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If you only had $1, you would definitely want to use it wisely and stretch it as far as you can. You wouldn’t just throw away 87 cents of your only dollar. Especially if you found out that you could actually spend just 27 cents to achieve the same goal.

Now let’s apply this example to mobility. A gasoline or diesel car’s internal combustion engine (ICE) literally burns fossil fuels and emits harmful gases. In doing all that, it is only about 13% efficient. This is represented beautifully in this wonderful chart from Transport & Environment that was covered this week by Zachary Shahan:

On the other hand, battery electric vehicles’ efficiency is around 73%. (In this article, we will ignore one of Toyota’s favorite technologies, hydrogen fuel cell cars.)

This story easily applies to a lot of countries, but we will again use Zimbabwe as an example to paint this picture as we saw in our recent article. Ditching ICE vehicles as fast as we can makes a lot of economic sense. Petrol and diesel imports account for a massive 30% of Zimbabwe’s total import bill! That’s about $1.2 billion annually. Don’t forget, they spend a little more on top of that to import ICE vehicle spare parts and engine oils, etc.

Zimbabwe has been experiencing a prolonged petrol and diesel shortage for 3 years and counting, with no solution in sight. The country is struggling to raise foreign currency to import these fossil fuels, so spending 30% of its hard-earned foreign currency by literally burning it in ICE vehicles is just crazy! Zimbabwe earns most of its foreign currency from exporting its mining and agricultural products.

Zimbabwe family shows that even with 18-hour daily grid outages, most people could live comfortably with an EV. Image courtesy of Brendan Wright.

After all that work from families trying to make a living toiling on the farms and mines for several months, the country really should be more prudent with all those hard-earned US dollars. Filling up an ICE vehicle’s tank can also be quite a challenge in Zimbabwe, and it could involve waiting in a queue at a petrol station for a day or two! Charging EVs overnight at homes or at office parks and malls whilst they’re parked could help solve this problem. That’s bringing a solution whose value proposition would be convenience. But the biggest benefit would still be on the financial side.

A 2015 Subaru Crosstrek ordered online from IBC Japan and delivered to Harare, Zimbabwe. Picture by Gladys Mukwazhi.

Let’s take a look at some examples. Zimbabwe has been importing around 70,000 vehicles per year in recent times. Most of these are used vehicles from Japan and the United Kingdom. Most people shop online on sites such as Beforward. Yes, buying a car online is actually quite common in this part of the world, as covered here. After making a payment, the cars generally arrive within 6 weeks. In fact, you can even buy a car online with Bitcoin, especially in countries like Zimbabwe where there is a shortage of foreign currency and moving foreign currency can be a nightmare with long wait times as local banks struggle to meet demand. Some of the popular vehicles that are part of the 70,000 are listed in the table below:

*Nissan Leaf added for comparison purposes. Although, some used Nissan Leafs are now being imported by people as well.

The Wright family’s Nissan Leaf. Image courtesy of Brendan Wright.

If we take the lower limit from this table and assume all the 70,000 vehicles are $7000 vehicles, that’s at least $490 million spent on importing used motor vehicles per year. Then $1.2 billion to fuel them and the rest of the existing fleet, which is about 1.5 million vehicles.

It would make much more sense to catalyze the adoption of EVs such as the Nissan Leafs, saving the much-needed foreign currency. Reducing or removing import duties and taxes would be a good starting point. The used Nissan Leafs could then end up being cheaper than a used Toyota Mark X. On the total cost of ownership (TCO) front, it’s not even a contest, as the Leaf wins by a mile. Living with an EV in Zimbabwe is not as hard as people may think, as discussed here.

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Sanctions cannot stop the PROCUREMENT OF MORE THAN 200 ISUZU, D4D for campaigning Mps but can stop the government from buying ambulances for hospitals.

Sanctions cannot stop Zimbabwe from importing Mercedes Benz Maybach S600 from Germany but can stop the same government from importing water treatment chemical from abroad.

