Zimbabwe lockdown: Grandmothers offer free therapy

1.6.2020 11:21

The Friendship Bench programme aims to tackle depression and anxiety during the pandemic.

Health experts say globally there has been an increase in anxiety and depression as people struggle to cope with COVID-19 and job losses.

Some grandmothers in Zimbabwe are offering free therapy sessions to tackle these mental health difficulties during the coronavirus lockdown. This is part of an initiative called the Friendship Bench.

Al Jazeera’s Haru Mutasa reports from the city of Gweru in Zimbabwe.

Post published in: Featured

Two decades on, Zimbabwe takes stock of Mugabe land reform legacy

Then she broke down and sobbed.

“It was my home for 47 years,” she said.

Her home is now a tiny one-bedroom cottage in a retirement home in the capital Harare, where she spends her time cross-stitching and reading.

“I am very happy here,” she said after composing herself.

She was happier on the farm, where she spent her teen years riding horses.

“I am a country girl at heart.”

Sixty-kilometres away in Glendale, Benard Chinyemba, 60, took over an 80-hectare farm in 2002, offered to him by the government as part of land redistribution to blacks.

The ex-engineer is thriving, growing maize and soya beans, while rearing goats, sheep, fish and chickens.

“There was no real farming going on here,” Chinyemba told AFP sitting on a garden chair on a well-manicured lawn.

“We renovated the house when we moved in,” he said.

Twenty years after Zimbabwe’s land reform began, the cases of Simons and Chinyemba illustrate the deep lingering divisions over what became a symbol of Mugabe, who ruled for 37 years until he was toppled in 2017. He died two years later.

– ‘On our terms’-

Two decades ago, Mugabe seized more than 4,000 farms from the country’s 4,500 white large-scale commercial farmers.

He justified the land grabs as a way to correct historical wrongs by claiming back land that was forcibly taken from the blacks.

Critics blame the land programme for wreaking havoc on the agriculture sector — a mainstay of the economy.

Economic output fell by half following the land seizures and the economy has been hobbled since — shrinking 7.5 percent last year, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube in a letter to the IMF in April, projected the economy could contract by between 15 and 20 percent, partly due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Food shortages experienced over most of the post-land reform years are widely blamed on the loss of white farmers.

The coronavirus pandemic has only worsened the shortages.

Two successive droughts have stunted agricultural harvests, leaving 7.7 million, half the population, food insecure.

According to the World Food Programme, 56 of the country’s 60 districts are experiencing “crisis” hunger and the virus pandemic risks driving people into “deeper desperation”.

President Emmerson Mnangagwa has promised to import food to feed them “so that no one will starve”.

For Chinyemba, the government was right “repossessing” land from the whites, but they deserve compensation, if only for improvements.

“I don’t feel any remorse at all. The land belongs to the indigenous people. If the whites want to farm, they should do so on our terms.”

He said while black “people were killed,” when their land was taken from them, but “in all fairness, (whites) should get compensation” for improvements.

– ‘Willing buyer’ –

For white Zimbabweans, the programme was an invasion of their property. To the blacks, it was the final battle in the country’s liberation since they first rose against British colonialists in the 19th century.

The land issue almost derailed the negotiations with Britain that led to the birth of Zimbabwe in 1980.

Ultimately a deal was struck that the new government would not embark on any land reforms in the first decade in power.

After that, a “willing buyer, willing seller” principle came into effect with Britain to fund the buying of white-owned farms.

But in 1997, Clare Short, then British Secretary of State for International Development told Harare that London had “no special responsibility to meet the cost of land purchases.”

Sporadic invasions of white-owned farms ensued, but the government curbed them, with Mugabe assuring white farmers that “squatting” would not be tolerated.

Simons said white farmers deluded themselves into thinking they were untouchable and indispensable “royal game” because agriculture was key to the economy.

All that changed when in February 2000 after a constitutional referendum with a clause that would legalise expropriation of white farms without compensation, was rejected.

Days later, veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation war started running white farmers off their land.

A year later, the government formalised the reform programme. Farms were either sub-divided into six-hectare plots or handed out whole to blacks.

Thirty kilometres west of Harare, 60-year-old Israel Pasipanodya Mushore inherited Rasper farm. But it has not been easy work.

In contrast to Chinyemba’s, his farm is rundown. What used to be a swimming pool is now a fishpond.

Weeds choked the maize crop. His showpiece is a herd of 70-plus cattle.

In 2016 government introduced the “command agriculture” scheme to supply farmers with so-called inputs — seeds, fertilisers and insecticides — and they pay back on harvesting.

The scheme brought hope, but not enough.

“Equipment and inputs are our biggest challenge; we have no draught power,” Mushore said.

Inputs were not timely disbursed to farmers, or just didn’t get to them.

Funding remains one of the biggest challenges.

Currently all land belongs to the state and farms operate on 99-year leases.

Financial institutions refuse to lend in the absence of collateral.

“The 99-year lease on its own, in its current form has not inspired confidence to the financiers,” said Paul Zakariya, who heads the Zimbabwe Farmers Union, which represents over a million small-scale farmers.

Ben Gilpin, who lost a farm, agrees.

“If the farmers were on the land with title or some bankable entity that is truly tradable and can be honoured by the banks, government wouldn’t have to fulfil the role,” said Gilpin, who is the director of the Commercial Farmers Union, which represents mostly white farmers.

– Compensation –

Zimbabwe’s government insists it will only pay compensation for improvements on the farms that were taken and for not the land.

John Laurie, 83, lost two farms in 2002, then valued at US$9-million.

Now wheel-chair bound and a double amputee, Laurie is one of the farmers’ representatives negotiating compensation with the government.

“We hope to have an agreement on a global figure for the immovable assets shortly,” he said.

The government has made “interim relief” payments to especially old and destitute farmers.

Some 800 farmers have so far been paid the equivalent of US$10,000 for each farm lost.

But 20 years on, the land reforms remain a work in progress.

After carrying out a land audit, government vowed to slash the size of under-utilised large farms and tackle multiple farm ownership.

