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 South Africa is a regional force and a close neighbour whose economic, diplomatic and moral influence should be brought to bear on Zimbabwe in order to bring about change. (Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images)  

When Robert Mugabe was removed from power in a civilian-assisted Zimbabwean military coup in 2017, it presented a narrow window of opportunity to transform the country into a real democracy. The appointment of Emmerson Mnangagwa, who claimed to be as “soft as wool”, as the new president was a masterstroke move by the army. It confounded critics and earned the coup the support of the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Critics who pointed out that this was a coup and that a military state was in the making were drowned out by a chorus from a “give-ED-a-chance” brigade, comprised of prominent businesspeople, diplomats, Zanu-PF supporters and some ordinary people. Many mistakenly equated the removal of Mugabe the person with the dismantling of Mugabe the system. The momentum generated by the removal of Mugabe by the army was long enough to give Zanu-PF another controversial electoral victory in the 2018 elections.

The role of Thabo Mbeki in covering up for Zanu-PF

South Africa is a regional force and a close neighbour whose economic, diplomatic and moral influence should be brought to bear on Zimbabwe in order to bring about change — even though it may be controversial change.

But sadly, despite its own human rights-centred Constitution, for the past 20 years South Africa has not used that influence to advance democracy and rights in Zimbabwe. In fact, it has done the opposite.

The lowlight was the role played by former president Thabo Mbeki in negotiating a delicate Government of National Unity between Zanu-PF and opposition parties after Zanu-PF had lost the 2008 elections. A lot of people view the 2008 intervention that helped an election loser, Mugabe, to retain power at the expense of the election winner, Morgan Tsvangirai, as a lost opportunity to strengthen democracy in the region. It was also at odds with what has happened in other regions, such as the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), where democratic election outcomes have been enforced by regional bodies, as happened in Gambia.

Part of the reason Zanu-PF has not fully embraced the growth of electoral democracy in Zimbabwe may be knowing that the ANC does not believe that any opposition party must win power in Zimbabwe, but instead makes public its desire to help Zanu-PF retain power.

South Africa’s approach towards violations of human rights by its northern neighbour has always been measured and non-confrontational.

When in the early 2000s Mugabe’s Zanu-PF faced the first real threat of loss of power democratically to Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC and defaulted to the use of organised violence and torture, concerns about human rights violations and abuses were raised. Despite president Mbeki’s knowledge of widespread and systematic use of organised violence and torture to influence electoral outcomes via many sources — including the Judicial Observer Mission on Zimbabwe elections that he commissioned leading to the production of the Khampepe report — Mbeki dismissed claims of rights violations. He argued that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe but just a “regime change agenda” sponsored by the West and that allegations of human rights violations were being used as a pretext for regime change.

That Mbeki took a position of “quiet diplomacy”, knowing full well that Zimbabwe was abusing rights and frustrating free and fair elections was borne out when the Khampepe report was released, confirming that the elections in 2000 and 2002 had been marred by serious irregularities and that they could be declared neither free nor fair.

According to an article in Daily Maverick, the fundamental precepts of South Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe were set out during the Mbeki presidency: that is, a policy of “quiet diplomacy” that was designed to encourage the Mugabe regime to bring about democratic change via a reformed Zanu-PF.

Managing Mnangagwa: Quiet diplomacy and its discontents

South Africa’s presidents may have changed, but once again in the current crisis in Zimbabwe, its government seems very reluctant to take any action. In fact, it was only jolted into action after sustained domestic, regional and international pressure.

To that end, on 6 August 2020, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the appointment of former speaker of Parliament Baleka Mbete and former safety and security minister Sydney Mufamadi as special envoys to Zimbabwe to:

“Engage the government of Zimbabwe and relevant stakeholders to identify possible ways in which South Africa can assist Zimbabwe, following recent reports of difficulties that the Republic of Zimbabwe is experiencing.”

True to form, this toned-down diplomatic language was used to refer to serious levels of state repression, manifesting in the arbitrary arrests of journalists, abductions, disappearances and torture of political activists, government critics and human rights defenders.

The most recent clampdown and state-led violence happened as a response to a scheduled 31 July demonstration that had been planned by activists, led by Jacob Ngarivhume of Transform Zimbabwe. The activists maintain the abortive demonstration was meant to be peaceful mass action aimed at voicing concern over corruption and the unbearable economic and social situation that has worsened owing to the Covid-19 pandemic.

From the beginning, the fact that the South African government again opted for a very mild characterisation of the situation as “difficulties” worried many observers who doubted Ramaphosa would take a decisive stance. They saw this softly-softly approach as a sure sign the intervention was not at the level required.

Among them was the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria which, though appreciating the deployment of the two envoys, regretted “the characterisation of a situation of serious human rights violations as ‘difficulties’ ”, and urged President Ramaphosa to ensure that South Africa’s approach is not one of “quiet diplomacy” at the expense of addressing the underlying issues of impunity and lack of accountability.

As the current chairperson of the AU, hopes were high Ramaphosa would use this platform to at least send a clear message that the actions of the government of Zimbabwe were at wide variance with the agreed norms of democratic governance.

The initial delegation sent by President Ramaphosa arrived in Harare with the intention of consulting with other stakeholders, including opposition parties and other key role players other than Zanu-PF. However, the Zimbabwean government was not interested in any arrangement that would debunk its well-choreographed baseline argument that there was “no crisis”. As a result, the visiting delegation was forced to return to South Africa without meeting anyone else. No communiqué followed this meeting.

President Ramaphosa then decided to send another delegation, this time under the auspices of South Africa’s governing ANC on 8 September.