Sanctions cannot stop the president from chartering the state of the art plane for VP to be treated in China/India but can stop the government from refurbishing ZISCO STEEL/CSC.

Sanctions cannot stop Mthuli from using USD but can stop the government from paying workers USDs.

Sanctions cannot stop Namibia from using 2 units at Hwange but can stop the government from refurbishing the same at Hwange.

Sanctions never came to kill people in August 2018 and in January 2019

Sanctions never carried out a coup

Sanctions never rigged elections

Sanctions never stole US$15 bn
Is it the sanctions that are stopping ED from bringing to book the culprits that are behind the looting in the country despite them being named and known

Sanctions never steal state funds to fund fake projects like Command Agriculture
Is it the sanctions that are stopping ED from implementing recommendations by the Montlante commission

Sanctions never allowed Tagwirei to do as he pleases with his Sakunda shit
Be careful before you match on the 25 October because you are simply contributing towards another man’s pockets.

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The Attorney-General’s Office Amendment Bill

Introduction

This is an odd Bill, in that it will amend an Act of Parliament which was passed by Parliament nearly nine years ago but has never been brought into force.  Some of the Bill’s provisions are even odder, as we shall show in this Bill Watch.

Background to the Bill

The Attorney-General’s Office Act

The Act to be amended by the Bill is the Attorney-General’s Office Act [link], which was gazetted as an Act on the 10th July 2011 but has never been brought into force.  Section 1(2) of the Act requires the Act’s date of commencement to be fixed by the President by statutory instrument in the Government Gazette, but the President has never published such an instrument.

The Act dates from the time of the former Constitution, when the Attorney-General was not only chief Government legal adviser but also held exclusive and independent responsibility for prosecuting criminal proceedings in all courts.  He [and all our Attorneys-General have been men] discharged these responsibilities with the assistance of one or more Deputy Attorneys-General and a large staff of civil servants serving in several divisions covering prosecutions, drafting legislation, representing Government in civil legal matters, giving legal advice and exercising certain statutory functions.  The Attorney-General and his deputies, however, were not themselves members of the Public Service [now the Civil Service].  They were appointed and exercised their functions under section 76 of the old Constitution.

The Act was intended to transfer the whole of the then Attorney-General’s Office, including prosecutors, to a new entity outside the Public Service called “the Attorney-General’s Office” which would have its own Board and administration to provide administrative services previously provided by the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.

Deferral of commencement of the Act

Bringing the Act into effect was deferred, probably because it was envisaged that the new Constitution would separate the offices of Attorney-General and Prosecutor-General;  possibly also because, as rumoured, the then Attorney-General Mr Tomana objected to not being chairman of his own Office’s Board.  Whatever the reason, the deferral has lasted for nearly nine years and the Act is no longer consistent with the new [i.e. the present] Constitution.

The Present Constitutional Provisions on the Attorney-General

In terms of section 114 of the Constitution the Attorney-General is appointed by the President as the Government’s principal legal adviser with additional responsibility for representing the Government in non-criminal legal proceedings and drafting the Government’s legislation.  Under section 115, he or she can be removed at any time by the President ‒ this follows from the fact that everyone, including the Government, must have the power to change their legal advisers whenever they want to.  The Attorney-General can act through subordinate officers in terms of section 114(3) but, beyond saying that, the Constitution does not deal with the appointment of Deputy Attorneys-General nor with the establishment and structure of an Attorney-General’s Office.

Attorney-General and deputies are currently part of Civil Service

Surprising as it may seem to the current Attorney-General and his deputies, all of them are civil servants except for one deputy who was appointed under the old Constitution.  This is because under section 199(2) of the Constitution the Civil Service consists of persons employed by the State excluding members of the security services, judicial officers, members of constitutional Commissions, the staff of Parliament and other persons whose offices or posts are stated by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament not to form part of the Civil Service.  The Constitution does not exclude the Attorney-General and his deputies from the Civil Service, nor does any Act of Parliament ‒ at least until the Attorney-General’s Office Act is brought into operation.  Until then they are civil servants and their conditions of service should, strictly speaking, be fixed by the Civil Service Commission under section 203 of the Constitution, rather than by the President.

