Come Party With Above The Law!

It’s that time of year again where we look back, take stock of the year in law, count the bonuses rolling in and order another round. With that in mind, we’re throwing a holiday party here in New York, and you’re invited!

So, if you want to grab some drinks and food on ATL, RSVP here! This year we’ll have our party on December 10th at Houndstooth Pub on 8th Avenue at 37th Street.

Want to brag about your bonus? Share a war story? Take a break from studying for finals? Catch up with your favorite (it’s me, I know it is) ATL editor? All are welcome!

Here are the details:

When: Tuesday, December 10th
Where: 520 8th Avenue, New York, NY 10018
Time: 6pm – whenever we stop drinking

Remember to RSVP soon to guarantee your spot and we’ll see you in December.


headshotKathryn Rubino is a Senior Editor at Above the Law, and host of The Jabot podcast. AtL tipsters are the best, so please connect with her. Feel free to email her with any tips, questions, or comments and follow her on Twitter (@Kathryn1).

46 Cities Sue The FCC For Trampling Their Rights

The Trump FCC has made it abundantly clear it isn’t particularly keen on state, city, or local rights, especially when they interfere with AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast’s ability to make a buck. The problem: when the FCC neutered its ability to police the telecom sector at lobbyist request as part of the net neutrality repeal, it may have ironically obliterated its authority to tell states or cities what they can do.

The agency fiercely opposes your town and city’s right to build its own broadband networks, even if nobody else will and locals have voted for it. The Pai FCC has also tried (illegally and unsuccessfully so far) to ban states from trying to protect consumers from predatory telecom monopolies in the wake of federal apathy. And a number of other FCC policy changes have attempted to hamstring your town or city’s ability to stand up to wireless carriers over things like environmental reviews for cell tower placement, or the money they can collect for hosting telecom equipment in public rights of way.

This week, the FCC was sued by a broad coalition of cities which say they’ve had enough. Dozens of states have joined forces to sue the FCC over an August ruling cities say not only limit how much money cities can collect for things like environmental impact reviews on cell tower placement, but hamstrings their ability to stand up to giants like AT&T and Verizon on pretty much any issue of substance. The FCC claimed the changes were necessary to accelerate our positioning in the “race to 5G,” though cities say the changes are little more than a giant gift to the nation’s biggest telecom conglomerates:

“At least 46 cities are asking federal appeals courts to undo an FCC order they argue will force them to raise taxes or cut spending on local media services, including channels that schools, governments, and the general public can use for programming.

The lawsuits reflect a larger clash of interests among localities, media companies, and the FCC brought on by the agency’s tactic of promoting broadband deployment nationwide—especially in rural areas with spotty or no internet access—by easing rules for business.”

The case began with Eugene, Oregon (pdf), though 46 cities, along with eight counties and the state of Hawaii, have since filed seven petitions in three different circuit courts in the hopes of overturning the rules. They say the FCC’s ability to constrain the money they can collect from telecom giants will hurt localities, and is part of an overall effort to weaken any municipal opposition to AT&T and Verizon:

“…cities will have to reduce their public media budgets, stop offering services, or cut into other programs to make up the difference, Christopher Ali, associate professor in the University of Virginia’s media studies department, said.

The order also stifles municipal decision-making authority over franchise terms, Ali said. “It allows cable companies to call the shots a lot more than they used to,” he said. The franchise order is part of “much larger agenda to diminish the power of municipalities,” Ali said. “We’re seeing this battle between municipalities and big media, and big media is winning.”

While the FCC says that freeing industry incumbents from oversight and accountability will spur greater broadband deployment, the net neutrality debate has shown that limited competition and regulatory capture ensures that doesn’t actually happen. Also like the net neutrality debate, the FCC may have painted itself into a corner. The courts haven’t looked kindly upon the FCC’s decision to neuter its own oversight authority over broadband, then turn around and tell cities or states what they can or can’t do, an issue that’s likely to rear its head here as well.

