Successful IP Associate Checklist: Depth (Part II)

Last week’s column focused on the importance of acquiring broad experience as an IP associate.  This week, it is important that we consider the value of also getting deep experience as early and often as possible as an IP associate. This may seem an ambitious goal, particularly for IP associates who may not feel like control over their careers is fully theirs yet. But with the right ambition, coupled with a willingness to learn, it is possible for IP associates to accumulate both broad and deep experience. It will take some time, however, say at least eight-to-10 years of practice for most. Step one is realizing there are no shortcuts, particularly when it comes to earning deep experience. It helps as well to have some guidance, which I hope this column can provide in at least a small measure.

For even the best IP associate, getting broad and deep experience will not be easy. It could even require moving firms if the mix of matters one is assigned to is too restrictive or superficial. But an ambitious, proactive IP associate can and should be able to get the experience they need, as well as the experience they want, if their goal is a long and satisfying career practicing IP law. Whether their future job is in-house, or as a law firm partner, or as something else is irrelevant. Building your foundation as broadly and deeply as possible — in terms of your technical legal skills, your understanding of legal economics, as well as your marketing skills — is essential to longevity and satisfaction in your career. Since we have already addressed the elements of acquiring breadth of experience as a young (experience-wise) lawyer, we can now focus on what deep experience means for IP lawyers. Because knowing what you need to do is the first step towards doing it.

In some ways, acquiring deep experience can be easier than acquiring broad experience — particularly in a law firm setting. Especially for IP lawyers, who tend to focus on one area of IP practice, sometimes even from the earliest days of their career. Say you are a young trademark associate, working for a firm that does trademark prosecution and enforcement for large multinational clients. There is a good chance you will be spending the overwhelming majority of your time exercising responsibility over the paralegals and more junior lawyers responsible for maintaining the trademark dockets of the firm’s key clients. In addition, you may also be the primary interface between the more junior members of the prosecution team and the relationship partner. 

In that scenario, there is a good chance you will be doing a lot of the same types of things on a daily basis. Your practice would be focused on docket management, responses to office actions, supervising new trademark filings, and perhaps occasionally drafting cease-and-desist letters or co-existence and other trademark-related agreements. By doing so, you will be acquiring deep experience in the area of trademark prosecution — which is a good thing. To fully reach the depths of experience in that area as much as possible, however, you should be looking at the delta between your experience and that of the senior lawyers you work with. Where is there is a gap between your experience and theirs? That is precisely the area of depth you should be striving to achieve — and the types of experiences you should be aiming to acquire.

Let’s make things concrete, using our trademark prosecution associate as an example. At a certain point, any young lawyer will get comfortable with a certain task, provided they are given enough chances to produce a similar work product. Let’s say our associate is at the stage where they have sent out a dozen cease-and-desist letters to infringers of the client’s trademarks. Or 10 takedown notices to Amazon, seeking to remove infringing listings. At that point of that associate’s career, we may be able to say that they have acquired deep experience in those specific aspects of a trademark practice.

The trick, however, is not to get complacent about your depth of experience. Ever. That same trademark associate may be sending out cease-and-desist letters. But are they the ones negotiating with opposing counsel when the response letter comes in? Or are they handing the matter off to a more experienced lawyer at that point? If the latter is true, then in order to acquire deeper experience, our trademark associate must find a way to get a chance to negotiate with opposing counsel at some point. 

The trick, therefore, is to focus on what more senior lawyers are doing that you are not yet doing. And if you are the most experienced lawyer at a particular level at your firm, you should be looking at lawyers outside your firm to see what you should be doing to get deeper experience. It never ends. But that is part of what makes IP law so interesting and fulfilling. There is always something to learn, at least if you have the humility to realize that more learning is something that can benefit you. 

Ultimately, IP associates who thoughtfully compare their experience levels with their more senior colleagues — and find ways to position themselves to close the experience gap — are much more likely to acquire deep experience in the areas of IP practice they find themselves focusing on. While acquiring deep experience is never easy and often fraught with setbacks and mistakes along the way, there is no substitute for actually getting that experience if the goal is to know what you are doing as a 40-year-old lawyer. Because no IP lawyer wants to end up well into their career with limited and superficial experience. So aim wide and aim deep, so that your hard work early on pays off later.