In fact the conditions of service of the Attorney-General and his deputies have been fixed by the President, purportedly in terms of section 340(1)(e) of the Constitution which states that a power to appoint someone includes power to fix their conditions of service.

Need for the Bill

What we have said in the preceding two paragraphs illustrates one reason for the Bill.  Another is that members of the Attorney-General’s staff probably feel the need for change.  They are still members of the Civil Service, and have been left behind by their former colleagues and contemporaries who are now members of the National Prosecuting Authority.  This has happened despite the fact that the original intention behind the Attorney-General’s Office Act was that all members of the office, not just members of the prosecutions division, should be separated from the Civil Service in the interests of impartiality and independence in the provision of all legal services to Government and the need to hire and retain staff of the right calibre.  More generally, it is necessary to update the Act to bring it into line with the Constitution.

Analysis of the Bill

The Bill will go some way at least towards bringing the Attorney-General’s Office Act into line with the Constitution

Updated preamble

Clause 2 replaces the preamble to the Act with an extract from the present Constitution, replacing the existing extract from the former Constitution.

Appointment of Deputy Attorneys-General

As we pointed out earlier, although the former Constitution provided for the appointment of Deputy Attorneys-General, the present Constitution does not.  Section 340(3) of the present Constitution, however, permits an Act of Parliament to provide for appointment of deputies to the holder of any constitutional office.  Clause 4 of the Bill will accordingly insert a new section 2A into the principal Act to allow the President to appoint Deputy Attorneys-General after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.  They will not be civil servants, and the Government will not be allowed to reduce their salaries and allowances during their tenure of office.

Composition of the Attorney-General’s Office Board

Clause 6 amends section 4 of the principal Act to make the Attorney-General the chairperson of the Attorney-General’s Office Board, replacing the existing provision for the chairperson to be a former judge or senior lawyer from outside the Office.  Deputy Attorneys-General will not be members of the Board.

Ministries not to employ lawyers without Attorney-General’s approval

Clause 7 of the Bill inserts a new section 11A prohibiting Government Ministries and departments from “engaging the services of a person under an employment contract to render any legal services relating to the functions of the Attorney-General’s Office without the approval of the Attorney-General”.  Note that the clause only prevents Ministries from engaging lawyers as employees;  it will not prevent them from engaging lawyers as consultants to provide legal advice, nor will it prevent Ministries from engaging lawyers to represent them in court ‒ because such lawyers are never engaged as employees.

Binding nature of Attorney-General’s opinions on questions of law

Clause 8 of the Bill inserts an extraordinary new section 22A in the Act which will state that opinions of the Attorney-General on questions of law are binding on the Executive unless overturned by a court of law.  What this means is that the opinion of even the most junior member of the Attorney-General’s Office will bind the Government, including the President, even if the opinion is palpably wrong.

While this may have been the practice [to encourage Ministries to follow legal advice given to them by the Attorney-General] it is not always appropriate to convert a practice into law.  Making the Attorney-General’s opinions and advice legally binding on the whole Government may turn out to be counter-productive:

• It may encourage those suing Government to add a new ground for their complaints:  that the Minister or other official being sued went against the Attorney-General’s legal opinion in contravention of an Act of Parliament [although such opinions are meant to be confidential, it is notorious that nothing remains confidential in Zimbabwe for long].
• It will lead to the anomaly that if a Permanent Secretary declines to follow an incorrect opinion given to him by the Attorney-General’s Office, he or she will be breaking the law [i.e. the new section 22A] while at the same time complying with the law as it really is.
• It may give rise to pointless disputes within the Government over whether an opinion was on a question of law, or a question of fact, or question of mixed law and fact.