46 Cities Sue The FCC For Trampling Their Rights

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Layoffs Watch ’19: WeWork

ED Mnangagwa MUST see this, Zimbabweans crying after police brutality – VIDEO – The Zimbabwean

22.11.2019 12:24

ED Mnangagwa MUST see this, Zimbabweans crying after police brutality – VIDEO


Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa arrives for the inauguration of Cyril Ramaphosa as South African president, at Loftus Versfeld stadium in Pretoria, South Africa, May 25, 2019. REUTERS/Siphiwe Sibeko/File Photo

The secrets behind Mugabe’s demise
EU worried about recent political developments in Zimbabwe: memo

Post published in: Featured

EU worried about recent political developments in Zimbabwe: memo – The Zimbabwean

An EU memo prepared for its diplomats ahead of talks in Harare on Thursday said the arrests and abductions of several political activists had “reinforced the impression that the democratic space is being curtained again”.

The memo, seen by Reuters, also said the EU was worried by Harare’s slow pace of political reforms, including the alignment of laws to the constitution that was adopted in 2013.

The EU withdrew budget support to Zimbabwe in 2002 when it imposed sanctions on the late Robert Mugabe’s government over charges of political violence, human rights abuses, vote rigging and violent seizures of white-owned farms.

The talks this week are seen as an important step towards the EU resuming direct financial aid for the economy, which is in the grip of its worst crisis in a decade and worsened by a severe drought.

Timo Olkkonen, the EU’s ambassador in Harare, told acting foreign affairs minister July Moyo and his team at the start of the talks that reforms and inclusive political dialogue would also help with Zimbabwe’s economic recovery.

“These reforms can pave the way for a further strengthened relationship between Zimbabwe and EU based on shared values, the respect of human rights and the sustainable development goals agenda,” Olkkonen said, flanked by several EU diplomats.

Moyo said the talks would deal with all “hard issues” and were supported by President Emmerson Mnangagwa – who last month described EU and U.S. sanctions on Zimbabwe as a “cancer” sapping the economy.

With the economy afflicted by dollar shortages, fuel queues, power-cuts, and soaring prices, Mnangagwa has said restoring ties with the West and multilateral lenders like International Monetary Fund is one of his major priorities.

But, like Mugabe, he blames sanctions for the country’s economic ills and says they are designed to remove the ruling ZANU-PF party from power. Critics also say that since Mnangagwa came to power, he has cracked down on opposition parties.

This week, Zimbabwean police used batons, tear gas and water cannon to beat up and disperse supporters of the main opposition party trying to listen to a speech by their leader.

In its memo, the EU noted Zimbabwe had made progress by deciding not to enforce its empowerment law, which would have required all foreign investors to cede at least 51% of their shares in local operations to Zimbabweans.

The memo also said the interim compensation of white farmers whose land was seized by the government was a positive gesture towards re-opening export markets in the European Union.

In a budget statement last week, Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube set aside $24 million to compensate white farmers, 768 of whom had consented to the interim compensation scheme.

ED Mnangagwa MUST see this, Zimbabweans crying after police brutality – VIDEO
Zimbabwe scraps import controls on maize, wheat flour after drought

Post published in: Featured

Zimbabwe scraps import controls on maize, wheat flour after drought – The Zimbabwean

More than half of Zimbabwe’s population requires food aid following an El Nino-induced drought that also reduced water levels in the biggest hydro dam, leading to rolling power cuts.

Acting information minister Simangaliso Ndlovu said in a post-cabinet press statement that the government would now allow anyone to import maize, maize meal and flour. Import duty on the products had also been removed so they can be brought into the country cheaply. Ndlovu said the measures were temporary.

Millers will no longer be able to buy grain at subsidized prices from the state grain agency, Ndlovu also said, in a move that takes immediate effect.

Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube had said in a budget speech last week the subsidies would end in January, raising concerns that impoverished citizens would face another round of price increases.

“The government will also be unveiling a mechanism for targeted subsidies for basic foodstuffs. This is intended as an additional cushion for vulnerable households and the generality of Zimbabweans,” Ndlovu said.

President Emmerson Mnangagwa has this year moved to remove subsidies on fuel and electricity and introduce a new currency, reforms that have unleashed inflation.

Mnangagwa says the reforms are painful in the short term but will eventually put Zimbabwe on a sound economic footing.

The government has said Zimbabwe needs more than 800,000 tonnes of maize to plug its grain deficit.

EU worried about recent political developments in Zimbabwe: memo
From Zimbabwe to Bolivia: what makes a military coup?