Opinions on the reforms remain split. But even those who lost farms agree the situation where white farmers occupied the best agricultural land while millions of black Zimbabweans were cramped on semi-arid land, was untenable.

Economically though, the reforms are widely seen as a failure.

Independent economist Tony Hawkins, said agriculture’s share of GDP has fallen from about 15 percent to less than 10 per cent.

Despite several attempts, AFP failed to obtain a government response.

But for the Zimbabwean leadership, Mugabe’s farming legacy continues to empower blacks.

“Our land reform programme remains a fundamental cog to our independence and sovereignty,” Mnangagwa said during independence celebrations in April.

“To this, there is no wavering or going back.”

Zimbabwean government seeking to revive steel giant

Photo: newsday.co

The task force, chaired by Industry and Commerce Minister Sekai Nzenza, also includes the ministers of finance and economic development, energy and power development, and mines and mining development. The group will assess the costs of refurbishing the company’s abandoned steel plant, along with plans to court investors and other financing strategies.

ZISCO, which once employed over 5,000 people, ceased production in 2008 at the height of Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown. Getting the company off the ground would help Zimbabwe renew the faith of allies like China—the country’s largest direct investor—despite Zimbabwe defaulting on $2.2 billion worth of Chinese loans from 2000 to 2017.

Numerous foreign investors have already failed to revive the company, most recently Chinese property developer Guangzhou R&FA, which backed out of a $1 billion deal last year. Although the inter-ministry task force shows initiative, the likelihood remains slim that ZISCO will make a smooth comeback. Going forward, a botched attempt at revival could cause China to reconsider its investments in Zimbabwe, which may never yield returns.

Post published in: Business

Zimbabwe’s critical choice: state collapse or people-power

There is no dispute about the depths of political, ethical and economic degradation of Zimbabwe after two and a half years of Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Presidency.

No dispute because his own ministers and advisors publicly admit the state is on the brink of collapse due mainly to the grand corruption of the country’s ruling class.

Worse still for Mnangagwa, many junior officers share the view that he and the predatory elite that he leads are steering the country into the abyss.

It is this message from the junior officers and the ranks of the military that is unsettling the generals, with whom Mnangagwa has shared the spoils of state capture. Although Mnangagwa and his deputy General Constantino Chiwenga were once seen as inseparable allies, the looming failure of the Zimbabwean state is sharpening the elite’s sectional and divergent interests.

By allowing corruption to rip through the system, from illegal gold and diamond exports to arbitrage between the US dollar and the latest version of Zimbabwe’s currency, Mnangagwa has undermined his own praetorian guard.

Hollowed out and looted, the state can no longer look after its own soldiers and police, and their families – let alone address the spectre of mass starvation and a public health emergency haunting over half of Zimbabwe’s 16 million people.

Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube wrote to the IMF last month lamenting that the “…economy could contract by 15-20% during 2020 with very serious social consequences. Already 8.5 million Zimbabweans (half the population) are food insecure.”

So bad is the situation, wrote Ncube, that Zimbabwe’s state could implode and threaten security in neighbouring states. He warns: “… the global pandemic will take a heavy toll on the health sector with many lives lost and raise poverty to levels not seen in recent times, including worsening food security.”

This ranks as a tragic admission of political defeat.

Mnangagwa and his military allies insisted they had organised the overthrow of Robert Mugabe in 2017 to stamp out corruption, to open the country for business and hold free and fair elections. On their own admission  they have failed.

Listen to Shingi Munyeza, a kingpin of Zimbabwe’s business class and an member of Mnangagwa’s advisory couincil, describe how the government is leading Zimbabwe into perdition:

“These are the last kicks of a dying horse, of a system that is evil and corrupt… our state is captured by cartels who are operating with those who are in power, strong men, to the detriment of the rest of us,” says Munyeza in a remarkable indictment of a government with which he had worked closely.

“They move from state capture to state abuse where citizens are being abused, physically, emotionally …. there is nothing that passes on to the ordinary man or ordinary woman and then it moves on to state failure which I believe is where we are heading now…”

A senior pastor in the Faith Ministries Church as well as a wealthy businessman, Munyeza is now prophesying the fall of Mnangagwa’s government, relayed over social media. It resonates strongly with the military, some of whose top officers are said to be backing him.

Why sound the alarm bells now after years of elite plunder of Zimbabwe? Some, at least, in the predatory elite are seriously rattled by the prospect of state collapse and their own survival in a new order.

Last year’s revolution in Sudan offers several parallels. A grassroots movement, outside the confines of traditional opposition parties, brought together trades unionists, professionals and community activists across the country, building from street level in the regions until it became an unstoppable national force.

Under the ousted Omar Al-Bashir regime, Sudan’s deep security state, with its myriad militias and spy networks, electronic surveillance and capacity to wage civil wars  in four regions simultaneously was a still more formidable apparatus than Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation and its many proxies.

Yet it was the combination of Sudan’s economy going into free fall – mass demonstrations were triggered by a threefold increase in the price of bread – and deepening schisms between rival wings of the security state that opened the avenue for its revolutionaries to race on to the national stage and force out the political leadership.

If anything economic conditions in Zimbabwe are currently worse than those in Sudan under Al Bashir. At least Sudan’s regime had some regional sponsors such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Mnangagwa’s government evinces no regional solidarity.

South Africa, whose ministers worry about the worsening instability and grand corruption north of the Limpopo, makes ritualistic complaints about the unfairness of sanctions which bar Zimbabwe from borrowing from the IMF.

In truth, President Cyril Ramaphosa is exercised about Harare’s debt mountain with South Africa and a growing tide of Zimbabweans heading south to compete on the local labour market.

At home in Zimbabwe, the continuous profiteering and nepotism in the award of state contracts as half the country face what the UN euphemistically calls ‘food insecurity’ tells people that the Mnangagwa government ha plumbed new moral depths. Some of his oldest allies now fear popular retribution, and that they cannot rely on the fracturing security services to protect them.

