ZANU-PF versus MDC-A : Chairing of Parliamentary Committees – The Zimbabwean

ZANU-PF versus MDC-A : Chairing of Parliamentary Committees

Neither House has been sitting since the Budget was presented on Thursday the 14th, but MPs had a full programme of post-Budget meetings for last week.  The post-Budget Seminar was on Monday 18th November and for the rest of the week there were Portfolio Committee meetings.  These were for post-Budget consultations with relevant Ministries and stakeholders in preparation for the debate on the 2020 National Budget, which is due to resume in the National Assembly on Tuesday 26th November.

The scheduled Portfolio Committee meetings were, however, interrupted by further moves in the ZANU PF campaign against MDC-A MPs in retaliation for absenting themselves from Parliamentary events at which the President was present – such as the opening of Parliament and the Budget Speech.

As noted in Bill Watch 62/2019 [link], after the Budget presentation in the National Assembly on 14th November, a resolution was passed in the absence of MDC-A members, to establish a Committee of Privileges to look into alleged contempt of Parliament by MDC-A MPs.

The next day, ZANU PF committee members forced the abandonment of an important Public Accounts Committee  [PAC] meeting because they objected to the PAC chairperson, MDC-A MP Tendai Biti.

ZANU PF Chief Whip Pupurai Togarepi was later reported as warning that what happened at the PAC meeting was “just a teaser to what they should expect, I can guarantee you that no committee which is being chaired by an MDC-A member will proceed until they recognize President Mnangagwa”.

Targeting of MDC-A Committee Chairpersons is Continuing

Last week the same tactics were employed by ZANU PF committee members against MDC-A committee chairpersons, not always successfully.

On 20th November, in the Environment and Tourism Portfolio Committee meeting, ZANU PF members objected to MDC-A Consilia Chinanzvavana presiding and voted for Robson Mavenyengwa of ZANU PF to preside in her stead; MDC-A committee members present were outvoted 15-3.

Also on the 20th, in the Health and Child Care Portfolio Committee meeting, ZANU PF committee members objected to MDC-A’s Dr Ruth Labode chairing the meeting, but were outvoted by MDC-A members.

On Friday 22nd November a PAC meeting was hearing evidence from Mr Morland, head of Fertiliser, Seed and Grain Ltd, on payments for the Command Agriculture Programme when two ZANU-PF MPs Hon Nduna and Zhou, arriving late, caused such a disturbance that the committee was unable to proceed with its hearing.

Can a Committee Remove its Chairperson? – No

After her ouster from the chair of her committee, Hon Chinanzvavana commented that her ouster had been unconstitutional, not procedural and contrary to Parliament’s Standing Rules and Orders.

Hon Chinanzvavana was correct.

Section 139 of the Constitution states that Parliamentary proceedings must be regulated by Standing Rules and Orders which are drawn up by the Houses on the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders [CSRO].

According to the National Assembly’s Standing Rules and Orders, the chairpersons of all Portfolio Committees must be appointed by the CSRO – Standing Order 18.  The chairing and composition of Committees must take into account the number of MPS from each party in Parliament and also gender representation.

It is only if no chairperson has been appointed [which is not applicable in present circumstances] or if the appointed chairperson is absent, that committee members may elect a temporary chairperson for themselves [Select Committee Rules, rule 8].

It follows that only the appointing authority [the CSRO] may remove a chairperson from office, whether temporarily or permanently.

Veritas makes every effort to ensure reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied.

Open Committee Meetings Monday 25th to Friday 29th November
What does pro-poor rural development mean for Zimbabwe?

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What does pro-poor rural development mean for Zimbabwe? – The Zimbabwean

Any rural policy must take a more differentiated view, and these blogs have offered some data from four communal areas in Masvingo province, contrasting them with their A1 resettlement neighbours. Given the insights offered, what are the implications for rural development policy?

The previous blogs have shown that, on average, communal area households across Masvingo province are asset and income poor, with little surplus produced on-farm, and with limited engagement in agricultural markets, even in relatively good years. Reliance on remittances, off-farm informal work and hand-outs from the state and NGOs is central. There are a few who are making it, but very few; most people are very poor, and with limited land areas and a lack of money circulating locally, no prospects for local level accumulation. For the next generation, without jobs and with no land, the prospects are bleak. This means that focused social protection measures on those most vulnerable will remain a priority for the communal areas.

What should development agencies focus on in the communal areas?

