’s
a
summary
of
the
key
issues:
Overview
of
SB
99
-
Purpose:
The
law
aims
to
protect
minors
from
undergoing
“harmful,
experimental”
treatments
such
as
puberty
blockers,
cross-sex
hormones,
and
certain
surgical
procedures
before
they
reach
adulthood.
-
Prohibitions:
-
The
law
prohibits
the
administration
of
puberty
blockers
and
hormones
(e.g.,
testosterone
for
female
minors,
estrogen
for
male
minors)
intended
to
affirm
a
minor’s
gender
identity.
-
Bans
specific
surgeries
(e.g.,
hysterectomy,
vaginoplasty)
performed
to
affirm
a
gender
identity
incongruent
with
a
minor’s
sex
assigned
at
birth.
-
Exemptions:
These
procedures
and
treatments
are
permitted
if
they
are
not
aimed
at
addressing
a
minor’s
perception
of
their
gender
identity.
-
Professional
Penalties:
Health
professionals
who
violate
the
law
face
disciplinary
actions,
including
suspension
of
their
license
for
at
least
one
year,
civil
liability,
and
exclusion
of
insurance
coverage
for
damages.
Plaintiffs’
Arguments
-
Constitutional
Violations:
SB
99
infringes
on
privacy
and
equal
protection
rights
guaranteed
under
Montana’s
Constitution.
-
Medical
Necessity:
-
Treatments
banned
under
SB
99
are
supported
by
medical
standards
(e.g.,
WPATH
Standards
of
Care
Version
8)
and
are
often
necessary
for
addressing
gender
dysphoria.
-
Evidence
submitted
indicates
untreated
gender
dysphoria
can
result
in
severe
mental
health
issues,
including
depression
and
suicidality.
-
Expert
Testimony:
Plaintiffs’
experts
attest
that
gender-affirming
care
is
safe,
effective,
and
the
accepted
standard
of
care
for
minors
with
gender
dysphoria.
State’s
Defense
-
Medical
Concerns:
-
The
State
argues
that
there
is
no
consensus
within
the
medical
community
on
using
puberty
blockers
and
hormones
for
minors
with
gender
dysphoria.
-
It
asserts
that
gender-affirming
care
may
harm
minors.
-
Legislative
Authority:
SB
99
reflects
the
State’s
interest
in
regulating
medical
practices
to
protect
minors.
Holding:
The
court
decided
to
uphold
the
District
Court’s
preliminary
injunction
against
SB
99,
finding
that
the
plaintiffs
had
shown
a
likelihood
of
success
on
the
merits
of
their
privacy
claim.
The
District
Court
determined
that
SB
99,
which
bans
certain
medical
treatments
for
minors,
violated
the
plaintiffs’
fundamental
right
to
privacy
under
the
Montana
Constitution.
The
court
applied
strict
scrutiny
and
found
that
the
State
had
not
demonstrated
a
compelling
interest
or
that
the
law
was
narrowly
tailored
to
achieve
such
an
interest.
Key
aspects
of
the
decision
include:
-
Prima
Facie
Case
Against
SB
99:
The
District
Court
concluded
that
the
plaintiffs
presented
sufficient
evidence
to
establish
that
the
treatments
banned
by
SB
99
are
not
harmful
or
experimental,
and
therefore,
do
not
justify
the
State’s
interference
under
the
Armstrong
standard.
-
Strict
Scrutiny
Standard:
The
statute’s
impact
on
individual
privacy
rights
triggered
strict
scrutiny,
requiring
the
State
to
justify
the
law
with
a
compelling
interest
and
show
that
it
was
narrowly
tailored.
The
State’s
failure
to
demonstrate
that
the
banned
treatments
posed
a
bona
fide
health
risk
meant
it
could
not
meet
this
standard.
-
Preliminary
Injunction
Process:
The
court
rejected
the
State’s
argument
that
the
District
Court
erred
by
not
allowing
live
testimony
or
cross-examination
during
the
preliminary
injunction
hearing.
It
found
that
the
District
Court
had
broad
discretion
in
how
it
conducted
the
hearing
and
provided
both
parties
a
full
opportunity
to
submit
evidence.
-
Irreparable
Harm:
The
court
agreed
that
the
plaintiffs
faced
irreparable
harm
absent
the
injunction
because
the
statutory
restrictions
prevented
individualized
medical
care
for
minors,
affecting
their
fundamental
rights.
Overall,
the
court
emphasized
that
the
preliminary
injunction
did
not
resolve
the
ultimate
merits
of
the
case,
which
would
be
determined
at
trial.