Activists, journalists and opposition politicians who point out this demeaning of our country under Mnangagwa’s rule are  beaten, tortured and killed. As the European colonialists found out, Zimbabweans are slow to anger but when they decide to fight, they become an implacable force.

Mnangagwa and his allies are about to discover that again as they are held to account for the destruction of our country and the theft of our futures.

Mnangagwa did the exact opposite of fighting corruption. The government reinforced a system of primitive accumulation in which a narrow predatory elite of which he is patron, benefits from corrupt state contracts and tenders.

Economic policy is used to benefit his Mnangagwa’s business cronies such as  Kudakwashe Tagwirei and his Sakunda Fuels. Tagwirei made so much money from Sakunda’s monopolistic position as a supplier of fuel and farm inputs for the state-sponsored Command Agriculture programme that it was able to finance Mnangagwa’s and ZANU-PF’s election campaign in July 2018.

Now Mnangagwa’s regime is repaying Tagwirei, ensuring the central bank offers him opportunities for arbitrage and money laundering opportunities. Former Finance Minister Tendai Biti, an opposition who chairs the Public Accounts Committee in parliament, told parliament that the government

Mnangagwa, aided by finance minister Ncube and Beserve Bank governor John Mangudya, have tipped the country back into the economic abyss of 2008 – mass unemployment and hunger, hyper-inflation and a worthless national currency.

They facilitated the grand theft of citizens’ bank balances by reintroducing the Zimbabwean dollar currency while allowing their business allies to access to the state’s reserves of US dollars, and to benefit from the arbitrage between the two currencies. This corruption system built around the relaunch of the Zimbabwean dollar, which cost our people US$500 million in stolen state resources, guaranteed the new currency was strangled at birth.

By late May, Mangudya claimed an official exchange rate of Zim$25=US$1 – in reality it was taking pover Z$70 to buy a US dollar, and the rate has been falling daily.  Inflation has skyrocketed to at least 700%, second only to Venezuela.

So far Mnangagwa seems impervious to the consequences of this economic incontinence, seeing no need to rein in his extravagances. He has been renting luxury jets from as far as the United Arab Emirates to take him on 400 kilometre trip within Zimbabwe.

He has appointed several ministers known to be corrupt.  His top appointees have looted over $300m from the citizens pension fund with no official inquiries , let alone prosecutions.

As a smokescreen, he appointed a presidential anti-corruption team that delivered nothing whilst his reconstituted Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission acquired the ‘catch and release’ moniker.

Mnangagwa’s officials have failed to account for US$3b Command Agriculture budget, much of which enriched ruling party cronies such as Tagwirei.

By using the COVID-19 crisis to issue a fiat banning public passenger transport companies, Mnangagwa cleared the decks for the government and Tagwirei-controlled Zimbabwe United Passenger Company for further profiteering via inflated procurement contracts.

Despite hiring lobbyists in Washington DC, international views of the Mnangagwa government are overwhelmingly negative. Almost none of the promised US$10bn in foreign investment has materialised.

Salaries are worth just a fraction of what they were when Mnangagwa seized power. When doctors, nurses, teachers and others protest against these rock bottom wages and working conditions, the government unleashes the police to break up demonstrations. Sometimes, its agencies send thugs to abduct union leaders and oppositionists, who are tortured and left for dead on the outskirts of Harare.

In the latest atrocity state security agents abducted three women from the youth league of the Movement for Democratic Change, to torture and sexually abuse them for almost two days before pushing them out of a moving car about 90km from Harare.

In January 2019, Mnangagwa sent the army to quell protests against higher fuel prices. He later boasted that he had told the army to “use a whip laced with salt” against the dissidents.

Political repression has ramped up as the state’s utilities fall apart. Power cuts drag on for days, even weeks. Clean running water is a scarcity in many towns.

Doctors and nurses are struggling to improve pay and conditions. Fearing a breakdown of the public health service, Econet chief executive Strive Masiyiwa contributed to their salary funds.

COVID-19 salt to the wound

When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in Asia, predictions of its consequences in Zimbabwe were dire.

Despite advance warnings, the government was dismissive of the threat. The Defence Minister suggested that COVID-19 was divine punishment against th US for imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe.

Led by an incompetent and unqualified Health Minister, Obadiah Moyo, whom Mnangagwa has retained despite multiple epic failures, the country lacked any strategy for COVID-19.

It relied on testing kits donated by Chinese billionaire Jack Ma but failed to distribute these in time.

COVID-19 saw health workers unprepared and unprotected, health infrastructure for infectious diseases non-existent and treatment facilities and equipment unavailable.

The largest burden of mobilising support for COVID-19 response has been borne by citizens, coming together to raise funds for personal protective equipment for health workers, sanitisers, and the refurbishment of isolation facilities.

The pandemic has exposed shocking levels of elite self-interest with reports of preferential treatment for the first reported case, Zororo Makamba, son of former Zanu PF Member of Parliament, James Makamba, who later died.

This would be followed by reports of establishment of private COVID-19 treatment facilities for the elite and its families by Tagwirei.

A young boy sits in a queue for cooking gas in Harare, Zimbabwe, Sunday, March, 29, 2020. Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced a nationwide lockdown for 21 days, starting March 30, in an effort to stop the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

Ignoring the difficulties that the globally recommended lockdown protocols would present in Zimbabwe, the government saw the restrictions as a way of stifling social dissent.

Mnangagwa is trying to use COVID-19 to entrench his authoritarian rule, passing regulations that stifle free speech, arresting journalists, deploying police and soldiers to violently enforce the lock down, using the lockdown to decimate the opposition and unleashing state agents to abduct, torture and sexually abuse activists.

Fearing that the combined impact of food shortages, economic crises and political contagion would trigger a public backlash against his government, Mnangagwa has extended the COVID-19 lockdown indefinitely. His decision lacks any scientific justification and rationality.

#ZanuMustGo

Two and half years after the coup, and two years after the disputed election, there is consensus at least that Mnangagwa has failed.