Liberation war ‘sister parties’: Time for tough love

The party-party approach was justified by the ANC leadership as the perfect approach in dealing with a “sister” revolutionary party to address fundamental domestic issues whose effects are, however, international, including an influx of economic and political refugees into South Africa. Predictably, it seems to have yielded nothing as the final communiqué again avoided the term ‘crisis’. The Zimbabwe government prefers to fool the world that the country is facing only “challenges”, like many other countries affected by Covid-19.

Questions have emerged on the true intentions, mandate and indeed sincerity of the South African government in this latest round of interventions. MDC Alliance vice-president Tendai Biti has criticised the South African envoys for being a political smokescreen with no genuine mandate to remedy the ongoing crisis.

Another crucial question is just how should South Africa be expected to rein in a sovereign state?

When one considers the strong sentiments issued by some members of the ANC delegation soon after its return to South Africa, it is difficult to reconcile this with the statements made by the Zimbabwe government, as both sides seem to be at odds despite emerging from the same meeting.

For example, the South African delegation announced it had agreed with its Zanu-PF counterparts that the next South African delegation would meet the opposition and civil society groups. But in a highly charged press conference, Zanu-PF declared that the ANC would not be allowed to meet the MDC Alliance. Zanu-PF secretary for external affairs Simbarashe Mumbengegwi declared there “is no crisis in Zimbabwe, therefore, the ANC’s mediation is not needed”.

At the same time, Zanu-PF’s acting spokesperson, Patrick Chinamasa, and the president’s spokesperson (via Twitter) have both heavily criticised South Africa for even daring to attempt to intervene in Zimbabwe, saying that Harare was not “a backyard” or “province” of South Africa. The presidential spokesperson went as far as suggesting that South Africa only achieved independence in 1994 and was therefore “too young” to intervene in Zimbabwe.

However, according to Wits University’s Professor Mills Soko, “given Zimbabwe’s overwhelming dependence on South Africa, it still has the political, diplomatic and economic power to shape an inclusive, peaceful and progressive long-term political settlement in the country”.

It should be clear now that South Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe is ineffective and simply does not work against Zanu-PF. The brazenly intransigent regime in Harare will not be moved by a policy which fails to recognise the true political nature of the Zimbabwe crisis. Without asserting it’s significant leverage to rein in the Zimbabwean government, South Africa is increasingly being viewed as insincere, incapable, or both.

Soko argues that perhaps the most important factor affecting any meaningful interventionist policy in Zimbabwe is the tag of being former liberation war parties:

“For several years, the ANC government’s engagement with Zimbabwe has been guided by the nebulous notion of liberation solidarity between the ANC and Zanu-PF, not by the national interests outlined in South African foreign policy.”

This seems to virtually incapacitate the ANCs ability to rein in its counterpart.

Ministers Naledi Pandour, Lindiwe Zulu and others have been vocal in describing the situation in Zimbabwe as a “crisis”. However, they cannot be expected to do much individually if there is no political will or capability at the highest levels of the state, government and region.

Conclusion

Despite all the challenges of intervening in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, which refuses to accept the necessity, nay, legitimacy of such well-meaning intervention, South Africa has a strong interest and obligation in taking a more decisive position on Zimbabwe. As Elizabeth Sidiropolous, the CEO of the South African Institute of International Affairs, observed, the fate of the neighbouring state has a profound influence on the economy of the entire region.

For about 20 years, South Africa has watched, rarely exerted pressure and in some instances aided and abetted the tragedy Zimbabwe has become.

But that must change. Now President Ramaphosa and South Africa need to appreciate the enormous potential they have to help restore Zimbabwe economically and politically. The criticisms coming from Harare should not dissuade the regional power from pursuing a more pragmatic approach that will force the authorities in Zimbabwe to pause and begin taking their governance and human rights mandate seriously. DM/MC

The Southern Africa Human Rights Roundup is a weekly column aimed at highlighting important human rights news in southern Africa. It integrates efforts of human rights defenders and facilitates evidence-based engagement with key stakeholders and institutions on the human rights situation across the region.

The roundup is a collaboration between the Southern Africa Human Rights Defenders Network and Maverick Citizen.

 Tawanda Muchehiwa. (Photo supplied by Thandekile Moyo)

In recent weeks the government of Zimbabwe has vociferously denounced claims that a crisis exists in that country. The ANC leadership seems keen to keep that faith. Yet on a daily basis, the tales of terror and violence mount up. In addition, there is an untold tale of hunger and immiseration that spreads across the population. In this article, regular Maverick Citizen correspondent and human rights activist Thandekile Moyo tells a personal story of the day the abductions came to her doorstep. We publish a three-part series from Moyo.

On Tuesday 28 July I got a voice note from my book research assistant Tawanda Muchehiwa saying to me, “I am being followed. This afternoon I noticed three cars that were following me and I felt them closing in on me, I felt surrounded. Fortunately my cousin managed to quickly come and rescue me. I’m home safe.”

I quickly picked up the phone and called him. Something I hardly ever do, I hate phone calls, so our communication is always voice notes and messages. We spoke about what had happened and he expressed how he felt maybe he was being paranoid.

“Why would they follow me? I’m a nobody.”

Tawanda Muchehiwa. (Photo supplied by Thandekile Moyo)

I said to him, “look, you are a Human Rights Defender. In their eyes you are an enemy”. We then decided to play it by the ear and be more vigilant. I think at the time, both of us had no real grasp of the ominousness of the situation. Having been followed before, with nothing sinister happening to me, I thought maybe they were just trying to intimidate him.

But just to be on the safe side, I notified a few people that Tawanda might be in danger.

The next day, Wednesday 29 July, I got another frantic message from Tawanda. He was being followed again. I remember panicking as well and asking him what on earth he was doing in town. “Didn’t we agree that you must stay at home?” I asked him. He explained that he had some errands to run and he still wasn’t entirely convinced he was seriously being followed. He then told me not to worry because he was now safe.