Post published in: Featured

Morning Docket: 11.22.19

* A former White & Williams lawyer has pleaded guilty to stealing portions of settlements from insurance litigation. Hopefully he didn’t defraud his malpractice insurer. [Philadelphia Business Journal]

* A former FBI lawyer is under fire for altering a document related to 2016 surveillance of a Trump campaign adviser. [CNN]

* McDonald’s has been sued over allegations that it has not adequately protected employees from dangerous customers. Never knew McDonald’s are so dangerous, maybe more people should have a Happy Meal. [USA Today]

* The ex-office manager of a lawyer to the stars has been accused of embezzling millions of dollars from her former employer. [New York Post]

* An ex-assistant U.S. attorney has pleaded guilty to stealing thousands of dollars by falsifying time cards. There is a lot of greed in the Morning Docket today! [Commercial Appeal]


Jordan Rothman is a partner of The Rothman Law Firm, a full-service New York and New Jersey law firm. He is also the founder of Student Debt Diaries, a website discussing how he paid off his student loans. You can reach Jordan through email at jordan@rothmanlawyer.com.

From Zimbabwe to Bolivia: what makes a military coup? – The Zimbabwean

Evo Morales, president of Bolivia since 2006, resigned on November 10 following weeks of demonstrations triggered by a disputed election in October. Morales won the election amid allegations that the result was rigged in his favour.

The turning point in Morales’s departure from office was the intervention of Williams Kaliman, commander of the Bolivian armed forces. Speaking at a press conference, Kaliman urged Morales to resign “for the good of our Bolivia”. Morales has since gone into exile in Mexico and the manner of his departure has sparked passionate debate about whether it was tantamount to a military coup.

Two years ago this month, the Zimbabwean military placed former President Robert Mugabe under house arrest. Subsequently, SB Moyo, a major general in the army, accompanied by a high-ranking air force officer, publicly broadcast the message:

This is not a military takeover of government. What the Zimbabwe Defence Forces is doing is to pacify a degenerating social, political and economic situation in our country.

The military insisted it was only targeting criminals around Mugabe who were perpetrating “crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country”. The officers vowed that the situation would return to normal, once they brought the “criminals” to justice. The “criminals” were never brought to justice, but Mugabe resigned from office a week later.

Like the recent case in Bolivia, the Zimbabwean military’s intervention generated animated discussion about whether it was actually a military coup. Some Zimbabwean ruling political elites, international media and political commentators described it as a “military-assisted transition”, “non-coup-coup”, and a “modern” intervention, among other names.

Call it by its name

My new research provides some clarity on how to understand the Zimbabwean military’s action in November 2017: the intervention was a coup bearing substantial commonalities with historical coups in Africa.

The coup happened because Zimbabwe’s generals were dissatisfied with Mugabe’s demotion of those who had fought in the country’s 1970s liberation struggle within the structures of the ruling ZANU PF party. Mugabe’s waning authority also coincided with growing political ambitions of some generals and insecurity in the military’s higher ranks caused by job insecurity and fear of criminal prosecution.

The way the military justified its political manoeuvres were similar to justifications used by other military forces in Africa since the 1960s. Crucially, the military also violated Zimbabwe’s constitution by deploying without the president’s authorisation.

These and other indicators that the military’s action was a coup went largely unrecognised at the time by many commentators and journalists. Mugabe was also a demonised politician, particularly by sections of the Western media and diplomats, who were keen to see him leave political office.

The more coups have become widely unacceptable in Africa since the early 2000s, the more pervasive strategic uses and misuses of the term coup have become. Mugabe’s international adversaries chose not to call the military’s intervention a coup, lest that saved him from an ignominious fall from power. In a volte-face, when Mugabe died in September 2019, Western media and diplomats often described him, in their obituaries and commentaries on his political career, as having lost power in a military coup.

Subjective uses of the word coup risk banalising and misrepresenting a term that has a clear meaning. Patrick McGowan, an accomplished researcher on coups in Africa, has offered a usefully precise definition. Coups are ejections from power of political leaders, through unmistakably unconstitutional means, mainly by part of the army: “Either on their own or in conjunction with civilian elites such as civil servants, politicians and monarchs.” Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup played out along the lines of McGowan’s definition.