Internal rivalries inside Zanu PF are an open secret with new factions that pit Mnangagwa against his Deputy Constantine Chiwenga.

The public spats between his close ally and former deputy information minister Energy Mutodi and his boss Monica Mutsvangwa and Foreign Minister, former army General Sibusiso Moyo – one of the leading actors in the coup- suggest that the fallout is more serious than Zanu PF is willing to admit.

Most important is the shift among Zimbabweans who can no longer tolerate the Mnangagwa-Zanu PF regime and see no prospect for its reform. Its combination of grand corruption, serial incompetence and brutal repression are beyond redemption.

Making matters still worse is the pomposity, arrogance and epic hypocrisy of the ruling elite, founded on their belief that they can always bludgeon their way out of trouble, thanks to the blind loyalty of Zimbabwean soldiers and police. A reality check on that front is about to confront Mnangagwa and his allies head on.

A brief tour of Africa would prove informative for them. In Malawi, after years of apparent docility, a citizens’ movement emerged  to reject the fixed outcome and demand fresh election after elections were manipulated by President Peter wa Mutharika.

The movement successfully defied, violence, killings and intimidation and endured for over a year culminating in an independent adjudication of the electoral petition by the courts and a decree to nullify the election and order a fresh poll.

In Tunisia, in 2010, although living conditions were comparatively better than Zimbabwe’s, a self-immolation by a street vendor, triggered a 28-day public protestsa 28-day public protest and what became the Jasmine Revolution that ousted president Zine El Ben Al I after 24 years in power.

In Egypt, in 2011, crash living conditions and an oppressive governance system triggered public protests that culminated with demands for President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation.

In Burkina Faso, in 2014, attempts by former President Blaise Campaore to extend his 27-year term in office  triggeredoffice triggered countrywide protests that culminated in his resignation.

More recently in 2019, an attempt by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to seek a fifth term in office, triggered successful public protests to demandi his resignation and radical changes in the political system.

What all these change in regimes have in common is that they were achieved by popular movements, not established opposition parties. There is a vital lesson here for the country’s fractious opposition parties – if they fail to come together as a serious national movement demanding political change, they will be sidelined.

For rival politicians in the MDC to be fighting on court over political minutiae at a time of unprecedented human suffering is chipping at their street credibility. So too is the record of many local authorities under MDC control: their theft of public resources looks like a poor man’s imitation of Zanu-PF’s grand corruption in central government.

Just a matter of time

This shift by citizens from national political consciousness and then to action is not easy and direct. But it is now a matter of when not if.

And when the popular protests reach their peak, experience has shown that it will not matter whether Mnangagwa has the backing of the army commanders. Other revolutions have succeeded against repressive regimes with still stronger armies. The writing is on the wall.

Underage smoking Zimbabwe’s new headache

HARARE, Zimbabwe 

Group of underage boys puff at cigarette stubs as they sit on a pavement leaning against a wall of a shopping mall in Zimbabwe’s capital Harare.

But the three boys who live on the streets, Prichard age 11, Ben 14 and Trynos 16, are wholly oblivious to the health effects of smoking.

For them, smoking is just a pastime so they gathering the dumped stubs on the streets of Harare.

“We have nothing to do on the streets and smoking gives us joy,” Trynos told Anadolu Agency.

A survey conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2015 showed 20% of Zimbabwe’s youth between the ages of 13 and 15 are smokers.

The WHO found nearly 12.5% of Zimbabwe’s children began smoking at the tender age of 7.

As Zimbabwe grapples with underage smoking, the trio engage in the activity as nations commemorate May 31 the annual World NO Tobacco Day.

Increasing child smokers

The growing epidemic of tobacco use among Zimbabwe’s underage children is happening as youth living on the streets smoking freely, unaware of the harmful effects of tobacco.

The UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization said tobacco stands out as Zimbabwe’s largest export commodity, accounting for nearly 10% of its GDP.

Contributing unethically to the GDP are school-aged children, to whom smoking has become common.

But efforts in the past by groups like the Health Services Board to introduce tobacco control measures has fallen on deaf ears.

Smoking and selling tobacco products to those under the age of 18 is forbidden by law in Zimbabwe but the legislation lacks enforcement.

Government weak in fighting child smoking

As detailed accounts of rising underage smoking are illuminated, the government has tried but failed to meet the challenges.

Lovemore Mumbengeranwa, who headed the Health Services Board, went on record calling for new tobacco control and prevention programs.

“This will save lives, reduce illnesses, and help reduce the economic burden associated with tobacco-related illness and lost productivity,” said Mumbengeranwa.

Five years later, nothing has taken place to curtail underage smoking in the southern African nation.

In fact, Zimbabwe stands as one of the top tobacco producing African nations, despite five years ago becoming the 180th country to ratify the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, a treaty meant to regulate tobacco production, sales, advertising and taxation.

Now, as children puff cigarettes stubs, even public health specialists like Shungu Munyati, who headed WHO-funded research on child smoking here, felt action was necessary to surmount the challenge.

For other health experts like Senelise Sithole, an official in the Ministry of Health and Child Care, underage smoking has come with worse challenges.

“When young people smoke, this results into negative lifestyles; smoking combined with drinking brings in risky behaviors which may lead to exposing oneself to HIV and AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections,” Sithole told Anadolu Agency.

Poor economy fueling underage smoking

But, clobbered with joblessness, Zimbabwe’s youth like Douglas Chihota, 17, based in the Mabvuku high density suburb of Harare, smoking is a way to occupy time.

“If we had jobs as young people, we would not be smoking nor taking drugs,” said Chihota, who said he completed high school last year.

Unemployment in Zimbabwe stands at 90%, according to the primary trade union federation, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).

While unemployment contributes to heavy smoking among underage children, health experts like Margaret Dhliwayo said the government’s attitude needs to change.

“The law needs to take its course in terms of enforcing legislation so that young people do not have access to cigarettes; right now children can buy cigarettes and nobody really questions what age they are,” said Dhliwayo.