On Thursday morning, the day before the much anticipated 31 July protests, Tawanda and I discussed our plans for the protests. He then disclosed to me that he had been talking to Samkeliso Tshuma, another activist. I was excited to hear that because I knew not many people would be brave enough to take to the streets.

Later that day I received information that Tawanda might have been arrested. Their cars had been seen parked outside Bulawayo central police station.

At around 5pm, my phone rang. I checked the ID and it was Tawanda. But something was off; first of all, Tawanda and I mostly communicate with WhatsApp messages, secondly, we never “direct call” each other because we all know that our phone lines are bugged. We only call via WhatsApp. Thirdly, Tawanda had been MIA all day, and we suspected he had been arrested, so if he was arrested, how was he calling me?

I then decided to answer the phone in case it was a distress call or some kind of SOS. I answered and asked him if he was okay, to which he said yes. He had the most bizzare thing to say. He told me “the posters” were ready and I should come and see them.

“What posters?” I asked.

He couldn’t explain. He said just come and see them. I then told him let’s talk on WhatsApp. He protested that request and said his network was bad but I insisted and he had no choice but to agree.

A few seconds later I was on the phone with his uncle, Zimlive editor Mduduzi Mathuthu, to whom I relayed the information that Tawanda had called me and he shouted “Do not go. It’s a trap. They have Tawanda. The police are at my house as we speak.”

Never have I felt so defeated in my life.

I checked my phone and discovered several missed calls from Tawanda again, this time on WhatsApp. I knew it was a trap. But I couldn’t not talk to him. I don’t remember if I called him back or if he called but we spoke again. I asked him where he was and he responded with uncertainty. I got the sense someone was telling him what to say. He sounded different, I could tell he was under duress. He was also addressing me in an uncharacteristically casual manner, flippantly – he’s usually so respectful, I can’t explain it but the whole conversation confirmed my worst fears, Tawanda had been abducted.

I then remembered he had mentioned he was in touch with Samkeliso Tshuma and I went into a panic because if they had his phone then they knew he had been planning to march with her on 31 July. I thought she might be at risk so I called her and told her, “Tawanda has been abducted. no matter what, do not take any calls from his number.”

I then called Nqobani Sithole, Tawanda’s lawyer and informed him about my fears. He said the police were denying having arrested Tawanda, but he said the cars Tawanda and his cousins had been in were parked outside the police station.

He refused to leave the police station until his clients were produced. The police then reluctantly produced Tawanda’s cousins, Advent Mathuthu and Amandlenkosi Mathuthu. But not Tawanda Muchehiwa. Police claimed Tawanda had escaped. But his cousins immediately set the record straight. Nqobani Sithole then sent me these messages:

“Actually I can confirm, i’ve seen the other 2 who allege they were arrested with Tawanda & he was bundled in a different car, he is missing.”

“You were right! Tawanda has been abducted. Pound the alarm.”

My heart sank.

I then went to Twitter and posted these three tweets:

“I believe the govt of Zimbabwe abducted my book research assistant Tawanda Muchehiwa this afternoon,

They arrested him together with 2 boys & we have spent all day searching for them to no avail,

Police claimed they didn’t have them in custody,

Said they escaped,

#ZanupfMustGo”

“Around 5pm I received a call from Tawanda who sounded desperate & not ok/himself,

Asking me to meet him,

I asked him where he was & he was incoherent,

A lawyer went to Byo central & ZRP denied having the 3,

The lawyer was unrelenting,

ZRP then produced the other 2.

#ZanupfMustGo”

“This is the message from lawyer:

“Actually I can confirm, I’ve seen the other 2 who allege they were arrested with Tawanda & he was bundled in a different car, he is missing.

The Police are saying they know nothing about him.”

I am deeply worried for his safety!

#ZanupfMustGo”

Only after I had published the tweets did I realise I had made a mistake and posted to the wrong Twitter account. I had been asked to be guest administrator for the page @curatebyo, a Bulawayo page run by a different person every week. I decided it did not matter, the goal was to let as many people as possible know that Tawanda had been abducted and disappeared.

I will never forget that first night Tawanda was missing. I could not sleep. I kept waiting and hoping to hear he had been dumped somewhere. But we had no such luck.

Tawanda’s cousins revealed something peculiar. They had been arrested together with a woman called Tendai Masotsha, the Bulawayo women’s chairperson of Zimbabwe’s main opposition, the MDC alliance.

Who was this Masotsha woman? Tawanda had never mentioned her to me.

Advent and Amandlenkosi explained they had met up with the woman in town and she said she wanted to give Tawanda fliers for the 31 July protests. When they got to her, instead of giving Tawanda the fliers, she offered to leave her car, get into the car the young men were in and tag along as they ran their errands. They then drove with her to the hardware shop and left her and Tawanda in the car. When the two cousins got out of the shop, the abduction was already in progress. They said Tawanda was stuffed into a white Isuzu twin cab and they were taken to Bulawayo central police station along with Tendai Masotsha.

To their surprise, police later let Tendai Masotsha go, despite her allegedly having been the one in possession of the fliers they were apparently arrested for. They never saw Tawanda at the police station and they had no idea where he had been taken. Advent Mathuthu spent the night in police custody and Amandlenkosi was released after the lawyer intervened.

It is still a mystery why Tendai Masotsha was released and why she had insisted on tagging along with the young men and how the state security agents who pounced on them knew exactly where to find them.

It has been almost two months since the abduction but the MDC Alliance claims they are still investigating one of their leader’s roles in this crime.