However,
it
found
no
abuse
of
discretion
in
the
District
Court’s
decision
to
enjoin
SB
99
pending
a
final
determination.
Justice
McKinnon:
Justice
McKinnon
concurred
with
the
Court’s
decision
to
uphold
the
preliminary
injunction
on
the
plaintiffs’
right
to
privacy
claim
but
emphasized
the
importance
of
addressing
the
equal
protection
claim
as
well.
McKinnon
highlighted
that
Montana’s
constitutional
protections
are
broader
than
their
federal
counterparts,
particularly
in
prohibiting
discrimination
on
the
basis
of
sex,
which
includes
transgender
status.
McKinnon
criticized
the
Court’s
avoidance
of
this
issue,
arguing
that
it
leaves
litigants
and
lower
courts
without
crucial
guidance,
fosters
uncertainty,
and
delays
justice
for
those
impacted
by
SB
99.
McKinnon
underscored
the
necessity
of
recognizing
transgender
persons
as
a
suspect
class
and
applying
strict
scrutiny
to
the
law,
asserting
that
this
case
presents
an
opportunity
to
provide
clarity
on
these
critical
legal
questions
under
Montana’s
Constitution.
Justice
Rice: Justice
Rice
concurred
with
upholding
the
preliminary
injunction,
agreeing
that
SB
99’s
restrictions
fail
to
meet
the
high
bar
of
addressing
a
bona
fide
health
risk
but
noted
that
evolving
medical
and
legal
standards
require
ongoing
evaluation.
Decision
Link
Court:
Supreme
Court
of
Delaware
Decision
Date:
December
2,
2024
Opinion
Author:
Justice
Valihura
Areas
of
law {conspiracy,
merger,
bargaining,
contract
law,
financial,
torts,
purchasing,
liability,
fraud}
Opinion
word
count:
26,435
Amicus
brief:
0
What
it’s
about:
This
case
revolves
around
the
sale
of
Mindbody,
a
software
company,
to
Vista
Equity
Partners
for
$36.50
per
share
in
2018.
The
lawsuit
focuses
on
whether
the
company’s
CEO,
Rick
Stollmeyer,
and
the
board
of
directors
acted
properly
during
the
sale
process.
Shareholders
claim
that
Stollmeyer
prioritized
his
own
interests
over
securing
the
best
price
for
investors,
including
early
discussions
with
Vista,
favoring
them
over
other
bidders,
and
failing
to
disclose
critical
financial
information
before
the
merger
vote.
The
case
examines
whether
these
actions
violated
fiduciary
duties
to
shareholders
and
influenced
the
sale’s
outcome
unfairly.
Decision:
CEO
Richard
Stollmeyer,
Vista
Equity
Partners
Management,
LLC,
and
Mindbody
lost
on
several
critical
points,
including:
-
Breach
of
Fiduciary
Duty:
The
Court
found
that
Stollmeyer
breached
his
fiduciary
duty
of
loyalty
by
failing
to
maximize
the
company’s
sale
price
for
stockholders.
-
Failure
to
Ensure
an
Informed
Stockholder
Vote:
The
stockholder
vote
approving
the
merger
was
found
to
be
insufficiently
informed.
-
Material
Omission
in
Proxy
Statement:
The
acquirors
failure
to
include
important
information
regarding
their
informational
advantages
was
considered
material.
Stollmeyer
and
the
acquirer
were
also
found
to
have
waived
their
right
to
seek
settlement
credit
and
the
acquirers
failure
to
correct
material
omissions
did
not
meet
the
“knowing
participation”
element
for
aiding
and
abetting
claims.
What
the
appellants
won:
-
The
Delaware
Supreme
Court
reversed
certain
aspects
of
the
trial
court’s
ruling,
particularly
concerning
the
acquirors
responsibility
for
aiding
and
abetting
the
CEOs
breach
of
duty.
-
The
Delaware
Supreme
Court
held
that
the
acquirors
failure
to
correct
the
proxy
statement
did
not
fulfill
the
“knowing
participation”
standard
needed
for
the
aiding
and
abetting
claim.
Additionally,
the
Court
found
that
the
acquirors
contractual
duty
did
not
create
an
independent
fiduciary
duty
of
disclosure
to
the
stockholders.
The
appellees
(stockholders)
were
the
bigger
winners,
as
they
secured
the
damages
award
and
the
ruling
on
the
breach
of
fiduciary
duty.
The
appellants
(CEO
and
acquiror)
managed
to
secure
partial
reversals,
particularly
on
the
aiding
and
abetting
claims.
Decision
Link
Court:
N.D.