Zimbabwe’s land reform areas twenty years on (4)

When land invasions took place during 2000, many areas were invaded and land was claimed. In some instances this was not made official during the ‘fast-track’ process, and ‘offer letters’ were not issued. Sometimes there was dispute over years and years, as the new land reform villagers petitioned the government to gain recognition. In some cases this was granted, in other cases such claims are still outstanding.

This blog covers some of these so-called ‘informal’ sites, although all but one is now formalised. These sites are in Chiredzi and Mwenezi districts and so in the very dry southeast of the country. These are areas where agricultural production is risky, and more diverse livelihood options, including livestock production, must be sought.

In part because of the uncertainty over tenure and in part because of the challenges of agricultural production, these sites show the highest level of turnover, with 24 exits being recorded out of 110 households in our original sample. Some exits are only temporary, however, as diversified livelihoods mean that people move frequently, including recently from our Mwenezi sites to Masukwe to mine purple amethyst. There are, however, also many new households coming, especially in the most remote, informal sites. One of the village leaders argued, “if we have many people, then we stay here; the government will not be able to get rid of us, so we have Shangaans from Gezani, Vendas from Beitbridge and Pfumbi from Matibi coming here”.

The average age of household heads in these sites is 47, but 65% have children in the 21-30 age group, with 43.5% now farming, often having got plots in the area, or in other resettlements nearby. Indeed, half of all households had a member who had gained a plot in another resettlement; far higher than other areas. Due to the proximity of the border with South Africa and Mozambique, 34% of households had adult children outside the country, often in low-paid jobs, but nevertheless able to send some remittance income. 41% of households had received some remittance in the past year, which is a high rate compared to other sites, and reflective of the challenges of 2019 as a major drought year.

Overall, populations in this area are marginalised and mobile. Many male heads of household are working elsewhere, and 41% of households are de facto female headed. Women take on important roles in these areas and 37% of households have women involved in an independent business, while 24% have women involved in local leadership roles, often in groups for production and marketing. Educational levels are not as high as in other areas, with only 27% having proceeded beyond Form II at school, while 21% had Master Farmer certificates.

Everyone grows maize, but also sorghum. Total outputs are highly variable, with maize varying between an average of 297 kg and 1816 kg per household between 2107 and 2019. Sorghum production was a bit less variable and averaged about one tonne per household over the period. Although yields were way down in 2019, in the previous two years around 43% of households produced more than a tonne of maize and around 36% of households produced more than a tonne of sorghum. This is perhaps surprising given the marginal agroecology, but demonstrates the high variability of production. With decent rainfall, the good soils produce well in favourable years, but production drops to vanishingly little in other years, meaning grain storage and other off-farm incomes are required. Mr TG explained the consequences of this variability:

We came from Chivi communal area in 2000 with just three donkeys. I bought cattle since. I bought six at one time in 2004 from a bumper crop of cotton and sorghum. The highest number we had was in 2008 when there were 17. Since then the animals died from drought, and we have had to sell many over time. Drought is now every year.

One of the sites in this area (Uswaushava) was the centre of a cotton boom in the 2000s, but this dropped off as prices collapsed. Only in the last year or two has cotton picked up again, and in 2019, a quarter of households had a contract for cotton growing. To replace cotton, farmers in this area diversified into other contracted crops, including lablab bean, sesame and water melon; all of which generated decent profits. Those with gardens along the river – which is now nearly everyone – grow water melons, which are marketed in huge quantities along the road and to nearby towns. The water melon business is especially important for younger farmers. Without other land, they can get small portions by the river, and once they have a pump they can expand production, transporting their crop in cars they have acquired or on buses that move along the Ngundu-Chiredzi road.

The area is highly suited to livestock production given the ‘sweet veld’ of this region, but herd sizes are not large, with household holdings of cattle on average 7.4 head and goats 7.8 head. However, only 9% had no cattle at all. 38% of households had purchased cattle in the last five years, and 57% had sold at least one during the 2019 drought period. 59% had sold at least one goat, and two-thirds of households had sold poultry. Livestock as a source of livelihood, usually for coping with drought, are essential. Mr HM from Turf Ranch explained:

I arrived here with very few cattle. They grew to a large herd. Now I have only 24, but I have bought a tractor (in 2014) and a truck (in 2018), as well as invested in a well and pump (in 2012) and a grinding mill (in 2015). Cattle were bought from selling sorghum and the herd grew on its own. I have a large area of land, and the soil is good if there’s rain. My sons tried their luck in South Africa, but failed and I have allocated them land. All three of my wives have land too. There is plenty here – you just have to clear the bush!

Because of the variability of crop production, a diversified livelihood is essential. Here, the type of off-farm income sources include pottery/basket making (38% of households), piece work (48%) and cross-border trading (44%). Because of the marginality of the area, some 67% had been provided some form of welfare during the previous 12 months, in the form of food aid/cash support from the state or NGOs/church groups. However, all our informants commented that life was better in the new resettlements:

Despite the droughts, life here is good, much better than before. We don’t suffer that much from the drought, and we get good yields in some years, and if not we always have a beast to sell. Our relatives from Chivi come and get food here, and they come and sell labour in drought periods too. Things are definitely going up. We have household utensils, decent blankets and so on. It might look like something small, but it’s definitely an improvement. Others even have cars, everyone has bicycles and there are lots of livestock here. Scotch carts are like wheelbarrows now, and pumps and solar panels are everywhere.

Looking forward, people again comment on the importance of irrigation. There are some river bank irrigation areas in these sites, and people have started buying pumps and selling vegetables, including to various boarding schools. Domestic water supplies are also a challenge, but compared to when the land was invaded and settled, things have improved. “We used to have to go with carts and barrows up to eight kilometres, but now many have dug boreholes and with so many scotch carts in the areas it’s so much easier”, said one informant from Uswaushava.