The next morning, Nqobani Sithole filed an urgent application (habeas corpus) to get a magistrate to order the police to produce Tawanda. The hearing was set for Saturday the first of August.

The second day and night passed and there was still no news and no sign of Tawanda.

On Saturday 1 August, the habeas corpus was granted and police were ordered to produce Tawanda within 72 hours. I was petrified and outraged. I posted this on Twitter, on my page @mamoxn this time:

“72 hours from the time this was granted,

Expires on Tuesday.

TUESDAY!

This judge is saying to people who disappeared

@TeeMuchehiwa

 on Thursday,

&Had him all of Friday,

&Saturday;

Ok you can keep him tonight,

& All day Sunday & Monday,

SIX DAYS!!!

No!!

#FreeTawanda

#ZanupfMustGo”

Some time during his disappearance I had sent this message to Tawanda’s phone in the hope that he might see it:

“We will find you Tawanda, Don’t worry”.

At around 11pm, I checked my phone and found four disjointed, undecipherable messages had come in from Tawanda’s phone at 9:46pm saying:

“Hi”

“Hello”

“Where”

“Come”

I immediately called the lawyer Nqobani Sithole, who then told me Tawanda had been dumped some 3km from his uncle’s house. Alive, but badly tortured. They sent me pictures of his damaged buttocks and my relief at his being found turned into one of the worst heartbreaks I have ever experienced.

All I could do was just break down and cry.

Zimbabwe is in the hands of criminals. DM/MC

Thandekile Moyo is a writer and human rights defender from Zimbabwe. For the past four years, she has been using print, digital and social media (Twitter: @mamoxn) to expose human rights abuses, bad governance and corruption.

The Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill [link] was published in August last year and, after public hearings conducted by the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Information, Media and Broadcasting Services [the committee’s report can be accessed on the Veritas website ‒ link], it is currently going through its Committee Stage in the National Assembly.  The responsible Minister has tabled amendments to the Bill, [which can also be accessed on our website [link].

In this Bill Watch we shall analyse the provisions of the Bill, but first we shall look at its constitutional background.

Constitutional Background to the Bill

The Zimbabwe Media Commission is established by sections 248 and 249 of the Constitution.  It consists of a chairperson and eight other members all appointed by the President, the chairperson after consultation with Parliament’s Committee on Standing Rules and Orders, the other members chosen from a list of 12 nominees submitted by that committee.  [We should point out that the members have only this month been appointed, some seven years after the Commission was established by the Constitution.  The commissioners appointed to the Media Commission under the old Constitution continued in office, probably illegally, for some years after the present Constitution came into force in 2013.  It is ironic that having waited such a long time, government is now fast tracking the Bill through Parliament.]

The Commission’s main functions are set out in section 249 of the Constitution:

“to uphold, promote and develop freedom of the media;

“to promote and enforce good practices and ethics in the media;

“to monitor broadcasting in the public interest and, in particular, to ensure fairness and diversity of views broadly representing Zimbabwean society.”

The Constitution goes on to say in section 321 that an Act of Parliament may confer additional functions on constitutional commissions and can regulate the manner in which they exercise their functions.

It is against this background that the Bill must be considered.

Outline of the Bill

Scope of the Bill

Clause 2 of the Bill defines the word “media” in wide terms, to include print media, broadcasting, television and internet media.  Since the Commission’s functions relate to media, the definition effectively defines the scope of the Commission’s functions.  There should be no difficulty with this so long as the definition covers all forms of information dissemination that are normally regarded as falling within the usual meaning of the word media, but there are two problems:

• the Minister will be permitted to make regulations extending the definition to cover additional forms of information dissemination not already included in the definition.  This means that the Minister will be given the power to make regulations which have the effect of extending the Commission’s functions, i.e. conferring additional functions on the Commission.  The problem is that under section 321 of the Constitution additional functions can be conferred on the Commission by an Act of Parliament but not by a Minister.  In this respect, therefore, the Bill is unconstitutional.
• The definition is wide enough to cover social media, and issues of privacy may arise if the Commission seeks to control social media.  These issues are not addressed in the Bill.

Functions, membership and staff of Commission

Part II of the Bill deals with the functions, membership and staff of the Commission:

• Clause 3 states that none of the commissioners, apart from the chairperson, can be full-time employees of the Commission.  In fact none of the commissioners, not even the chairperson, should be employees of the Commission, whether full-time or part-time.  If, as seems likely, the clause was intended to mean that only the chairperson may be engaged full-time on the Commission’s business, then the clause should be reworded to make it clear.
• Clause 4 extends the Commission’s functions to allow it to secure compliance with laws regulating media and media practitioners and with treaties dealing with freedom of expression.  The reference to treaties is welcome, because it means the Commission will have the function of ensuring that Zimbabwe complies with treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 19), the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (article 9) and the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (Banjul, 2002).
• Clause 5, as read with paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule, sets out disqualifications for appointment as a commissioner.  While the disqualifications are not unreasonable in themselves ‒ persons will be disqualified if they are not citizens, or are insolvent, or have been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty ‒ there is nothing in the Constitution that permits an Act of Parliament to limit the persons who can be considered for appointment to the Commission.  So the provision is probably unconstitutional.
• Clause 14 states that if members of the Commission knowingly participate in an investigation or other proceeding in which they have a conflict of interest, they “shall be guilty of gross misconduct” and will be dealt with in accordance with section 237(3) of the Constitution, i.e. dismissed.  This is unduly draconian and probably unconstitutional.  While commissioners can certainly be dismissed for gross misconduct, the question whether a particular commissioner’s conduct amounts to gross misconduct is a matter for a tribunal to decide under section 237(3).