Please feel free to send comments or questions to me at gkroub@kskiplaw.com or via Twitter: @gkroub. Any topic suggestions or thoughts are most welcome. 


Gaston Kroub lives in Brooklyn and is a founding partner of Kroub, Silbersher & Kolmykov PLLC, an intellectual property litigation boutique, and Markman Advisors LLC, a leading consultancy on patent issues for the investment community. Gaston’s practice focuses on intellectual property litigation and related counseling, with a strong focus on patent matters. You can reach him at gkroub@kskiplaw.com or follow him on Twitter: @gkroub.

Lessons from Robert Mugabe’s misrule and how not to run a country – The Zimbabwean

Those that have experienced the misrule and tyranny of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe have a duty to correct the false eulogies and hagiographies now being peddled about that country’s former president. And the only lesson to learn form Mugabe is how not to run a country, writes Kevin Malunga

The manner and place of Robert Mugabe’s death is of particular significance.

While his compatriots wallow in decaying health facilities, he chose to die in that well known citadel of efficiency, Singapore.

As I walked around (as a tourist) in sweltering Marina Bay during a convenient flight layover in Singapore last Sunday, Mugabe lay dying in the swish and world class Gleneagles Hospital somewhere in the vicinity.

According to rates published on the hospital’s website, in Singapore dollars, and based on Mugabe’s estimated recent 150-day booking at R80 500 per day, his stay would have cost just over R12m.

The undisputed narrative of his entire presidency has been that his bills are footed by the state. If the state didn’t pay this bill the question must be asked: where did he get the money? As I took photographs of the glistening, swanky skyscrapers and impeccably clean streets of Singapore, I wondered why he had not chosen to be treated and die at home, as most patriotic statesmen would have done, especially those credited with liberating their countries?

I received my answer as to why he shunned his own facilities very quickly.

Junior doctors have been on strike since March of this year and, for about 20 years, most of the country’s public health facilities, from major referral hospitals such as Parirenyatwa Hospital in Harare to Mpilo Hospital in Bulawayo to the small regional hospitals and municipal clinics, have faced endless shortages of drugs and equipment, power cuts and food shortages.

So if Mugabe had been treated at one of his own country’s facilities he would long have been dead probably at 75 and not 95.

Why Mugabe was a despot

Predictably the death of Mugabe has brought with it much excitement and reignited interest in a man who is considered Zimbabwe’s founding father. For most Zimbabweans though that mantle is shared with, and some would say actually belongs to, the late ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, who wasn’t such a polarising figure.

Much has been written about Mugabe’s legacy in the past three days, with a few obituaries being repetitive hagiographies which attempts to sugarcoat the brutal legacy of a man who publicly declared that he had “degrees in violence”.

Most have been frank assessments of a flawed legacy. While Mugabe has guaranteed himself a place in the annals of history as a liberator, he has also secured an ignominy as a despotic head of state who shirked all forms of accountability.

The Zimbabwe that Mugabe inherited in 1980 was highly industrialised, with a highly productive industrial sector that assembled cars and made the finest clothes along with all manner of consumer goods for the rest of the world.

Alois Mlambo in his seminal 2017 article entitled From an Industrial Powerhouse to a Nation of Vendors: Over Two Decades of Economic Decline and Deindustrialization in Zimbabwe 1990–2015 traces the collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy over two decades. In summary he posits that from being the second most industrialised country in Sub-Saharan Africa at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s economy declined rapidly to a point where the country ranks among the poorest economic performers in the region.

The three pillars which had underpinned the country’s vibrant economy, namely agriculture, mining and manufacturing, suffered greatly from poor government policy choices, resulting in the near collapse of each of the sectors and massive unemployment.