Asked about the persistence of informal status on the land, our informants were less concerned than they were a decade or so ago, when protests to argue for their land rights were organised. “No-one comes to bother us”, one informant commented. These places are far away from the centres of power and administration and the state is largely absent. After a long silence, the same informant said, “yes the state does help us – certainly social welfare for the needy and cotton seed and maize seed are provided. We however had to build the school and clinic ourselves, although they provide the staff. And it was the church that paid for the first borehole”. Even in the remotest site in Mwenezi, our informants admitted that the state was now more present than before, and they have graded the road and a clinic and school nearby are being built, but extension workers are rare, and the government “doesn’t really bother us”.

In the Mwenezi sites, where turnover of plots is high and there are is a constant flow of people, the governance arrangements are more fluid than the more settled sites such as Uwwaushava where the original Committee of Seven continues to function. In Turf ranch, for example, the number of sabhukus (headmen) has increased from four to 18 since 2000, reflecting the influx of people. This is facilitated by village leaders who get paid for new land, and churches who attract followers and bring them to new land. Although wildlife damage remains a problem, and especially from elephants, there is perceived to be a large amount of land, and the under-used A2 farms nearby offer free, unrestricted grazing for now. For many years, these sites were remote, frontier settlements, operating under different rules, but increasingly they are being incorporated into state administration and wider economic circuits. Transport is easier now, for example. Eleven households have cars and scotch carts in Turf ranch, making transport to nearby townships easier. Cars are bought in exchange for cattle, and dealers from as far as Harare come and sell, knowing that in good years farmers in these remote new resettlements have money to spend.

As in our other case study areas, across a variety of income sources, some people are able to accumulate and invest. Perhaps surprisingly 33% had bought ploughs in the past five years, 22% had bought carts and 59% had bought solar panels. Unlike in the other areas covered in previous blogs, the investments are, however, intermittent and the result of infrequent windfalls – a good sorghum or maize crop, the selling of cotton, the sale of cattle and so on. Accumulation is a stop-start affair, but nevertheless, compared to when they first settled many – probably at least a third – are doing well, and comment how life has improved.

The townships and open markets in these areas are witness to the underlying strength of the economy. The weekly Chikombedzi bakosi market is always full, and many women are involved in the Mwenezi sites in trading, including selling goats in Limpopo, South Africa, as well as mopane worms across the region when in season. Similarly, the township near Uswaushava resettlement area now has 20 shops, several grinding mills as well as the usual selection of bottle stores/bars, with many of these up-and-coming businesses owned by farmers, with them being started from agricultural proceeds, notably cotton and vegetable sales.

Despite this, overall, households in these informal A1 areas in these remote, dry parts of the country are poorer and more vulnerable that the other A1 resettlement areas in Masvingo province. But nevertheless, these are not the same as nearby communal areas from where they mostly originally came from. A significant group are even are to accumulate, even if unevenly, and invest both in fine buildings, new township businesses and farming.

This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on ZimbabwelandLed by Felix Murimbarimba, the Masvingo team is: Moses Mutoko, Thandiwe Shoko, Tanaka Murimbarimba, Liberty Tavagwisa, Tongai Murimbarimba, Vimbai Museva, Jacob Mahenehene, Tafadzwa Mavedzenge (data entry) and Shingirai, the driver. Thanks to the research team, ministry of agriculture officials and the many farmers who have supported the work over the years.

Post published in: Agriculture

From tragedy to farce – Zimbabwe Vigil Diary

https://www.flickr.com/photos/zimbabwevigil/49956634397/sizes/m/

Three young women arrested after attending a peaceful demonstration in Harare and then mysteriously driven through the night to Bindura to be tortured and sexually abused in holes in the ground: that’s tragic.

A few days later the traumatised trio are charged with breaking lockdown regulations and demonstrating against hunger at a bizarre court hearing held at their hospital bedside surrounded by security agents: that’s farce.

Only totally formulaic Zanu PF could come up with such a predictable circus. Only Zanu PF could scrape the barrel for such a variety of unlikely excuses to obscure the obvious: that state agents were to blame – as they have been for countless victims before and after the Vigil’s friend Itai Dazmara was abducted five years ago.

The first Zanu PF excuse was the story that the victims were in fact prostitutes and were beaten up when they asked to be paid in foreign currency. Ten out of ten for imagination, but perhaps a little too theatrical?

Then there was the claim that they had beaten themselves up (or asked their husbands or party comrades to do it). No marks for this one: too melodramatic, as the hospital doctors stitching them together could attest.

Former Mugabe fan, British citizen now government information flunkey, Nick Mangwana offered a different script: it was all the work of Mugabe followers. Who knows – perhaps Grace herself? Well, the show needs a proper villain surely?

No? Perhaps you prefer General Moyo’s scenario: a piece of stage-managed theatre organised by a ‘third force’ was responsible designed to soil the image of the government. This sounds a reliable standby. Maybe Joshua Nkomo’s lot or Rhodesian Front relics or Blair’s mob? We all know they are lurking somewhere ready to grab the limelight when our defences are down.

But of course the buck stops with impresario Mnangagwa, who dismissed the incident as ‘cheap atrocity propaganda’ unworthy of the stage. He was supported by former all-weather actor and now stand-in Zanu PF spokesman Patrick Chinamasa, who complained that the three women were refusing to co-operate with the police.

The onus was on them to prove they were abducted, Chinamasa declared. Beating his chest, he declaimed ‘We find it abhorrent that to date neither the three lady complainants nor their family members or their friends have made a formal report to the police, suggesting that they don’t want the truth to come out’.

An MDC spokesperson Gladys Hlatshwayo dismissed Zanu PF statements on the abductions: ‘The three were abducted at a police station by people who purported to be police officers. How can one even be able to talk to the same people who abducted her and put them through such a situation? How can the police investigate themselves? This is why we are calling for an independent investigation into the abductions,’ she said

Ms Hlatshwayo suggested the situation had moved from farce to fiasco: ‘The police have failed to investigate the August 1, 2018 shooting where seven people were shot dead in broad daylight by armed soldiers. Even after a commission led by (former) South African President Kgalema Motlanthe, they have failed to arrest just one person for the killings; 49 abductions since January 2019, not a single arrest.’ (See: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2020/05/mdc-a-activists-charged-at-hospital-hearing/.)