Investigations, hearings and inquiries

Part III of the Bill gives the Commission power to hold investigations, hearings and inquiries [the Bill does not indicate what difference there is between an investigation, a hearing or an inquiry so we shall refer to them collectively as investigations].

The Commission will be able to investigate violations of freedom of expression, either on its own volition or on receipt of complaints from members of the public (clause 8 of the Bill).  For the purposes of an investigation the Commission will have the same extensive powers to summon witnesses and hear evidence as a commission of inquiry (clause 10).  Anyone with an interest in the subject of an investigation will be entitled to make representations to the Commission (clause 11) and anyone whose conduct is being investigated must be given an opportunity to be heard (clause 10(6)).  Although clause 10 allows the Commission to conduct investigations in private (i.e. closed to the public), the Bill makes it clear that any decision to hold a closed investigation must comply with section 86(2) of the Constitution, that is to say it must be fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness.  Investigations will have to be concluded within 60 days, or earlier when time is of the essence (clause 11(4) of the Bill).

Following an investigation the Commission will have power under clause 12 of the Bill to make “such order or recommendations as it considers appropriate in the circumstances” in order to redress any violation of the law that may have taken place, and its orders will be enforceable by the High Court, either on application by the Commission itself or by the complainants in whose favour the orders were made (clauses 13 and 15).

Although generally the Bill’s provisions for investigations are reasonable, there are some problems:

• Clause 8(4) prohibits the Commission from investigating conduct that occurred before the Bill comes into force, or investigating complaints submitted more than three years after the conduct complained of.  These restrictions on the Commission’s powers, particularly the first, are not warranted by the Constitution.
• There is no provision for the Commission to deal with complaints through mediation or arbitration, which will often be more appropriate ways of settling complaints than conducting formal investigations.

Media Fund

A new Part V, inserted into the Bill by a Committee Stage amendment, will establish a Media Fund with following objects:

• to build capacity in media services, particularly through training media practitioners, in order to maintain high standards
• to fund research and development, and
• to promote public awareness in the right of access to information and protection of privacy [making the public more aware of their right to freedom of expression would perhaps be more useful].

The Fund will get its money from levies to be imposed on mass media owners [a term that is not defined in the Bill] and from money appropriated by Parliament.  The Fund will also receive any money the Commission may have left over at the end of its financial year.

The Commission will administer the Fund and hold it in a bank account from which, curiously, all withdrawals will have to be made by cheque [Does anyone use cheques nowadays?].

Media self-regulation

Another Committee Stage amendment will allow the Commission to recognise associations of media practitioners with power to regulate the conduct of their members and to adjudicate complaints from the public.  Anyone with a complaint against a member of a recognised association will have to approach the association first before complaining to the Commission.

Self-regulation by the media is to be encouraged because, according to article IX.3 of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights’ Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa:

“Effective self-regulation is the best system for promoting high standards in the media.”

Accreditation or registration of journalists

The Bill makes no provision for the accreditation or registration of journalists.  The law which did provide for this, the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [AIPPA] was repealed earlier this year by the Freedom of Information Act, though regulations which provided for the accreditation of journalists by a Media Commission established by AIPPA were preserved in force.  The Commission with which this Bill is concerned ‒ i.e. the Media Commission established by the Constitution ‒ will have no power to accredit or register journalists under those regulations.

General provisions relating to Commission

The Bill has standard provisions for the Commission’s procedures, mostly contained in the Second Schedule.  Points to note:

• Records of all the Commission’s proceedings, findings and orders must be kept open for public inspection under clause 20 of the Bill.  This is an admirable provision, which if followed will ensure that the Commission is more transparent than other constitutional commissions such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.
• On the other hand, under clause 21 the Minister of Information will have to approve all regulations made by the Commission, which will seriously limit the Commission’s independence.

General Comments on Bill

Generally, the Bill provides a workable framework for the Commission to start its operations.  The Commission is given wide scope to determine its priorities and how it should treat each particular class of media.  The preamble to the Bill emphasises freedom of expression, and that emphasis is repeated in clause 4(1)(b) which enjoins the Commission to support and entrench human rights and democracy.  This in itself cannot prevent the Commission from trying to stifle the media through over-regulation, but at least it points the Commission in the right direction.

Whether the Commission will promote or suppress freedom of expression, indeed, will depend not so much on the Bill as on the commissioners themselves.  We hope they will live up to their task.

Veritas makes every effort to ensure reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied.

Post published in: Featured

Both the Senate and the National Assembly are Sitting This Week

Fast-Tracking to Apply to All Government Business This Week

Fast-tracking will apply this week to all Bills and all other Government business in both Houses.  This is in accordance with resolutions approved by both Houses in recent sittings.

Coming Up in the National Assembly This Week

Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill [link] Committee Stage continuing

For Veritas commentary on this Bill see Bill Watch 62/2020 [link].  Still facing the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, who is steering the Bill through the National Assembly, is the task of persuading the House to approve a totally new and very lengthy clause 28 headed Conditions under which Commission may Allow Self-Regulation of Media Practitioners with respect to Complaints Against Them.   During last week’s proceedings some MPs indicated they were not entirely happy with this clause.  The new clause is available on the Veritas website [link].

Forest Amendment Bill [link] for start of Second Reading stage

Financial Adjustments Bill [link]  for start of Second Reading stage

For Veritas comments on this Bill see Bill Watch 66/2019 [link].  The Public Accounts Committee [PAC] has made several unsuccessful attempts to secure evidence on this Bill from the Permanent Secretary for Finance and Economic Development, the latest last Monday – he has repeatedly not turned up and PAC have asked for Parliament to issue a subpoena. It was a PAC report in 2019 on several years’ worth of unauthorised Government expenditure, amounting to billions of US dollars, that necessitated this Bill.  As the Bill is asking for condonation of these billions of US dollars, without producing full information on how the debts were run up, the debate on the Bill is likely to be stormy.