Ohio,
Decision
Date:
November
26,
2024
Opinion
Author:
Judge
Pamela
Barker
Areas
of
Law {contract
law,
employment,
liability,
accommodations,
precedent,
religion,
labor,
evidence}
Opinion
Word
Count:
21,711
Amicus
Briefs:
0
What
it’s
about:
This
case
centers
around
an
employee,
Bobnar
who
worked
AstraZeneca,
a
pharmaceutical
company,
and
requested
religious
exemptions
from
the
company’s
COVID-19
vaccine
mandate.
Bobnar
requested
a
religious
accommodation
to
avoid
the
COVID-19
vaccine,
citing
his
religious
beliefs
about
bodily
integrity.
However,
his
request
was
denied,
and
he
was
eventually
terminated
by
AstraZeneca.
Bobnar
also
applied
for
paternity
leave
under
the
Family
and
Medical
Leave
Act
(FMLA),
which
was
granted.
However,
he
faced
issues
during
his
leave,
including
being
contacted
by
coworkers
for
work-related
matters
and
feeling
pressured
to
continue
business
activities
while
on
leave.
He
considered
these
communications
harassment.
Bobnar
was
also
part
of
a
sales
incentive
program
and
was
expecting
a
bonus,
but
his
termination
affected
his
eligibility
to
receive
the
bonus.
The
legal
issues
in
the
case
revolve
around
whether
AstraZeneca
appropriately
handled
the
religious
accommodation
requests
and
whether
Bobnar’s
termination
was
justified,
particularly
in
relation
to
his
leave
and
bonus
eligibility.
The
case
also
touches
on
the
legality
of
AstraZeneca’s
actions
under
employment
law,
including
how
they
managed
the
accommodation
requests,
leave,
and
incentive
pay.
Decision
Parts:
-
Title
VII
Religious
Discrimination/Failure
to
Accommodate
(Count
One):
The
Court
found
that
AstraZeneca
discriminated
against
Bobnar
by
denying
his
request
for
a
religious
accommodation
related
to
a
vaccine
mandate.
The
Court
ruled
that
Bobnar’s
termination
was
discriminatory
and
granted
summary
judgment
in
Bobnar’s
favor
on
this
count.
-
FMLA
Interference
and
Retaliation
(Count
Four):
The
Court
found
that
AstraZeneca
did
not
interfere
with
Bobnar’s
FMLA
leave,
as
he
voluntarily
performed
some
work
during
his
leave.
The
Court
also
ruled
that
there
was
no
retaliation
for
taking
FMLA
leave,
granting
summary
judgment
in
favor
of
AstraZeneca
on
this
claim.
-
Breach
of
Contract
(Count
Five):
The
Court
ruled
that
AstraZeneca
wrongfully
denied
Bobnar
his
earned
bonus
for
Q1
2022,
as
his
termination
was
unlawful.
The
Court
granted
summary
judgment
in
Bobnar’s
favor
on
the
breach
of
contract
claim,
stating
that
AstraZeneca
was
required
to
pay
him
the
bonus.
-
Violation
of
Ohio’s
Prompt
Pay
Act
(OPPA)
(Count
Six):
AstraZeneca’s
motion
for
summary
judgment
was
granted
on
this
claim
because
there
was
a
dispute
over
whether
Bobnar
was
entitled
to
the
bonus,
and
the
OPPA
does
not
apply
where
a
dispute
exists
regarding
the
payment
of
wages.
Why
was
Bobnar
the
bigger
winner?
-
Key
Wins:
Bobnar
succeeded
on
the
two
claims
that
were
central
to
his
legal
battle—religious
discrimination
under
Title
VII
and
the
breach
of
contract
regarding
the
unpaid
bonus.
-
Damages
and
Compensation:
The
breach
of
contract
ruling,
in
particular,
could
result
in
Bobnar
receiving
the
bonus
he
earned,
which
is
a
significant
financial
win.
-
Religious
Discrimination:
The
courts
ruling
on
the
Title
VII
claim
implies
that
AstraZeneca
could
face
significant
legal
and
financial
repercussions
for
discriminating
against
Bobnar
based
on
his
religious
beliefs.
-
In
contrast,
the
claims
that
AstraZeneca
successfully
defended
against
(retaliation
under
Title
VII,
FMLA
claims,
and
OPPA
violation)
were
either
appear
less
financially
impactful
in
comparison
to
the
two
claims
Bobnar
won.