Given this, what then should the state and development agencies do? Should they simply be a site for humanitarian aid, keeping people alive, hoping that there will be an exit to other areas, ‘liquidating’ these areas in favour of the urban economy?

I am not so pessimistic about rural development, but communal areas’ futures rely centrally on the prospects of the wider economy. If this takes off again and jobs are created, money will flow back to the rural areas to support elderly relatives and younger children, and the need for external aid will decline. Even with aid, reliance on external sources of income, including remittances, is far more important, as our data show.

This has been the pattern since when the communal areas were created as ‘reserves’ through colonial legislation. They were never meant to be vibrant, productive places for entrepreneurship and accumulation; they were meant to be providers of adult (usually male) labour, and a cheap route to providing social security for those not in the workforce. But of course since the economic reforms of the 1990s, the labour market has changed, and there are no longer ‘jobs’ available, just work, often temporary, informal and precarious. Currently, there is very little even of that, as the economy tanks further. Turning the economy around is the most significant rural development intervention of all.

Rethinking rural development: a territorial approach

Beyond this, how to think about rural development? As mentioned in previous blogs, the land reform got rid of the divisive dualism of the old order, creating a new more mixed agrarian structure, with a mixture of land sizes and ownership arrangements. Communal areas must be thought of as part of this; indeed in area and population terms, the dominant part.

With A1 (smallholder) and A2 (medium-scale) resettlements next to or nearby all our communal area sites, their presence is felt. This is in relation to exchanges of food, labour, grazing, technology, skills and so on. There are much more fluid boundaries than before (although of course conflicts exist) and links to urban areas are often less to the large metropolitan centres of Harare, Bulawayo and Masvingo, but more to the smaller towns and growth centres embedded in rural areas, such as Mvurwi, Mazowe, Chatsworth, Gutu Mpandawanda, Ngundu and Chikombedzi.

It’s in the rural small towns where labour is being employed, crops are being sold, processing is taking place, services are supplied and shops and businesses are expanding. The growth is intermittent and fragile, and faltering currently with the latest turn in the on-going economic crisis. But looking to these areas is vital, along with the A1 and A2 areas where labour is employed, tractors hired and grazing and other contracts are issued.

Rural development investment that benefits the communal areas may have to be focused on these areas, supplying credit and finance, support entrepreneurs and training in new skills, as part of a wider territorial plan. Our data show that, in particular, the A1 areas are richer, more productive, investing and accumulating more, but, crucially, they can also drive development elsewhere through providing employment, services, natural resources, equipment and so on.

For development agencies, this means getting beyond the communal area project focus to a wider rural development strategy. There are too many chicken or nutrition garden projects in communal areas that are going nowhere. They may alleviate poverty at the margins, but are more palliative than transformative, and most collapse when the donor leaves. Beyond the clearly-needed social protection support for extremely vulnerable groups, and some of the basic infrastructure investment that’s sorely needed in the absence of state support, much communal area agricultural development is a waste of resources.

I say this reluctantly as I was involved in many communal area projects in the 1980s and 90s, but having seen how agricultural development can occur following redistribution of land, I now believe we were operating in such a constrained setting that it could never have made a difference. A wider view, with a post-land reform economic geography, however, opens up many opportunities.

The role of the state and donors has to be enabling: encouraging enterprises, facilitating linkages and improving basic infrastructure (roads, mobile phone signals and so on) that economic development relies on. Fewer chicken projects, more road building, and then let people get on with it. External assistance can also help with planning, and particularly the revitalisation of capacity in the local state.

This must link economic development to land administration and governance, for example, and focus especially on economic facilitation of hubs and growth poles where success is already bubbling up. This will allow local government, together with line ministries, to move from a role currently restricted to limited regulation, taxation and the running of beer halls to one with a greater economic role at a territorial level.

Moving to a local economic development focus however means allowing donor funds to be used in the new resettlements (currently prevented by ‘restrictive measures’ – aka ‘sanctions’). This would mean donors could engage in a wider, more meaningful approach to local economic development that connects areas and economies in new ways. This will create sustainable opportunities for poor people as part of a wider economic transformation. This is what pro-poor rural development means for Zimbabwe; not keeping people poor in the communal areas, trapped in a colonially-defined land-use and economic framework, and with development opportunities currently constrained by a narrow focus on projects in communal areas.