Cyber Security & Data Protection Bill [link] for continuation of Second Reading debate.

For the Second Reading debate so far, see below [In the National Assembly Last Week].  Ministers have stressed the urgency of the Bill.

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Bill [link] for continuation of Second Reading debate

Other business

Belated approval of BIPPAs in terms of section 327 of Constitution

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has motions seeking the National Assembly’s approval of Agreements on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, four of them signed by Zimbabwe twenty years ago or more [dates of signing by Zimbabwe in brackets].  The agreements are with the following States.

1. Korea (2010)
2. Czech Republic (1999)
3. Kingdom of Sweden (1997)
4. United Arab Emirates (2018)
5. Kingdom of Thailand (2000)
6. United Arab Emirates (1999).

Unpresented committee/delegation reports and uncompleted debates on members’ motions

There are numerous such items on the Order Paper, including the customary motion thanking the President for his speech at the opening of the present session on 1st October 2019.

Coming Up in the Senate This Week

The Senate has only two Bills on the its Order Paper for this week. They are:

Marriages Bill [as amended by the National Assembly]

The Senate is still waiting for a response by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs to the Second Reading debate.  Chiefs and many other Senators have expressed their disappointment that the Bill does not expressly recognise the importance of lobola in customary marriages, even where couples and their families choose to observe and comply with the tradition.  Further developments are awaited with great interest.

Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Bill, 2017: Repeat of Third Reading Vote

The complex background to this item is explained in Bill Watch 27/2020 of 13th May [link].  Suffice it to say, the purpose of repeating a vote, first conducted over three years ago, is to see whether the Senate can muster 54 affirmative votes instead of the 53 affirmative votes mustered in 2017.  This is required by the Constitutional Court ruling on 31st March which declared the 2017 vote null and void on the ground that 53 yes votes were not sufficient to pass the Bill, being fewer than the 54 yes votes required by section 328(5) of the Constitution to pass a constitutional bill.  The Court ruling allowed Parliament 180 days from 31st March 2020 to conduct a valid vote, “failing which the declaration of nullity would come into force”.

Day 180 from 31st March was Sunday 27th September, so the declaration of nullity has already come into operation.  This means the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.1) Act is null and void.

In the National Assembly Last Week

A new vacancy in the House

On 23rd September the Speaker formally announced the death on 12th September of Hon Patrick Chidakwa, ZANU PF MP for the Marondera East constituency.

Auditor-General’s Reports Tabled by the Speaker

On Tuesday 22nd September the Speaker tabled the following four reports by the Auditor-General.  He explained that he was doing so in terms of the Audit Office Act because the Auditor-General had reported that the Ministers concerned had failed to carry out their obligations under the Act to table the reports before Parliament.

1. Monitoring by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce of the Quality of Goods being Imported into the Country
2. Support of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises by the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Corporation
3. Management of Occupation Health and Safety in Mining Operations by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development
4. Management of Sewerage Systems by Urban Local Authorities under the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing.

Motions on deaths of Hon Masango Matambanadzo and Hon Senator Perrance Shiri

Much of the rest of the sitting on Tuesday was taken up by MPs’ contributions to the debates on these two motions, both moved by Hon Mliswa.

Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill [link]

The Second Reading stage started on Wednesday 23rd September after Question Time.  The introductory speech by the Minister of ICT, Postal and Courier Services was followed by the presentation of a Joint Committees’ report on the Bill [link].  Debate continued the following day with one contribution from the floor.  More MPs are likely to wish to contribute to the debate, which is listed to continue this week.

Liaison and Coordination Committee Report on First Session

Also on Wednesday, this report was adopted.  It had been presented previously by ZANU PF Chief Whip, Hon Togarepi, and had attracted several contributions from MPs eager with suggestions for the more efficient conduct of Parliamentary business.

Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill [link] – Committee Stage begun

National Assembly business on Thursday 24th September began with the start of the Committee Stage of this Bill.  Before the lengthy proposed amendments already on the Order Paper [link] were reached, the Minister eventually accepted MPs’ fervent objections to the Commission being able to ask for police assistance in their investigations, and clause 10(4) to that effect was deleted.  Also deleted after MPs protested against it, was clause 13(2).  And the Minister accepted, and the House approved, Hon Biti’s suggestion that the word “or” be inserted after the words “if it thinks fit” in clause 15(1) conferring the Commission’s powers to institute or participate in court proceedings for redress of violations of the Act.

The House also approved the insertion of a new Part V, after Part IV, providing for a Media Fund and containing new clauses 20 to 26.  The provisions for the Media Fund – to be funded partly by annual levies payable by mass media owners under the new clause 24 – come more or less straight from the now repealed AIPPA.

Before the remaining [and potentially controversial] part of the Committee Stage was postponed to 29th September, the House approved the addition to the original clause 20 [now renumbered 27] of two subclauses (4) and (5) requiring the Commission to submit general annual and special “particular” reports to Parliament through the responsible Minister.

In the Senate Last Week

Bills  Senators were not called on to deal with either of the two Bills still on their Order Paper.  Both these important Bills head the Order Paper for Tuesday 29th September [see above].

Motions introduced

Senator Mohadi introduced a take-note motion on the Report of 46th Plenary Assembly Session of the SADC Parliamentary Forum at Swakopmund in December 2019.