Whether events in Bolivia constitute a military coup will become clearer in the coming weeks and months as researchers and investigative journalists uncover the elite politics at play behind the scenes and the exact motivations of Kaliman and his fellow military commanders.

In the aftermath

In Zimbabwe today, the state of affairs looks much like the aftermath of first-time coups seen in African countries such as Benin in 1963 or Uganda in 1971. First-time coups are often extremely popular, so a government that emerges as a result of such a “maiden” coup commands significant legitimacy early on.

But that legitimacy soon fades when pledges to deliver a credible post-coup election and to conduct substantive political, social and economic reforms do not materialise. As legitimacy wanes, authoritarianism re-emerges.

This is a key part of the post-coup situation in Zimbabwe today. Two years on, reforms are cosmetic and proceed slowly. And an election held in July 2018 was not deemed credible by Commonwealth, EU and American election observers. Legitimacy has dwindled and authoritarianism returned, as demonstrated by the military’s strong repression of protests against fuel price increases in January 2019.

In 1970, the South African scholar and anti-apartheid activist Ruth First warned that:

Once the army breaks the first commandment of its training – that armies do not act against their own governments – the initial coup sets off a process… the coup spawns other coups.

Perhaps First is wrong and Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup was simply an aberration, a never-to-be-repeated occurrence now consigned to the history books. But one can never be too certain. The quip by American historian Walter Laqueur rings true: “Coups d’état are annoying not only for practising politicians but also from the point of view of the political scientist”, because they are capricious.The Conversation

Blessing-Miles Tendi, Associate Professor in the Politics of Africa, University of Oxford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

China demands explanation as Zimbabwe understates aid figure by US$133 million

Post published in: Featured

China demands explanation as Zimbabwe understates aid figure by US$133 million – The Zimbabwean

On Tuesday, the embassy issued a statement saying that according to its records the total financial support provided by China in the period was US$133.2 million more than stated.

“The embassy has noted that in the statement [issued by Ncube] … the figure for support provided by China to Zimbabwe is US$3,631,500,” it said. “The actual [figure] is US$136.8 million.”

China extended more than US$2.2 billion worth of loans to Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2017, according to a Washington research institute. Photo: Handout

The embassy said that its figure also did not include other forms of financial support, such as the cost of providing expert help and donations made by the mission itself to local groups.

It urged the Zimbabwean government to “make a comprehensive assessment of the bilateral support figures and accurately reflect the actual situation when formulating the budget statement”.

The embassy said it understood “bilateral development support” to include funding for cooperative projects, cash and the value of donated goods.

Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting responded by saying it was holding talks with Chinese officials.

“The government has noted the query raised by the Chinese embassy regarding aid figures … [and] consultations are under way to establish a common accounting position,” it said.

According to Ncube’s presentation, the

United States

and

were the biggest donors in the nine-month period – each providing US$50 million, followed by the

European Union

 (US$41 million), Japan (US$14.2 million),

Switzerland

(US$6.4 million) and India (US$500,000).

Most of the funding from Western nations came via charities, it said.

Both the US and EU have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe over allegations of government corruption but Beijing has repeatedly backed Harare’s call to have the sanctions lifted.

And while the

International Monetary Fund

and the World Bank have been reluctant to provide financial aid to Zimbabwe, figures from the China Africa Research Initiative at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington show that China extended more than US$2.2 billion worth of loans to Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2017.

The Chinese embassy says Ncube’s figures did not include donations made by the mission itself to local groups. Photo: EPA-EFE

The Chinese embassy says Ncube’s figures did not include donations made by the mission itself to local groups. Photo: EPA-EFE

Share:

The discrepancy in the latest figures is likely to raise questions in Harare, especially from opposition politicians who have accused the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front of misreporting its debts and accepting foreign loans without parliament’s approval.

In October, reports emerged that Chinese backers had suspended US$1.3 billion worth of loans for three major infrastructure projects after

President Emmerson Mnangagwa

’s government diverted US$10 million from an escrow account for an airport expansion project to offset the country’s foreign currency shortage.

The Chinese embassy said at the time that it supported the Zimbabwean government and that the three projects were being carried out in line with agreed-upon plans. However, Zhao said the US$10 million taken from the airport project account had not been returned.