This post is the last in a series of nine and was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

This field research was led by Felix Murimbarimba and Jacob Mahenehene. Data entry was undertaken by Tafadzwa Mavedzenge

ZANU-PF versus MDC-A : Chairing of Parliamentary Committees
Lifting sanctions won’t solve Zimbabwe’s woes

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Lifting sanctions won’t solve Zimbabwe’s woes – The Zimbabwean

A resolution at the recent SADC Summit chose October 25 as the day for regional governments to articulate and mobilise support for the sanctions imposed two decades ago on Zimbabwe to be lifted.

SADC has claimed that sanctions against Zimbabwe have ultimately been damaging to the region’s economy. The direct link between sanctions and Zimbabwe’s economic crisis has not, however, been made.

October 20 was declared a national holiday in Zimbabwe to encourage citizens to protest against the continued imposition of sanctions, although only 3000 turned out at the national march and the stadium was not even half full.

While the lifting of sanctions would certainly provide economic relief to targeted individuals and entities, they certainly will not serve as a panacea to Zimbabwe’s economic crisis.

Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s claim that “sanctions are slowing down our progress, inhibiting our economic recovery and punishing the most vulnerable”, is not borne out by expert research.

Neither is the assertion of the government of Zimbabwe that sanctions have caused untold misery to ordinary Zimbabweans.

Sanctions seem to be used by politicians as a scapegoat for Zimbabwe’s economic decline that is largely the result of years of economic mismanagement, pilfering of state resources, endemic corruption, entrenched state capture, and poor governance.

The fact that basic services are not available to many Zimbabweans, and the cost of essential goods and staple food items are beyond the reach of millions, cannot be blamed primarily on targeted sanctions.

Political instability has also been a factor in Zimbabwe’s poor economic performance.

As Minister for International Relations Naledi Pandor said in her opening remarks at a symposium on Zimbabwe in Pretoria this week: “The political dynamics are inextricably linked to the economic and thus should be confronted simultaneously.”

Pandor also acknowledged an inescapable truth about discussions on the situation in Zimbabwe: “We have all become very competent at addressing and adopting resolutions, yet far too inadequate in informed reflection on what solutions or approaches may be practicable.”

A good starting point is to understand exactly what sanctions have been imposed on Zimbabwe, what economic effect they have had, and whether they remain relevant after two decades.

The newly arrived US Ambassador to South Africa, Lanna Marks, told the press on her first official day in the job last week that the only sanctions being maintained by the US on Zimbabwe were against Grace Mugabe, as well as an arms embargo.

But the US is still maintaining targeted sanctions on 83 individuals who face financial and travel restrictions.

There is some confusion around the exact figures as some individuals are listed a number of times under different aliases, such as Chinese businessman Sam Pa.

The US list of specially designated individuals on the Zimbabwe sanctions list is particularly problematic as it has little relevance 20 years on, and has not been updated. Some of those listed are now deceased, and others no longer have political relevance.

New names have been added, however. For example, after the October 20 march against sanctions, the US slapped sanctions on Zimbabwe’s State Security Minister Owen Ncube for alleged gross human rights violations, such as the torture of civil society activists, and the recent spate of abductions.

The US is maintaining sanctions against 53 large companies and organisations, which can specifically be broken down into 21 farm enterprises and 32 other business entities.

Of the 32 entities listed, 17 are linked to businessman John Bredenkamp as a result of his alleged involvement in mining deals in the DRC and arms dealing. Some of those are also on the list for having been implicated in the exploitation of the Marange diamonds.

Two Zanu-PF party companies are on the list.

In addition to the US targeted sanctions, the US has imposed a ban on arms exports to Zimbabwe.

As for the EU, it imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2002 due to the escalation of violence and intimidation of political opponents and the harassment of the independent press.

The sanctions comprised an arms embargo as well as an asset freeze and travel ban on targeted individuals and entities.

In 2008 there were 200 individuals and 40 entities on the list, but by 2016 only then-president Robert Mugabe and his wife remained on the list, as well as Zimbabwe Defence Industries.

The list of targeted individuals has since been updated and currently only former first lady Grace Mugabe remains on the list. While the Commanders of the Defence Force are on the updated list, they have been suspended. There remains a ban on the export of military equipment to Zimbabwe as well as technical military assistance.

As far as the effect of EU sanctions goes, it can hardly be argued that an asset freeze and travel ban directed at Grace Mugabe, and a ban on exporting military equipment to Zimbabwe have caused “untold misery to ordinary Zimbabweans”.