As a result, he observes, an estimated 90% of the Zimbabwean population was unemployed by 2015, a figure which holds firm. People are forced to eke out a living in the informal sector, mostly through vending of second-hand clothes and other basic items. With regard to the manufacturing sector specifically, the sector had all but collapsed by 2015, as companies either folded or relocated to escape the country’s harsh economic climate.

Mugabe a victim of Western conspiracies?

There is a Utopian, romantic fantasy which mostly reposes among YouTube and Twitter ideologues who believe that Mugabe was sabotaged by sanctions for his anti-Western stance.

Zimbabwe fell apart because of a range of factors, but I would argue that the Mugabe government is 80% responsible for economic and socio-political decline, with the rest the result of external factors such as capital flight and crippling debt.

There are three reasons for Zimbabwe’s collapse.

Firstly, the ill-conceived smash-and-grab approach to land reform was Mugabe’s knee-jerk response to a bruising defeat in a constitutional referendum in 2000. I would use the term “land reform” if the programme had yielded positive results and had not been used to enrich the inner circle of Mugabe and ZANU-PF.

To this day large swathes of highly productive farms remain fallow and overgrown by bush. Granted, there are some success stories among new farmers, but the overall statistics from various monitoring bodies point to an increase in transfer of land ownership but a decline in production.

Granted, there were commitments made in terms of the Lancaster House agreement in 1979, which Mugabe may have been correct to argue had not been honoured by the British. Those who defend Mr Mugabe throw the numbers about that seem impressive.

According to the 2010 UN Zimbabwe Country Report, a total of 10 816 886 hectares had been acquired since 2000, compared to the 3 498 444 purchased from voluntary sellers between 1980 and 1998. This would have been laudable if had not come with so much hunger and suffering highlighted by the frequent grain shortages during Mugabe’s tenure.

Secondly, the independence of state institutions was desecrated. The Reserve Bank was treated like a personal piggy bank by the first family which would use state resources to finance shopping junkets to the same Western capitals they condemned in searing rhetoric.

In fact, so frequent and so ostentatious were such shopping trips that the former first lady, Grace Mugabe, was dubbed “Gucci Grace”. She later acquired a high-speed PhD at the University of Zimbabwe under circumstances that are still questioned by the university community.

The judiciary was also not spared. In 2001, during the time of the land grabs, independent judges led by former Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay were asked to resign, ostensibly because there was a perception of bias on their part. The moment they left, Mugabe packed the courts with judges deemed sympathetic to him.

Air Zimbabwe, a fully functional airline, also fell victim to the constant commandeering of planes by Mugabe, who could have scheduled commercial flights altered if he needed a lift. A fleet of almost 20 in 1980 was down to three verifiable aircraft in 2017, two of which have allegedly gone missing. And at the time of his ouster, in November 2018, Mugabe’s son-in-law was conveniently serving as the airline’s chief operations officer. Almost like what happens at a South African state-owned company.

During Mugabe’s tenure, the notion of “independent state institutions” became a misnomer, as anyone who dared exhibit any traits of independent thinking, as we often do in South Africa’s oversight institutions, lived to regret it or didn’t live at all.

Thirdly, Mugabe always had to be in charge. Anyone who thought differently had to be eliminated. After winning independence in 1980, Nkomo and ZAPU soon became his enemy. He was brutal, often threatening to “crush” his enemies. And he did not mean “crush” in a metaphorical sense. He meant it literally.

No apology or acknowledgement of the Matabeleland masscres

There are ample examples of where Mugabe threatened to destroy Nkomo and his comrades, including my own father, Sydney Malunga, who was jailed on spurious grounds.

What followed in the 1980s was a genocide known as Gukurahundi, which means “the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains”. During this orgy of violence, an estimated 20 000 civilians were killed in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. Many gruesome descriptions of how it was carried out abound, including bayoneting of babies in of their mother’s wombs, dumping of bodies in mass graves and rape.

When pressed to account for this violence Mugabe, who had earlier bragged about having degrees in violence, referred to Gukurahundi as “a moment of madness”. He never apologised, right up until his comfortable death at Gleneagles Hospital in Singapore.