We recommend that when the Second Reading debate resumes MPs should press the Minister to rethink this clause.

Law officers in Ministries to become members of Attorney-General’s Office on secondment

Clause 9 of the Bill is very obscure.  It provides that every “law officer” [i.e. a civil servant employed in a Ministry to do legal work] is “deemed to be seconded” to that Ministry “until reassigned by the Attorney-General”.  The Attorney-General cannot reassign civil servants ‒ that is the function of the Civil Service Commission.  Perhaps the clause was supposed to mean that the law officers are to be taken out of the Civil Service and transformed, without any option, into members of the Attorney-General’s Office.  If that was the intention, the clause does not say so;  in any event, it may well be unconstitutional to transfer people out of the Civil Service and into another service without their consent.

Commencement of the Bill

The Bill does not have a delayed date of commencement so it will come into effect as law immediately it is published in the Gazette as an Act, and the amendments it makes will thereupon be incorporated into the Attorney-General’s Office Act.  That Act, however, is not yet in operation so the amendments will not take effect until the President has published a notice in the Gazette bringing the Act into operation.

As we pointed out at the beginning of this bulletin, it is odd to amend an Act which has not yet come into operation, but it is legally permissible to do so.

General comments on the Bill

The Bill has not been carefully checked.  Typos and incorrect punctuation and omissions of capital letters abound.  It is disappointing that the Attorney-General’s Office allowed a document with so many minor flaws to be sent to Parliament and gazetted.  This lack of attention to detail prompts one to wonder whether the principal Act has been carefully read through from beginning to end to check whether the passage of nine years has necessitated any updating not covered by the Bill.  We have found a couple of instances:

• Section 4(2), which states that the minimum number of women on the Attorney-General’s Office Board must be “at least three or four” needs to be clarified.
• references to the “Comptroller and Auditor-General” in section 21 need to be updated – the title is now Auditor General.
• the date “31st December 2010” in section 27(6) needs correcting.

More importantly for the Attorney-General himself, a provision should be inserted stating that his salary and allowances cannot be reduced while he holds office [the Bill contains such a provision for the Deputy Attorneys-General but nothing is said about the Attorney-General].

Status of the Bill

The Bill was gazetted on the 21st February and was referred to the Parliamentary Legal Committee [PLC] immediately after its First Reading in the National Assembly on the 18th March, the day Parliament adjourned to comply with measures against the COVID-19 pandemic.  It has had a non-adverse report from the Parliamentary Legal Committee, but because of COVID-19 there have been no public hearings.

Veritas makes every effort to ensure reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied.

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Harare West legislator Hon. Joana Mamombe aged 27 years, Cecelia
Chimbiri aged 31 years and Netsai Marova aged 25 years appeared before
Magistrate Makwande after they were arrested by Zimbabwe Republic
Police members and charged with a cocktail of charges including
publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the state
as defined in section 31(a)(ii) of the Criminal Law (Codification and
Reform) Act, publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial
to the state as defined in section 31(a)(iii) of the Criminal Law
(Codification and Reform) Act.

The trio was also charged with defeating or obstructing the course of
justice as defined in section 184(1)(f) of the Criminal Law
(Codification and Reform) Act.

Prosecutor Charles Muchemwa told Magistrate Makwande that Hon.
Mamombe, Chimbiri and Marova stage managed their abduction and told
falsehoods to their lawyers, relatives and friends that they had been
abducted on 13 May 2020.

Muchemwa said the false statements by the MDC-Alliance youth leaders
attracted some adverse comments from local and international
organisations including from some heads of missions at some foreign
embassies and the United Nations Special Rapporteurs, who condemned
the abduction and torture, thereby tarnishing the image of the country
and affecting the country’s prospects of an economic recovery.