Other points

  • Because of the coronavirus we can no longer physically meet outside the Zimbabwe Embassy in London, so we have a virtual Vigil while the lockdown continues. We ask our activists to put on Vigil / ROHR / Zimbabwe regalia and take a photo of themselves holding an appropriate poster reflecting our protest against human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. The photos are uploaded on our Flickr site (see: https://www.flickr.com/photos/zimbabwevigil/albums/72157714525735123). Our virtual Vigil activists today were Deborah Harry, Shylette Chipangura, Esther Munyira and Molly Ngavaimbe who all kindly contributed to Vigil funds.
  • For Vigil pictures check: http://www.flickr.com/photos/zimbabwevigil/. Please note: Vigil photos can only be downloaded from our Flickr website.

NOTICES:

  • The Restoration of Human Rights in Zimbabwe (ROHR) is the Vigil’s partner organization based in Zimbabwe. ROHR grew out of the need for the Vigil to have an organization on the ground in Zimbabwe which reflected the Vigil’s mission statement in a practical way. ROHR in the UK actively fundraises through membership subscriptions, events, sales etc to support the activities of ROHR in Zimbabwe. Please note that the official website of ROHR Zimbabwe is http://www.rohrzimbabwe.org/. Any other website claiming to be the official website of ROHR in no way represents us.
  • The Vigil’s book ‘Zimbabwe Emergency’ is based on our weekly diaries. It records how events in Zimbabwe have unfolded as seen by the diaspora in the UK. It chronicles the economic disintegration, violence, growing oppression and political manoeuvring – and the tragic human cost involved. It is available at the Vigil. All proceeds go to the Vigil and our sister organisation the Restoration of Human Rights in Zimbabwe’s work in Zimbabwe. The book is also available from Amazon.
  • Facebook pages:
    Vigil: https://www.facebook.com/zimbabwevigil
    ROHR: https://www.facebook.com/Restoration-of-Human-Rights-ROHR-Zimbabwe-International-370825706588551/
    ZAF: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Zimbabwe-Action-Forum-ZAF/490257051027515

Post published in: Featured

Law Librarians Helping Law Firms Meet COVID-19 Research and Practice Challenges

Every law firm was blindsided by the COVID-19 pandemic. But librarians were faced two special challenges: assuring that the remote workforce of lawyers had access to standard resources and fielding the tsunami of questions arising from the emergence of “pandemic law and practice.” Lexis, Westlaw, Bloomberg, WoltersKluwer and Fastcase quickly responded to the crisis with special toolkits and resources in the first weeks primarily focused laws and policies issued by state and federal legislative bodies. COVID-19 was different – it spawned a whirlwind of local pandemic laws that no one was prepared to track and collect.

Libraries were anything but quiet as COVID emptied law offices across the country. In New York Patricia Barbone, Director of Library Services at Hughes, Hubbard & Reed noted in an interview that since the firm issued the first work-from-home policy, her staff was “actually working longer days – the commute has all been given back to the firm. We are very dedicated and want to do everything possible to help our lawyers support our clients or help position our firm for potential business in this new pandemic and post-pandemic environment. “

On the West Coast Cynthia Brown, Director Research Services at Littler reported that COVID resulted in a dramatic uptick in demands on the research team. “As a Labor and Employment firm, we have been inundated with questions from employers. Every question has been urgent, and most questions required a response from a very recently developed team of subject matter experts (SMEs).” The Littler research team was charged with funneling all questions through their tracking system, and getting each question to the correct SME on a newly created COVID task force. The research department also began tracking developments and helping the Knowledge Management team curate content. In less than a week, we created a new repository of firm work product to address the crisis. This repository grows on a daily (sometimes hourly) basis. The researchers also assist with a three daily newsflash’s which provide critical updates.’”

When the Law is in a Text Message! When California Governor Gavin Newsom issued the nation’s first state “stay at home” order on March 19, 2020, no one was prepared for the relentless cascade of orders, ordinances and policies issued from every kind of local governmental unit (cities, counties, towns, boroughs, villages) as well as administrative units overseeing issues such as health, transportation, public utilities, fair housing…One firm has located over 8,000 local COVID related laws and policies.
Across the US. law librarians and knowledge managers began developing a “skunk-works” approach to gathering what was normally viewed as the “ephemera” of legal documents: governors’ proclamations and agency policy statements. Most states lacked a systematic publication plan and most failed to publish all the COVID materials on one central website. Sometimes these life altering statements were issued as tweets, texts, on Facebook or other social media sites. Finding COVID materials was not unlike a scavenger hunt. Lexis, Westlaw and Bloomberg have all begun to tackle the challenges of local laws but the legal publishers are focused on the largest cities. Law firms need to advise clients who have facilities rural areas and law librarians are filling that vacuum. Law firm themselves have to understand the local policies for the office locations as they develop their reopening plans. COVID litigation for business interruption, labor claims, personal injury, contract disputes are the bread and butter of litigation departments. Librarians will be critical in identifying the best tracking sources and strategies for alerting lawyers to business development opportunities. According to the Hunton Andrews Kurth COVID-19 Complaint  tracker, 2,360 COVID related complaints have been filed across the US.

COVID A Boon for Technology Adoption. Barbone reports that many projects have been focused towards business development and librarians are using their expertise on legislation, industries, and legal practice areas to guide junior lawyers drafting firm advisories and introducing them to existing research products that they previously didn’t use including ebooks. Technology adoption has been enhanced by the COVID environment. Barbone noted that resources “become relevant only when you have an applicable use case, and we are trying to take advantageous the teachable moments.” While librarians’ core responsibilities are to select, deploy, organize, and train technology enabled products, the new virtual workplace has provided librarians with the opportunity to expose lawyers to existing products which can help them “draft, analyze, research, produce etc. legal work product faster, better, and cheaper.”