The rise of Morgan Tsvangirai and the Movement for Democratic Change from 1999 presented the most formidable challenge for Mugabe and he responded to it with brute force, breaking every rule in the book to stay in power. He rigged the 2002 election to remain in power and then lost the election six years later, with Tsvangirai capitulating to form a Government of National Unity. More than 250 people lost their lives in the subsequent violence.

Mugabe, though, was a liberation fighter. Some have sought to take that away from him, arguing that he only joined up after ZANU was formed in August 1963 by Ndabaningi Sithole, Enos Nkala, Leopold Takawira and others.

Whatever his flaws in strategy, Mugabe, as a liberation fighter, was resolute and very clear in his mission, namely to topple white minority rule which relegated Zimbabweans to third class citizens in their own country.

But his power hungry, controlling personality was always bound to be a liability. It soon manifested itself in the form of a personality cult which was propped up by his inner circle and, in turn, the country. The result was that no one challenged him when he ran the country into the ground. In fact, he was often cheered on. The result was a 37-year grip on power which was comically mediocre at the end, with him sleeping in meetings and reading the same speech twice as he was past the age of 90.

The great educator?

The roll-out of free education after 1980 is held as testament to Mugabe’s own love for education.

But that is a highly contested legacy because, although many hate to admit it, the uncomfortable truth is that the brutal Ian Smith regime bequeathed to Mugabe flawless socio-economic infrastructure that included good schools, roads, agriculture and industry.

Mugabe had no plausible excuse to mess it up.

In fact, Julius Mwalimu Nyerere, president of Tanzania, warned him that he was inheriting the jewel of Africa and he better not mess it up. All he had to do was take the baton and take the country to greater heights. He didn’t. Instead he crushed the baton and turned it into a weapon to suppress political dissent, killing and maiming along the way.

As the misinformed and feigned tributes for this highly compromised leader continue to flow we, who know better, who watched the decline of the land of our birth, cannot be told that this evil man was a good man.

We cannot be told to forget that he led a project that murdered thousands and displaced millions from the land of their birth.

We cannot be told that a power hungry megalomaniac was a pious Pan-African patriot or an economic reformer.

Those of us who have a lived experience of Mugabe’s Zimbabwe have a duty to ensure that the false eulogies delivered in the name of Pan-Africanism are corrected.

He was a formidable liberation fighter, but a terrible head of state and an even worse democrat.

As someone who has worked for seven years to assert good governance and accountability in South Africa as deputy public protector (with a degree of success against formidable odds) I can safely say that the overarching lesson that African leaders and Africans in general should learn from Mugabe’s life is how not to run a country.

His attitude to diversity of opinion, fair elections, human rights, ethnic inclusion, economic policy, race relations and land reform are certainly not to be emulated.

** Advocate Kevin Sifiso Malunga was born and raised in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. He is outgoing deputy public protector and writes in his personal capacity.

FALSE PROMISE Zimbabwe’s EcoCash woes show dangers of early reliance on mobile money

Post published in: Featured

FALSE PROMISE Zimbabwe’s EcoCash woes show dangers of early reliance on mobile money – The Zimbabwean

A woman walks past a shop accepting EcoCash mobile phone payments for goods in Harare, Zimbabwe, February 20, 2019, REUTERS/Philimon Bulawayo

The country, which according to the IMF has the second-largest informal economy in the world behind only Bolivia, seems like an ideal test-bed for mobile money. In the fourth quarter of 2018, mobile money was used for 85% of all retail transactions in Zimbabwe. EcoCash, a subsidiary of EcoNet Wireless, the country’s leading mobile phone operator, is the dominant provider.

The growth of EcoCash was driven by its ability to extend financial inclusion by drawing in previously unbanked customers.

But recurrent power blackouts and food shortages in the context of a currency crisis are now showing the fragility of that model.

During blackouts, mobile operators need to resort to backup power generators, which makes their services much more expensive to provide. High transaction fees and a government tax all increase the difficulties facing users.