Teenagers discharged from Child Care Facilities   Senator Tongogara introduced her motion calling on the Government to partner with other stakeholders and the private sector to alleviate the challenges faced by teenagers discharged, without proper preparation, from Child Care Facilities on attaining 18 years of age

Motions adopted  On Wednesday 23rd September Senators voted to adopt four take-note motions on reports of Parliamentary delegations to meetings in far-flung destinations: Iceland [for the Women Political Leaders Global Forum, in November 2019) ; Bali, Indonesia 9for a World Parliamentary Forum on Sustainable Development Goals in September 2019]; Bangui, Central African Republic [for a meeting of the African Parliamentary Union in June 2019]; St Petersburg, Russia [for the 2019 St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2019].

National Peace and Reconciliation Commission [NPRC]: Annual Reports  On Thursday 24th September Vice-President Mohadi presented the NPRC’s Annual Reports for 2018 and 2019.  Senators then started debate on both reports.  Senator chiefs said that conflict between miners and farmers in their areas needed resolution by the NPRC.

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Post published in: Featured

Fulton Mangwanya, the director-general of the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, told a parliamentary committee that 34 elephants have died so far and “many” more could still die “in the short term.”

“All results to date point to the cause of these elephant deaths being a disease known as hemorrhagic septicemia,” said Mangwanya, noting that the disease does not appear to have been previously recorded as causing deaths among Africa’s savannah elephants.

“However, it has been reported to kill Asian elephants in India. It has also affected cattle, pigs, and chickens in southern Africa in which it can cause massive mortality. It has also been recognized in buffalo and some other wildlife species in this part of this world,” he said.

He said the disease “may have been around in elephants in this region for some time,” pointing to specimens from two dead elephants from the vast Hwange National Park in 2019 that showed “the same microscopic pathology,” although a definitive diagnosis could not be made at that time.

Most of the elephants that died recently in the Pandamasue Forest, located between Hwange National Park and Victoria Falls, were weak or young, mostly under 15 years old.

The dead elephants were found with their tusks still on their bodies, ruling out poaching. In recent years poachers in Zimbabwe have poisoned dozens of elephants with cyanide and then have taken their ivory tusks to sell them to illegal traders.

The parks authorities also said toxic water was an unlikely cause because the country has been pumping “clean water” from wells during this dry season.

To eliminate other causes, blood samples have been sent to the United Kingdom, while other samples will be sent to the United States and neighboring South Africa for further testing, said Mangwanya.

Not enough information is known about the disease’s effect on local elephants to predict a long-term outcome, he said.

“It is unlikely that this disease alone will have any serious overall impact,” on the survival of the southern African country’s booming elephant population, said Mangwanya.

“Yes they die, but honestly this is just nothing, a drop in the ocean because we have over 84,000 elephants in Zimbabwe, which is overpopulation already,” he said. “But this is a disease that we should work seriously to make sure that we unearth and identify properly so that corrective measures are taken,” said Mangwanya.

In neighboring Botswana, home to the world’s largest population of the pachyderms, the government last week said the sudden deaths of some 330 elephants in the northwestern region of the country earlier this year may have occurred because they drank water contaminated by toxic blue-green algae.

Mangwanya said the recent elephant deaths in Zimbabwe also showed that the animals experienced “extremely sudden death,” and that Botswana might need to conduct tests to find out if it’s not the same bacterial infection being experienced in Zimbabwe.

But many teachers did not report for work, as their union demanded that the government should first pay them a COVID-19 allowance and improve their salaries and working conditions.

Raymond Majongwe, secretary-general of the Progressive Teachers Union which is one of the largest in Zimbabwe, said teachers would report for work as soon as the government agreed to their demands.

“Teachers cannot afford the busfare to report for duty. They cannot even afford to pay school fees for their own children from the pathetic salaries that they get, yet they are expected to teach other people’s children,” said Majongwe while touring some schools in Harare on Monday.

Teachers in Zimbabwe’s government schools earn less than $50 a month and are demanding that they be paid at least $500 a month, he said.

Primary and secondary school pupils wore masks and applied sanitizer before entering classrooms on Monday. The teachers who reported for work conducted lessons. At some schools, such as at David Livingstone Primary School in the capital, Harare, lessons started more than an hour late as staff distributed sanitizing dispensers.

The students in grades 7 and the final year of secondary school are to write local public examinations in order to graduate from primary and secondary school, respectively. The examinations are expected to start in December, even though pupils lost considerable learning time since their schools have been closed since the end of March, as part of a nation-wide lockdown to slow the spread of the coronavirus.

Students lucky enough to have parents who could afford internet access took online lessons. Some teachers conducted small face-to-face lessons in the backyards of their homes. Children in Zimbabwe’s rural areas were the worst affected because many have no access to electricity, internet or backyard classes.

President Emmerson Mnangagwa last week assured parents and pupils that the government has put in place adequate measures to ensure the safety of returning pupils.

Zimbabwe, a country of 14.5 million people, has recorded more than 7,500 confirmed cases of COVID-19, including 227 deaths. The numbers of new cases and deaths have grown more slowly in recent weeks, encouraging the government to reopen much of the economy and to try to return the country to a semblance of normal life.

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The youths told ZimLive by phone that they had “found each other” with a section of the youth leadership loyal to MDC-T leader Thokozani Khupe.“We have just recovered Harvest House. It was a nice and clean retake,” an MDC Alliance youth leader said from inside the building, asking not to be named because he said all would be explained at a news conference at 10AM on Monday.

Paul Gorekore, the MDC-T’s current youth chairman for Harare province, is believed to have facilitated the latest occupation, accusing Khupe of “aiding the suffering of the masses” through working with Zanu PF.

MDC Alliance youth chairman for Harare Denford Ngadziore is understood to have also entered Harvest House, and will address Monday’s news conference.