Opportunities for the future. Littler’s Brown sees ongoing opportunity for the research department to shine. “We are looking at “the future” trying to determine what that might look like. The research department has been asked to assist a firm committee that is drawing up plans on how the firm will respond to the whatever that future is. We are taking the work we have done so far and finding ways to apply our new processes to the anticipated demand. For example, we have created a new way to track in Service Now packages that our Task Force created for clients. This allows us to track our work, but also to run a report to alert requesting attorneys when the package has been updated and they need to advise their clients of new changes to the law/issues. This process is also allowing us to assist with proper billing for work product. We plan for the firm to create more of this specialized work product in the future, and the research department will be vital in keeping that organized and properly commoditized.”

The pandemic will recede but the impact on the country and the legal profession will linger. One thing is certain – law firm have met the virtual workplace and that impact will endure. Barbone observed that one positive development has been the opportunity “to work in groups that include all levels of staff and attorneys to make better decisions about how the firm will operate in the future.” Law librarians and knowledge mangers will play an important role in helping law firms identify the external resources and develop internal resources necessary for practice in the post COVID legal market.

Zimbabwe’s inflation soars 756 percent in April

31.5.2020 9:16

HARARE (Xinhua) — Zimbabwe’s annual inflation for April stood at 765.57 percent, gaining 89.18 percentage points from the previous month, the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (Zimstat) said on Saturday in a statement.

Inflation stood at 676.39 percent in March.

Zimstat said month-on-month inflation in April was 17.64 percent, having shed 8.95 percentage points from March.

Exchange rate instability, driven by the parallel market, has been pushing up the prices of goods and services in Zimbabwe over the past months.

Zimbabwe has faced a prolonged shortage of foreign currency, which has in turn affected essential imports such as fuel and medical drugs.

Post published in: Business

Eight Portfolio Committees Resume Work

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES SERIES 11/2020

Eight Portfolio Committees Resume Work

There is One Open Meeting on Monday 1st June

Speaker’s Announcement on Committee Meetings and Public Hearings

Committee meetings

On 19th May the Speaker announced to the MPs present for the very short sitting that eight portfolio committees that had direct responsibility and oversight on the Corona Virus outbreak had been selected to implement the responsibilities.  The eight portfolio committees concerned are the committees on:

  1. Youth, Sport and Recreation
  2. Environment, Climate, Tourism and Hospitality Industry
  3. Primary and Secondary Education
  4. Higher and Tertiary Education
  5. Defence, Home Affairs and Security Services
  6. Mines and Mining Development
  7. Information Communication Technology, Postal and Courier Services
  8. Transport and Infrastructural Development.

These eight committees will all be meeting on Monday 1st June, but only one of the meetings will be open to attendance by the members of the public [see below for agenda, time and venue].

Arrangements for other committees to function will be announced in due course.

Public hearings

Also on 19th May the Speaker announced that arrangements for public hearings by committees were being put in place to ensure that the conduct of public business would be in accordance with laid down regulations.

Open Meeting Monday 1st June at 10 am

Portfolio Committee: Defence, Home Affairs and Security Services

Oral evidence from the  Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage  on the management of border posts in the light of the prevailing COVID-19 pandemic.

Venue: National Assembly Chamber.

Please note:  Parliament has warned that due to current restrictions on gatherings in light of COVID 19, attendance at open committee meetings will be limited. 

Members of the public may attend this meeting – but as observers only, not as participants, i.e. they may observe and listen but not speak. If attending, please use the entrance to Parliament on Kwame Nkrumah Ave between 2nd and 3rd Streets. Please note that IDs must be produced.  Masks and social distancing will be required.

The details given in this bulletin are based on the latest information from Parliament. But, as there are sometimes last-minute changes to the meetings schedule, persons wishing to attend should avoid disappointment by checking with the committee clerk that the meeting concerned is still on and open to the public. Parliament’s telephone numbers are Harare 2700181 and 2252940/1.

Reminder: Members of the public, including Zimbabweans in the Diaspora, can at any time send written submissions to Parliamentary committees by email addressed to [email protected] or by letter posted to the Clerk of Parliament, P.O. Box 298, Causeway, Harare or delivered at Parliament’s Kwame Nkrumah Avenue entrance in Harare.

What will Committees be Doing in the Closed Meetings?

Youth National Venture Capacity Fund

The Portfolio Committee on Youth, Sport and Recreation will be deliberating on evidence received previously from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development on the administration of this fund.

Forest Amendment Bill

The Portfolio Committee on Environment, Climate, Tourism and Hospitality Industry will be considering its draft report on this Bill, for presentation during the Second Reading debate on the Bill.  The Bill is available on the Veritas website [linkand is item 5 on the National Assembly Order Paper for Tuesday 2nd June.  Our comments on the Bill in Bill Watch 31/2020 are repeated here:

This Bill, amongst other amendments to the Forest Act, has a clause [clause 12] amending section 78 of the Act, which provides for what the Act calls “major offences”.  For setting of fires without authority in both State and private forests, clause 12 removes the option of a minimum fine from the existing mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of section 78(2) – this makes a minimum prison sentence of 5 years or, in less serious cases, 1 year, mandatory.  For fires left unattended on other land the levels of the existing mandatory fines in section 78(3) are reduced without changing the existing prison sentences.

Clause 12 also proposes adding a new section 78(4), which will oblige “the Court” [presumably a court sentencing someone for contravening section 78(1), (2) or (3)?] to ”take into account such aggravating factors as loss of human life, livestock, wildlife and other property”.  It then adds an incomprehensible proviso that “penalties for such offences” [which offences?] “shall apply as is provided for under the Parks and Wildlife Act … or the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform Act … whichever is greater”.  MPs will certainly need to demand a full explanation of this puzzling proviso.

There are other measures too, for instance, to decentralise to forestry and environmental officers decisions on such matters as the adequacy of fireguards.  The Bill also includes provisions designed to ensure the Forestry Commission Board includes persons with special qualifications in forestry, environmental planning and management and ecology, and that its membership and the staffing of the Commission is gender-balanced.

Veritas makes every effort to ensure reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied.

Post published in: Featured