  • Piers Pigou, senior consultant for southern Africa with the International Crisis Group, says that massive reliance on EcoCash has been “visibly shaken by a compromised infrastructure and power supply.”
  • The use of alternative power supplies, such as diesel generators, to keep the network running is unsustainable, while installing solar options is costly and will take time, he says.
  • Pigou has repeatedly heard complaints that the EcoCash fee structure has exploited a situation that has left Zimbabweans with “no feasible alternative either in terms of securing physical cash or alternative electronic services.”

Mobile money and food shortages

According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS) in August, food supplies across Zimbabwe are now significantly below average, especially for maize grain. Mobile money is doing little to improve access to food, with mobile money prices up to 40% higher than cash prices.

  • FEWS says that in parts of Zimbabwe, the 2018/19 rainfall season was among the worst on record.
  • Cash shortages have prompted an increase in the use of mobile money transfers for payments.

And mobile money is worsening rather than improving matters: “the high and increasing service charges imposed by retailers, traders, and service providers is further eroding household purchasing power.”

  • In some cases, FEWS says, poor households are resorting to bartering for food.

John BaRoss is the founder of Finnclude, a non-profit grouping of financial services professionals which aims to promote financial inclusion. He says that EcoCash’s woes show that it’s “premature to push any population” into going totally cashless due to the ongoing risk of power interruptions.

  • The challenge, BaRoss says, is to find a balance between using the capacity of technology to on-board the unbanked and “herding populations into cashless societies which can become potential cyber-slaughter-houses” that could descend into anarchy.

Infrastructure

For fintech to realise its potential in Africa, policymakers need to first fill the “large existing hard infrastructure gap”, Amadou Sy, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes in a paper in May.

  • Improved governance of public utilities to ensure reliable electricity and internet services is essential, Sy writes.
  • That, in turn, means reducing the risks involved for foreign investors in African infrastructure projects, Sy argues.
  • Operations and maintenance, and not just construction, must be built into electricity infrastructure projects, he writes.

Bottom Line: Mobile money is of little use in a crisis unless sustained infrastructure investment has prepared the way.

Food Insecurity Information bulletin – The Zimbabwean

As a result of El-Nino induced poor rainfall season, Cyclone Idai and economic shocks, Zimbabwe is currently going through a number of humanitarian challenges. The drought condition that started in 2018 continue to affect large numbers of population both in rural and urban areas. Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) 2019 Rural Livelihoods Assessment Report estimates that 5.5 million people in the rural areas are vulnerable and are at risk of food insecurity.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for Zimbabwe estimates that 2.29 million people have been facing severe acute food insecurity since June. The IPC further projects that 3.58 million people will face severe acute food insecurity during the October – December 2019 period, with 2,475,000 people in crisis (IPC phase3) and 1,105,000 people in emergency (IPC phase4) situation. Furthermore, the Government of Zimbabwe estimated that about 2.2 million people in urban areas are also food insecure. According to WFP, 2.3 million people in rural Zimbabwe were in “crisis emergency mode” and need food aid.

While Zimbabwe was responding to the food insecurity crisis, Cyclone Idai made landfall in the port city of Beira, Mozambique in March this year. Idai weakened to a tropical storm and moved to Zimbabwe causing heavy rains for many days and triggering floods which swept away hundreds of houses in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country. Cyclone Idai caused damage and destruction to harvests and the Government declared a state of disaster in affected areas. Chimanimani, Chipinge and Mutare districts (Manicaland Province) were the most affected. According to reports, 172 fatalities had been confirmed, 4,884 people displaced, 327 missing and at least 53,999 people are believed to have been affected. Cyclone affected areas are also significantly affected by the drought and the deteriorating macro-economic situation.

Moreover, the current macroeconomic and political challenges in the country have contributed to further deterioration of the situation. Rising inflation has resulted in prices of essential food items such sugar, cooking oil and rice to increase by hundred per cent since June 2019. Power cuts of up to 18 hours a day and reduced availability of food, fuel and medicines make people even more vulnerable and in need of urgent support.
A shortage of liquid cash in the country has resulted in the use other payment methods such as eco-cash, smart cards etc., to purchase essential goods, adding further frustrations.