Two years after Mugabe, what’s changed for Zimbabwe? – The Zimbabwean

On November 14 2017, Zimbabwe’s army pulled off a brazen operation: it seized President Robert Mugabe and his family, placing them under house arrest. A week later, on November 21, a frail-looking Mugabe announced his resignation. It was an ignominious end to a decades-long reign.

Ordinary Zimbabweans celebrated. For many, Mugabe was the cause of the country’s economic ruin. In the euphoria of the moment, thousands of jubilant citizens gathered in the capital, Harare. They embraced and took selfies with soldiers — heroes who had brought down the autocratic regime.

Fast-forward two years, and Zimbabweans are again grappling with a crisis.

By International Monetary Fund estimates, annual inflation hit 300% in August, destroying incomes. As living standards have deteriorated, so civil servants have demanded higher salaries. And the country’s doctors are two months into industrial action.

Many rue the decision to support the coup.

“We were used,” says Eric Mubako, who works for a large wholesaler. “They got what they wanted — Mugabe out of office.”

Felix Kabango, a book vendor in Harare, expresses a similar sentiment. “The coup has brought us more suffering … People who have normal jobs don’t earn a decent living,” he tells the FM. “Samp is the new rice in town.”

Informal trader Washington William also expresses frustration. “Things have plunged to new [lows],” he says. “Electricity is expensive, water is not available … transport is too expensive and money is hard to come by.”

Not everyone is convinced of the severity of the situation. Zanu-PF supporter Farai Marapira, for one, believes President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government simply needs more time to turn the economy around.

“Our economy couldn’t [recover] without some fundamentals being addressed,” he explains. “Chief among these was the perennial budget deficit. This was the main issue that caused austerity [measures] to be introduced. Now, ahead of time, austerity is over.”

Upon taking office, Mnangagwa sought to break with Mugabe’s ruinous path, launching an open-for-business policy — an invitation to foreign investors to invest in the country. Under Mugabe, the doors had been shut to investors owing to, among other things, indigenisation legislation that compelled investors to cede controlling equity stakes in businesses, and general disregard for property rights. Mnangagwa pledged to institute political reforms and do things differently.

But the wheels have since come off.

Just last week, finance minister Mthuli Ncube said the government would fall short of the targets in its turnaround programme.

“Refraining from unbudgeted activities and borrowing from the central bank will, therefore, constitute a key obligation for both Treasury and the central bank authorities from 2020,” he said.

Zanu-PF spokesperson Simon Khaya Moyo says the government has been hobbled by problems beyond its control, including drought and sanctions the US and EU imposed on dozens of Zanu-PF members and affiliated entities in 2001. These, he says “block lines of credit for the country”.

But Kipson Gundani, CEO of Africa Roundtable, says that while Mnangagwa inherited some economic problems, his administration has contributed to the downturn. “If you look at the level of money creation since [Mnangagwa] took over, you’ll realise this is a function of the Mnangagwa regime alone,” he says by way of example.

Gift Mugano, an economics professor at Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University, believes the economic reforms were doomed to fail because they were implemented without a “supporting institutional framework”.

“Zimbabwe was trying to model its reforms around Rwanda,” he says. “Rwanda has the Rwanda Development Board, and here they were trying to have the Zimbabwe Investment & Development Agency — and that has not taken off, two years later.”

But it’s not just a faltering economy that’s battering the government’s image. The same security forces who posed for selfies with the masses two years ago have come under fire for human rights abuses.

During nationwide protests in January, sparked by a dramatic fuel price hike, they allegedly used “excessive lethal force” — including firing live ammunition at protesters, killing 17, according to Human Rights Watch. And in August, antiriot police reportedly assaulted hundreds of protesters demonstrating against economic hardship.

For the moment, the security forces seem to be well protected. In his 2020 budget, announced last week, Ncube said the ministry of defence & war veterans would be allocated $3.1bn — the single largest line item.

Given the economic downturn, it may be a necessary move for Mnangagwa. “You can’t starve your boss,” political scientist Innocent Ncube told the Sunday Times this week. “A happy army is a cushion for rulers, especially in a country where there has been a fresh coup.”