US sanctions against Zimbabwe, which are more comprehensive and also outdated, have had greater indirect economic ramifications for the country. The reason being that as a result of US sanctions, companies find it difficult to move US dollars into Zimbabwe as banks can be fined for dealing with sanctioned countries.

Just as companies have shied away from investing in other countries under US sanctions (Iran, for example), it is also true that companies have shied away from investing in Zimbabwe.

The state of the Zimbabwean economy with runaway inflation at 97.9% in June, and other factors such as entrenched corruption, political instability, poor governance and weak export competitiveness are real impediments to Zimbabwe becoming an attractive investment destination.

It is also important to note that it is not as a result of sanctions that Zimbabwe has failed to access lines of credit from international financial institutions.

This is because the international financial institutions (IFI) require Zimbabwe to repay prior loans before accessing further funding. Zimbabwe is indebted to all IFIs except for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is why it has not been eligible for loans in the past two decades.

In 2016 Zimbabwe cleared its debt to the IMF, although it still has an outstanding debt of US$2.3billion (R33.8bn) to the World Bank, US$680m to the African Development Bank, and US$308m to the European Investment Bank.

While it is true that the lifting of US sanctions may assist Zimbabwe in attracting some forms of investment, and may make it easier for companies to transfer US dollars to Zimbabwe, it will not serve as the solution to Zimbabwe’s massive economic challenges or lead to the recovery of the agriculture, health and education sectors.

What Zimbabwe most needs at this juncture to improve its economic outlook is political stability and transparency, an end to the impunity of the security forces for human rights abuses, measures to stamp out corruption at all levels, consistent economic policies, a cash injection of hard currency into the economy, restructured debt with the IFIs, and ultimately debt relief.

It is a catch-22 situation, however, as the US is likely to vote against any new lines of credit or debt relief from the IFI’s for Zimbabwe unless reforms are undertaken.

* Shannon Ebrahim is Independent Media’s foreign editor.

Zimbabwe’s Chiwenga returns after 4 months in China receiving medical treatment – The Zimbabwean

FILE: Zimbabwe vice-president Constantino Chiwenga. Picture: AFP

HARARE – Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga returned home on Saturday after spending four months in China receiving medical treatment for an unknown illness, state-owned media reported.

Chiwenga, the 63-year-old former general who led a coup against the late Robert Mugabe two years ago, has spent a large part of the year away from work, also receiving treatment in South Africa and India.

His health is of great interest to Zimbabweans as he is widely seen as the driving force behind the country’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the front-runner to succeed him. His absence from public duties had stoked speculation about the gravity of his illness, which authorities have sought to play down.

The Herald, a government-owned newspaper, showed images of Chiwenga arriving at Harare’s airport in the early hours of Saturday, looking healthier than when he was last seen in public in June. He was welcomed by relatives and China’s deputy ambassador to Zimbabwe Zhao Baogang, the newspaper said.

Local private media have reported that Chiwenga’s health deteriorated in July and that he underwent two operations following a suspected poisoning.

Chiwenga and government officials were not available to comment on Saturday.

Government officials in Zimbabwe routinely seek medical treatment abroad while the country’s public health system has collapsed and hospitals struggle to provide medicines to patients.

Many Zimbabweans are angry that top government officials continue to travel abroad for treatment while state hospitals are turning away patients because doctors have been on a pay strike since September.

The government has so far fired 435 doctors for participating in the strike

Lifting sanctions won’t solve Zimbabwe’s woes
Mnangagwa visits general Chiwenga at home

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Mnangagwa visits general Chiwenga at home – The Zimbabwean

24.11.2019 16:51

 …..as Mrs Mnangagwa kneels before the general. Zimbabwe says determined to successfully de-dollarize

…..as Mrs Mnangagwa kneels before the general.

Zimbabwe says determined to successfully de-dollarize

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Zimbabwe says determined to successfully de-dollarize – The Zimbabwean

Mthuli Ncube

Addressing a press conference, the minister acknowledged that de-dollarizing was not an easy task, but vowed that enforcement and compliance will be pursued to ensure no use of the U.S. dollar for unauthorized transactions.

The Zimbabwe government abandoned the hyperinflation-ravaged national currency in 2009 in favor of multiple currencies that included the U.S. dollar, British Pound, Euro, Australian dollar, Chinese Yuan and Japanese Yen.