FALSE PROMISE Zimbabwe’s EcoCash woes show dangers of early reliance on mobile money
Zimbabwe’s Mugabe to lie in state at 2 different stadiums

Post published in: Agriculture

Zimbabwe’s Mugabe to lie in state at 2 different stadiums – The Zimbabwean

Mugabe, an ex-guerrilla chief who took power in 1980 when the African country shook off white minority rule and ruled for decades, died on Friday at a hospital in Singapore. He was 95.

Information Minister Monica Mutsvangwa said in a statement that the government has dispatched Vice President Kembo Mohadi and other senior officials and family members to Singapore to accompany Mugabe’s body home.

The body will arrive in the country “any time on Wednesday,” she said. The body will lie in state at Harare’s Rufaro Stadium and then at the National Sports Stadium, also in the capital, she said.

Mutsvangwa said Mugabe would be buried on Sunday but she did not say where he will be buried, saying more updates will be provided “as more information on the program trickles in.”

Presidential spokesman George Charamba and deputy information minister Energy Mutodi at the weekend said the former authoritarian ruler would be buried at the National Heroes’ Acre, a monumental burial site reserved for people viewed by the ruling ZANU-PF party as having served the country with distinction during and after the 1970s war of independence. Mugabe’s first wife, Sally, is buried at Heroes’ Acre and a vacant plot reserved for the former president is next to her grave.

However, family spokesman Leo Mugabe, a nephew of the former president, said over the weekend that burial arrangements have not yet been finalized. This has prompted speculation of a rift between the government and members of Mugabe’s family, who want him to be buried at his rural home in Kutama, about 85 kilometers (52 miles) southwest of Harare.

Leo Mugabe told reporters that Mugabe had died “a very bitter man” because he felt betrayed by the former political and military leaders who were his allies for close to four decades before they forced him to resign in November, 2017.

He dismissed reports that Mugabe had refused to be buried at the Heroes’ Acre, but also refused to say where the burial will take place.

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Robert Mugabe: a complex legacy – The Zimbabwean

There is a deep fascination with him in the UK. Despite the drama of Brexit, his death was top news across the papers and TV channels. I was taken aback  when I saw his image on a massive news screen at King’s Cross station in London announcing his death. Once feted by the Queen, now almost universally reviled, what is it about the dramatic tragedy in the narrative of a transition from ‘hero’ to ‘villain’ that so captivates people, but also blinds us to the complexities of history?

This complexity, and the importance of a deeper history, comes across in some of the better reflections on his death. There is much that’s already been written, but there are a few articles that have stood out for me. The piece ‘Mugabe: a man of more than one story’, for example, highlights the multiple threads of a complex narrative, as does Alex Magaisa’s BSR piece, which urges us not to forget the victims of Mugabe’s regime. Perhaps surprisingly, but like many Zimbabweans of his age, Tendai Biti, once tortured by the regime, says ‘I don’t feel bitterness. I feel indebtedness’. The missed opportunities of the liberation are reflected on in many pieces, including by Fadzayi Mahere, who argues that he ‘killed the freedoms he had worked so hard for’. Roger Southall, meanwhile, reflects on his legacy alongside other liberation party leaders in the region, pointing out that he is ‘as divisive in death as he was in life’. A typically quirky take comes from Percy Zvomuya focusing on deeper family backgrounds and historical contingencies in the piece, Robert Mugabe: the leader who shouldn’t have been. And my favourite of all is the 2017 article by Everjoice Win, widely recirculated in the past days, which captured the moment around the ‘coup’, but seems even more apposite today, and reflects the feelings of many.