Decision
Link
Court:
Appellate
Court
of
Illinois,
Second
District
Areas
of
Law {insurance,
commerce,
education,
liability,
fraud}
Majority:
Justice
Mullen; Dissent:
Justice
McLaren
Majority
word
count:
10,953; Dissent
word
count:
698
Amicus
brief:
1
What
it’s
about:
This
case
centers
on
a
claim
brought
by
plaintiff
Calley
Fausett
against
Walgreen
Company
(doing
business
as
Walgreens),
alleging
that
Walgreens
violated
the
Fair
and
Accurate
Credit
Transactions
Act
of
2003
(FACTA).
Specifically,
the
plaintiff
claims
that
Walgreens
printed
more
than
the
last
five
digits
of
debit
card
numbers
on
receipts
provided
to
customers,
which
is
prohibited
under
section
1681c(g)(1)
of
FACTA.
Positions
of
the
Parties:
-
Plaintiff (Calley
Fausett):
Fausett
argued
that
Walgreens
willfully
violated
FACTA
by
printing
too
many
digits
of
her
debit
card
number
on
receipts,
which
exposed
her
to
an
increased
risk
of
identity
theft.
She
asserts
that
this
violation
is
sufficient
to
bring
a
claim,
even
though
she
did
not
suffer
any
actual
injury
or
financial
loss.
Fausett
sought
statutory
damages,
punitive
damages,
and
attorneys
fees,
and
moved
for
class
certification
to
represent
others
affected
by
the
same
issue.
-
Defendant (Walgreens):
Walgreens
contended
that
the
claim
was
not
actionable
because
Fausett
had
not
demonstrated
any
actual
injury.
They
argued
that
revealing
part
of
a
debit
card
number
did
not
pose
a
significant
risk
of
harm,
and
thus
Fausett
lacked
standing
to
sue
under
Illinois
law.
Walgreens
also
challenged
the
appropriateness
of
class
certification,
asserting
that
the
violation
did
not
support
class-wide
claims.
Legal
Background:
-
FACTAs
Truncation
Requirement:
The
law
prohibits
businesses
from
printing
more
than
the
last
five
digits
of
a
debit
or
credit
card
number
on
receipts
to
protect
consumers
from
identity
theft.
-
Standing:
Walgreens
argued
that,
under
federal
law,
a
plaintiff
must
show
concrete
harm
to
have
standing.
However,
Illinois
courts
had
taken
a
more
liberal
approach
to
standing,
allowing
claims
for
statutory
violations
even
in
the
absence
of
actual
injury.
Court’s
Decision:
The
court
ruled
in
favor
of
the
plaintiff,
affirming
the
decision
of
the
circuit
court
to
grant
class
certification.
The
court
concluded
that
the
plaintiff
had
standing
to
bring
a
claim
under
FACTA
in
Illinois
state
court.
The
court
rejected
the
defendants
argument
that
the
plaintiff
lacked
standing
due
to
the
absence
of
an
actual
injury,
stating
that
under
Illinois
law,
a
violation
of
statutory
rights,
such
as
a
willful
violation
of
FACTA,
is
sufficient
to
confer
standing.
This
conclusion
was
consistent
with
Illinois
approach
to
standing,
which
does
not
require
proof
of
concrete
harm
or
injury
in
fact.
The
court
emphasized
that
it
was
not
addressing
the
ultimate
success
of
the
plaintiffs
claim,
only
the
issue
of
standing
and
the
propriety
of
granting
class
certification.
Dissent:
Judge
McLaren
disagreed
with
the
majority’s
decision
to
approve
the
class
certification
(the
ability
of
the
plaintiff
to
represent
a
group
of
people
in
the
lawsuit)
at
this
stage.
The
dissent
argued
that
the
majority
made
an
incomplete
and
speculative
decision
by
addressing
only
one
issue—whether
the
plaintiff
has
standing
to
bring
the
case—while
ignoring
other
important
legal
questions,
such
as
whether
the
plaintiffs
claim
is
valid
or
whether
certain
legal
defenses
apply.
The
dissent
also
criticized
the
majority
for
affirming
the
class
certification
without
fully
reviewing
all
the
necessary
details,
which
the
dissent
believed
should
have
been
handled
by
the
trial
court
before
deciding
on
the
class.
Essentially,
the
dissent
argued
the
majority
was
making
a
premature
decision
without
enough
information
and
should
have
sent
the
case
back
for
further
review
instead
of
addressing
the
class
certification.
Read
more
from
Legalytics
here….
Adam
Feldman
runs
the
litigation
consulting
company
Optimized
Legal
Solutions
LLC.
Check
out
more
of
his
writing
at
Legalytics
and
Empirical
SCOTUS.
For
more
information,
write
Adam
at [email protected]. Find
him
on
Twitter: @AdamSFeldman.
Kathryn
Olga