However, of all the foreign currencies, the U.S. dollar became the dominant currency of trade and transacting in the country.

But in June this year, government suddenly re-introduced the Zimbabwe dollar as part of currency reforms.

The local currency is currently made up of electronic money known as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS), bond notes and coins and new dollar notes that were introduced last week.

But as the new notes remain in short supply and continue to depreciate against the U.S. dollar, most businesses are reportedly continuing to charge their goods and services in the U.S. dollar.

Ncube said Zimbabweans had become used to the green back such that it will not be easy for them to quickly forget it.

“It is not correct that the local currency has been rejected. People are desperately looking for the money. It’s not also easy to de-dollarize. There are too few cases around the world where they have de-dollarized successfully,” Ncube said.

Meanwhile, deputy minister of finance Clemence Chiduwa told the same press conference that the government was considering coming up with tight measures to deal with the thriving black market for foreign currency.

He said one such measure would be designating a few commercial banks that allow depositors to freely withdraw their money from Nostro foreign currency accounts to purchase goods abroad.

But upon return, the individuals would be requested to declare the source of foreign currency and if it’s not from official sources, such goods would be forfeited to the State.

He lamented the current scenario where businesses are now indexing the price of goods and services against movements of the exchange rate on the parallel market.

“Our inflation rate at the moment is now being driven by expected movements in the parallel market rate.

“What is just needed is to ensure that all the laws that are supposed to guide the operations of economic agents are in place. What is needed on our part is compliance and enforcement,” he added.

Zimbabwe’s vice president returns after four months in China receiving medical treatment

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Zimbabwe’s vice president returns after four months in China receiving medical treatment – The Zimbabwean

Retired army chief Constantino Chiwenga

Chiwenga, the 63-year-old former general who led a coup against the late Robert Mugabe two years ago, has spent a large part of the year away from work, also receiving treatment in South Africa and India.

His health is of great interest to Zimbabweans as he is widely seen as the driving force behind the country’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the front-runner to succeed him. His absence from public duties had stoked speculation about the gravity of his illness, which authorities have sought to play down.

The Herald, a government-owned newspaper, showed images of Chiwenga arriving at Harare’s airport in the early hours of Saturday, looking healthier than when he was last seen in public in June. He was welcomed by relatives and China’s deputy ambassador to Zimbabwe Zhao Baogang, the newspaper said.

Local private media have reported that Chiwenga’s health deteriorated in July and that he underwent two operations following a suspected poisoning.

Chiwenga and government officials were not available to comment on Saturday.

Government officials in Zimbabwe routinely seek medical treatment abroad while the country’s public health system has collapsed and hospitals struggle to provide medicines to patients.

Many Zimbabweans are angry that top government officials continue to travel abroad for treatment while state hospitals are turning away patients because doctors have been on a pay strike since September.

The government has so far fired 435 doctors for participating in the strike.

EU Worried About Recent Political Developments in Zimbabwe: Memo

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EU Worried About Recent Political Developments in Zimbabwe: Memo – The Zimbabwean

HARARE — The European Union is concerned that the democratic space in Zimbabwe has deteriorated since it opened talks with Harare in June for the first time since 2001 in a bid to turn the page on years of hostile relations.

An EU memo prepared for its diplomats ahead of talks in Harare on Thursday said the arrests and abductions of several political activists had “reinforced the impression that the democratic space is being curtained again”.

The memo, seen by Reuters, also said the EU was worried by Harare’s slow pace of political reforms, including the alignment of laws to the constitution that was adopted in 2013.

The EU withdrew budget support to Zimbabwe in 2002 when it imposed sanctions on the late Robert Mugabe’s government over charges of political violence, human rights abuses, vote rigging and violent seizures of white-owned farms.

The talks this week are seen as an important step towards the EU resuming direct financial aid for the economy, which is in the grip of its worst crisis in a decade and worsened by a severe drought.

Timo Olkkonen, the EU’s ambassador in Harare, told acting foreign affairs minister July Moyo and his team at the start of the talks that reforms and inclusive political dialogue would also help with Zimbabwe’s economic recovery.

“These reforms can pave the way for a further strengthened relationship between Zimbabwe and EU based on shared values, the respect of human rights and the sustainable development goals agenda,” Olkkonen said, flanked by several EU diplomats.

Moyo said the talks would deal with all “hard issues” and were supported by President Emmerson Mnangagwa – who last month described EU and U.S. sanctions on Zimbabwe as a “cancer” sapping the economy.