Why has Mugabe’s passing attracted so much attention, particularly internationally? Some while ago, Miles Tendi, a Zimbabwean scholar and professor at Oxford University, pointed to the roots of the media fascination with Mugabe in the UK:

“Mugabe is the British media’s bogeyman for everything that is wrong with Africa and one can never escape the naked reality that the fallout from ZANU-PF’s violent eviction of white farmers in Zimbabwe from 2000 onwards, many of whom were British descendants, continues to attract a disproportionate amount of international focus compared to other more severe crises…”

In a similar vein, back in 2008, the renowned Ugandan scholar, Mahmood Mamdani pointed out in his controversial essay for the London Review of Books:

“It is hard to think of a figure more reviled in the West than Robert Mugabe. Liberal and conservative commentators alike portray him as a brutal dictator…. There is no denying Mugabe’s authoritarianism, or his willingness to tolerate and even encourage the violent behaviour of his supporters…. [but this] gives us little sense of how Mugabe has managed to survive. For he has ruled not only by coercion but by consent, and his land reform measures, however harsh, have won him considerable popularity, not just in Zimbabwe but throughout southern Africa. In any case, the preoccupation with his character does little to illuminate the socio-historical issues involved”.

Mugabe’s death reminded me of the screening of Simon Bright’s film, Robert Mugabe… What Happened? at Sussex some years ago. An earlier blog observed that it is a powerful documentary, using fascinating archival footage, together with interviews with key figures in the opposition movement in Zimbabwe. It tells a sympathetic, historically-informed, but still highly critical, story about the man. With Mugabe gone, it is well worth watching again.

It is considerably more nuanced than much of the mainstream commentary that has emerged following his death. This typically follows the hero-to-villain storyline, often attached to the positive then evil influence of his two wives, Sally and Grace. Land reform in 2000 is often marked as the turning point, with the story of land reform being given the usual, misinformed gloss of disaster, turning Zimbabwe from ‘breadbasket to basket case’, the result of party cronies being given the land, and poorly qualified poor farmers making matters worse. I have largely ceased to engage with these narratives, coming from many who really should know much better by now, and I am not going to rehearse the argument again that these views are grossly misinformed here. There are now 360 blogs on Zimbabweland, and many more research articles besides, which together give a more nuanced story.

Too often in mainstream accounts, the role of the British in the Mugabe story is glossed over. Yet the British government’s complicity – for example in the silence about the massacres by the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland in the 1980s – was significant. The failure of the British to push a more complete settlement at Lancaster House in 1979, and of course the diplomatic gaffe of the infamous ‘Clare Short letter’ in 1997, are all part of the picture. The resentments and hostility rose to a head in the late 1990s, as Mugabe and Blair locked horns. And, while commentaries are critical of white Rhodesia and Ian Smith’s UDI rule, they often do not explore the failure of a more complete reconciliation and integration of whites in the new Zimbabwe following Independence.

At our film screening panel discussion back in 2012, this was an issue tackled by Denis Norman, who served in Mugabe’s cabinet after Independence, and came from being the head of the white Commercial Farmers’ Union. He conceded that more could have been done back then, especially on land reform. There was an unwritten political contract between white farmers and the new state that whites could farm and make money, but not be involved in opposition politics, and land reform, despite the liberation war rhetoric, was parked. This fell apart with the launch of the MDC, and the support of white farmers of an opposition movement. The failure of the donor-brokered land conference in 1998 was a key moment, as no side was willing to compromise. The land invasions that followed were then perhaps inevitable.

As a number of the more sophisticated commentaries highlight, countering the hero-to-villain narrative means emphasising the continuities in the way politics have been played out in Zimbabwe since Independence, with Mugabe at the centre. A lack of tolerance of alternative views, violence and oppression have all been a consistent pattern, and stretch into the the pre-Independence period and the nationalist struggle (and indeed in particular the ‘struggles within the struggle’). A transition from militarised, violent liberation war struggle to peaceful, democratic governance did not happen.

It is not a question of seeing a golden age of the 1980s to contrast with the period since 2000. While there have been important changes, there are also repeated patterns. This is why the much-hailed 2017 ‘coup’ was doomed to failure, and perhaps no surprise that the Mnangagwa regime has seen much continuity, notably in violent repression of opposition forces. This is of course why a democratic transition, with a strong constitutional base, remains so critical; to shed once and for all this violent history.