In a brief statement, Gorekore said: “MDC-T Harare province (2014 structures) has taken over control of the party HQ tonight. This has been necessitated by our realisation o the need to unite the people in the fight for a better Zimbabwe.

“We as the youths have decided to go beyond our differences and unite to resolve the current crisis. We have been concerned by recent developments where the party (MDC-T) has been infiltrated by some Zanu PF elements battling to destroy the people’s movement thereby aiding the suffering of the masses.”

The youths said they had taken contingency measures, including changing locks and using chains to fortify the entrances.

Previous attempts by the MDC Alliance leadership to take back the building saw the party’s deputy leaders Tendai Biti and Lynette Karenyi-Kore being arrested. The youths told ZimLive they expected police and the military to try and reclaim the building for Khupe. The military has previously denied facilitating the initial occupation.

The leadership of the MDC Alliance party has been disputed since a March Supreme Court judgement which said the party’s leader Nelson Chamisa was illegitimate for failing to follow the party constitution when he succeeded founding leader Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018.

The court said Khupe, having been elected as Tsvangirai’s sole deputy at a previous congress held in 2014, should have assumed interim charge pending an extraordinary congress.

But by the time that judgement was delivered, Chamisa had led the MDC Alliance into an election in which he narrowly lost to Zanu PF leader Emmerson Mnangagwa. Khupe took part in the elections in July 2018 as leader of the MDC-T.

Khupe has used the judgement, which the MDC Alliance says was engineered by Zanu PF, to assert herself as leader of the MDC-T party, and also the Alliance, while moving to claim the party’s properties as well as funding due to it from the government.

Despite winning just two seats in parliament through proportional representation, she is now claiming leadership of over 100 MDC Alliance lawmakers and hundreds of councillors across the country. Those who reject her leadership have been recalled, including 24 MPs and Senators and dozens of councillors.

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Tanaka, 10, is in the fifth grade. Because of a shortage of teachers, students and classrooms, she has to learn with sixth-grade students.

She and her classmates are among thousands of students who attend so-called satellite schools, created 20 years ago to serve black farmers who needed basic services after the government resettled them on larger, more fertile fields. Until then, white commercial farmers owned most of Zimbabwe’s choicest plots of land.

Officials set up temporary, bare-bones facilities, which didn’t carry formal names, weren’t registered with the government and cost far less than most schools. Farmhouses, tobacco barns, sties and stables were suddenly transformed into classrooms.

The resettlement program, known as fast-track land reform, promised greater economic opportunity and stability to Zimbabwe’s black majority. But that prosperity has eluded many black farmers. Instead, those in resettled areas remain among the country’s poorest citizens.

Satellite schools are a stark symbol of that stalled progress, as many hobble along with few resources, and annually earn the lowest scores on Zimbabwe’s critically important public exams.

“The main problem we are facing is that parents do not have a source of income to pay school fees and buy books,” says Gracious, the headmistress of Tanaka’s school, who asked not to use her full name because she feared retribution from government officials for discussing the school’s inadequacies.

Parents, education experts and government officials say the state has failed satellite-school students. The issue drew fresh attention in March when Parliament passed an education bill mandating that all children receive free schooling.

“When we are talking about the coming in of free education, it needs to be targeted at satellite schools so that we can invest in their infrastructure and in making them reasonable schools for the kids to attend,” says Priscilla Misihairimbwi Mushonga, chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Primary and Secondary Education.

Between 2006 and 2018, the number of primary satellite schools shot up by almost 42% to 1,029, according to government figures. Many of them are found here in Mashonaland West province, where Tanaka’s satellite school is located.

During fast-track land reform, scores of black farmers were resettled in this farm-rich province, 139 kilometers (86 miles) west of Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital. Today satellites make up 31% of the province’s schools — the highest percentage in the country.

“Satellite schools are not going to disappear overnight,” says Caiphus Nziramasanga, who led an education commission inquiry in 1998.

This wasn’t the plan 20 years ago.

Back then, the land reform program handed property to at least 150,000 black farmers with the promise of food security and economic empowerment. Instead, a host of challenges have held them back, including lack of seeds and fertilizer and little access to machinery and financing. As of 2017, the government reported, about 83% of the resettled and communal farmers lived in poverty.

Satellite schools, originally fashioned as short-term facilities, reflect that poverty. They lack textbooks, technology and furniture, and at many satellites, few students pass public exams, which shape a student’s academic path.

“The infrastructure is bad for most of them,” Mushonga says. “It’s raining now, and some pupils sit outside. Some learn in barns. Reading materials and teachers are limited. This is not an ideal learning setup.”

Tanaka’s school sits a few meters from the Chirundu highway that leads to neighboring Zambia. Nearby are thatched huts and clay-brick houses, surrounded by small patches of farmland.

Built in 2002 for resettled farmers, the school hosts 339 students, from toddlers in early childhood development classes up to seventh-graders. There are seven teachers. (Some urban primary schools enroll as many as 2,000 students.)

The school, which charges fees of 30 Zimbabwean dollars (ZWL) (36 cents) per term, has only one classroom, used for early childhood development students. It offers few extracurricular activities. There are no netball hoops and no football pitch — staples at many schools.

Administrators have managed to buy desks, but students have few textbooks.

Miriam Mangwiro, mother of a first-grade student, wants to send her child elsewhere, but can’t afford anything else.

The lack of proper classrooms is “a health risk,” says Mangwiro, who grows tobacco and maize. “Such learning facilities aren’t good for students.”

Still, Gracious and her staff press on. In particular, they have paid special attention to raising scores on public exams. Since 2017, the headmistress says, her school’s pass rate has climbed from 24% to 34% last year.

“We have managed to do our best,” she says, “despite the challenges we are facing.”

Linda Mujuru, GPJ, translated some interviews from Shona.