With the economy afflicted by dollar shortages, fuel queues, power-cuts, and soaring prices, Mnangagwa has said restoring ties with the West and multilateral lenders like International Monetary Fund is one of his major priorities.

But, like Mugabe, he blames sanctions for the country’s economic ills and says they are designed to remove the ruling ZANU-PF party from power. Critics also say that since Mnangagwa came to power, he has cracked down on opposition parties.

This week, Zimbabwean police used batons, tear gas and water cannon to beat up and disperse supporters of the main opposition party trying to listen to a speech by their leader.

In its memo, the EU noted Zimbabwe had made progress by deciding not to enforce its empowerment law, which would have required all foreign investors to cede at least 51% of their shares in local operations to Zimbabweans.

The memo also said the interim compensation of white farmers whose land was seized by the government was a positive gesture towards re-opening export markets in the European Union.

In a budget statement last week, Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube set aside $24 million to compensate white farmers, 768 of whom had consented to the interim compensation scheme.

Zimbabwe’s vice president returns after four months in China receiving medical treatment
Jesus laughs

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Zimbabwean minister admits quoting wrong Chinese aid figure in his budget: China’s deputy ambassador – The Zimbabwean

China helped fund work at the Hwange power plant, Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube says. Photo: Handout

The statement by Ncube, which was issued after the meeting with Chinese officials on Wednesday, said that “the two sides agreed to continue working on a common accounting mechanism”.

It did not, however, specify the accounting formula to be used or the exact amount that Beijing has advanced to Zimbabwe between January and September 2019.

This prompted Zhao Baogang, deputy ambassador to Zimbabwe, to say on Twitter that the Zimbabwean government had agreed to the figures detailed in the Chinese embassy’s statement.

“The Chinese embassy is correct … Our figure has been confirmed by the Zimbabwe side … US$136 million,” Zhao wrote.

China to keep up Africa infrastructure loans despite debt-trap claims

Some Zimbabwean politicians have criticised the government, calling the apparent use of the wrong figure embarrassing. Former finance minister Tendai Biti said the omission of Chinese development assistance in the 2020 budget statement was “amateurish”.

Biti wrote on Twitter: “The same budget also omits Chinese loans to Zimbabwe and understates figures of external sovereign debt. The regime has been cooking books.”

The ministry said China had provided loans and grants to Zimbabwe for other projects, without giving details.

Ncube said China had helped fund the upgrade of the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport, the new parliament building and rehabilitation of the Hwange 7 and 8 power plant project, and that other donations included food aid, borehole drilling and building of the Mahusekwa District Hospital.

Will China ever tire of Zimbabwe’s corruption and bad debt?

Some of these projects were shrouded in controversy when reports emerged in October that Chinese backers had suspended US$1.3 billion worth of loans after President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government diverted US$10 million from an escrow account for an airport expansion project to offset a foreign currency shortage.

The Chinese embassy said at the time that it supported the Zimbabwean government and that the three projects were being implemented in line with agreed plans. However, Zhao has said that the US$10 million taken from the airport project account had not been returned.

According to figures from the China Africa Research Initiative at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, China extended more than US$2.2 billion worth of loans to Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2017.

Dubai’s Albwardy to buy Zimbabwe’s Meikles Hotel for $20 million – The Zimbabwean

24.11.2019 5:53

HARARE (Reuters) – Dubai-based Albwardy Investments said on Friday it would buy Zimbabwe’s Meikles Hotel for $20 million and would upgrade what is one of the southern African nation’s most well-known establishments.

The current owner, Meikles Limited (KMAL.ZI), has over the past few years struggled with low occupancy levels and has lacked foreign exchange to refurbish the property in Harare.

Albwardy said the investment had been approved by Zimbabwe’s stock exchange and competition commission, while the shareholders would vote on the transaction next month.

“The Meikles Hotel provides a unique opportunity to invest in Zimbabwe’s leisure and business markets as a first mover,” Albwardy director of hospitality Laurie Ward said in a statement.

Albwardy is expected to spend up to $30 million in upgrading the hotel, an official from Meikles Hotel told Reuters.

The hotel, which was established in 1915, has 312 rooms.

Zimbabwean minister admits quoting wrong Chinese aid figure in his budget: China’s deputy ambassador
Lets not delude ourselves – ordinary Zimbabweans played no role in Mugabe removal!

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