In assessing Mugabe’s complex legacy, the positive legacies of massively improved education and health services for all in the 1980s and land redistribution to smallholders, especially post-2000, have to balanced against the persistent use of violence, gross economic mismanagement and the failure to develop a democratic state. As opposition politician, Tendai Biti, noted on his death, Mugabe was a ‘coalition of controversies’.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

Photo credit: President of Zimbabwe Addresses UN General Assembly, 25 Sep 2009. UN Photo/Marco Castro. www.unmultimedia.org/photo/ via flickr)

Moyo expected Old Mutual to “respect the rule of law”
Robert Mugabe died a ‘very bitter’ man, nephew says

Post published in: Featured

Robert Mugabe died a ‘very bitter’ man, nephew says – The Zimbabwean

Robert Mugabe was ousted by a military coup in 2017 after nearly four decades in power

Robert Mugabe’s nephew has said the former Zimbabwean leader died a “very bitter” man.

Mr Mugabe, who died aged 95 last week, led Zimbabwe for nearly four decades until he was ousted by a coup in 2017.

“Imagine people you trusted – people that were guarding you, looking after you – [turning] against you,” Leo Mugabe said.

“He was very bitter and it dented his legacy,” he told the BBC from his uncle’s rural home.

“It was not an easy thing for him to take,” he added.

Initially praised for broadening access to health and education for the black majority, Mr Mugabe later used violence against his political opponents and presided over Zimbabwe’s economic ruin.

He was removed from office after he fired his deputy, with many fearing he was preparing for his wife, Grace Mugabe, to succeed him.

His former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, then became president after the army intervened and forced Mr Mugabe to step down.

The long-serving president’s legacy has been the subject of fierce debate since he died.

A man buys a daily newspaper at a stand on the streets of Nairobi following Robert Mugabe's deathRobert Mugabe’s legacy has been fiercely debated since his death in Singapore last week

When will the funeral take place?

Mr Mugabe’s death at a hospital in Singapore on Friday followed a long illness. He had been receiving medical care in the city since April.

Close relatives and government officials have travelled to the city and his remains are due to be returned to Zimbabwe on Wednesday.

His body is expected to be taken to his home village, which is about 80km (50 miles) west of the capital Harare, for an overnight wake.

His official funeral will take place on Saturday at the 60,000 capacity National Sports Stadium in Harare, according to government officials.

Zimbabwean and global reaction to Mugabe’s death

But there has reportedly been disagreement over where Mr Mugabe will be buried.

Some of his relatives want him to be buried at his rural homestead in the village of Kutama in Mashonaland West province. But government officials have pushed for a burial at a shrine near Harare.

Most of Zimbabwe’s national heroes – those who fought against white-minority rule – are buried at the Heroes’ Acre shrine just outside of the city.

“The [traditional] chiefs will bury him on Sunday, where I don’t know,” Leo Mugabe told AFP news agency on Monday.

If Mr Mugabe is buried at his rural home, it would represent a final snub to the comrades he believed betrayed him, the BBC’s Shingai Nyoka in Harare says.

Who was Robert Mugabe?

He was born on 21 February 1924 in what was then Southern Rhodesia – a British colony, run by its white minority.

After criticising the government of Rhodesia in 1964 he was imprisoned for more than a decade without trial.

Once released, he headed to Mozambique, from where he directed guerrilla raids into Rhodesia but he was also seen as a skilled negotiator.

Political agreements to end the crisis resulted in the new independent Republic of Zimbabwe.

Mugabe: From war hero to resignation

With his high profile in the independence movement, Mr Mugabe secured an overwhelming victory in the republic’s first election in 1980.

But over his decades in power, international perceptions soured. Mr Mugabe assumed the reputation of a “strongman” leader – all-powerful, ruling by threats and violence but with a strong base of support. An increasing number of critics labelled him a dictator.

He famously declared that only God could remove him from office.

He was forced into sharing power in 2009 amid economic collapse, installing rival Morgan Tsvangirai as prime minister.

But in 2017, amid concerns that he was grooming his wife Grace as his successor, the army – his long-time ally – turned against the president and forced him to step down.

Robert Mugabe: a complex legacy
Zimbabwe begins national mourning for hero-turned-despot Mugabe

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