In response to the allegations by Muchemwa, Alec Muchadehama and
Jeremiah Bamu, the lawyers from Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights,
representing the trio told Magistrate Makwande that their clients were
being victimised for seeking justice over their abduction, torture and
sexual molestation and that the arrest and prosecution of the trio was
an attempt by Zimbabwean authorities to cover up their abduction and
torture.

The lawyers argued that their clients who are victims of abduction and
enforced disappearance and torture had been turned into villains.

While Muchemwa had argued that Hon. Mamombe, Chimbiri and Marova
should be denied bail and detained in prison because they would flee
Zimbabwe with the assistance of some foreign embassies before they
stand trial, Muchadehama and Bamu dismissed the claim as scandalous.

Magistrate Makwande postponed the matter to Monday 15 June 2020 when
she will hand down her ruling on the trio’s bail application.

Hon. Mamombe, Chimbiri and Marova went missing on 13 May 2020 when
they were abducted in Harare and were found on 15 May 2020 after being
dumped in Bindura in Mashonaland Central province.

They have already been charged with committing public violence after
they were arrested on 26 May 2020 for allegedly participating in an
anti-government protest against hunger during the national lockdown
period as defined in section 37 of the Criminal Law (Codification and
Reform) Act and for contravening section 5(3) (a) as read with section
5(1) of Statutory Instrument 99 of 2020 of Public Health (COVID-19
Prevention, Containment and Treatment) (National Lockdown) Order, 2020
and will stand trial in August.

Thursday 11 June 2020 marked day 74 of the national lockdown declared by President Emmerson Mnangagwa and has been in place since 30 March 2020.  The Ministry of Health and Child Care reported an increase in the number of confirmed cases increased to three hundred and thirty-two (332). The number of cumulative tests done stood at fifty-six thousand seven hundred and forty-six (56 746). Of these, fifty-six thousand four hundred and fourteen (56 414) were negative. The number of recoveries increased to fifty-one (51) and the death toll remains at four (4).
2.0       Methodology
Information contained in this report is derived from the following Forum Members:

• Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP)
• Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)
• Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)
• Counselling Services Unit (CSU)
• Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR)
• Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights)

6.0 Court Update
The urgent chamber application filed by Alice Kuvheya and Chitungwiza and Manyame Rural Residents Association against the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Senate President been set down for hearing on 16 June 2020 before Justice Mangota in the High Court in Harare.  The applicants are seeking an urgent order to interdict Parliament of Zimbabwe holding public hearings concerning Constitutional Amendment No.2 Bill until the lockdown is lifted.

5.0 Conclusion
The Forum is concerned with the growing number of COVID-19 confirmed cases at the backdrop of the reopening of schools and tertiary institutions. The Forum urges the government to adequately prepare for the reopening of schools to avoid the spread of the pandemic within academic institutions.

The Forum is concerned with the growing number of citizens defying the lockdown at a time when confirmed COVID-19 cases are on the increase. The Forum, therefore, urges community members to abide by lockdown regulations relating to social distance and the wearing of masks. Conditions in quarantine centres need to be improved to meet World Health Organisation standards to avoid the spread of COVID-19 in isolation centres. Finally, the Forum welcomes the decision by the President to address the nation.

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Flatten the Research Curve

Flatten the Research Curve

Wolters Kluwer

Today is the anniversary of Loving v. Virginia, and in honor of appreciating the magnitude of that opinion, how many states had anti-miscegenation laws on the books?

Hint: Only 16 states still had active laws when Loving was decided, as some states repealed their laws over the course of the 1950s and early 60s.

See the answer on the next page.

Folks who are on the frontlines of diversity and inclusion issues are doing a lot of work right now. Amid the nationwide racial reckoning going on right now, folks who’ve made a career trying to make our workplaces more diverse are still doing that work and dealing with their own trauma at the same time.

In this episode of the Jabot, I talk with Lia Dorsey, newly elected President of the Association of Law Firm Diversity Professionals and Director of Diversity and Inclusion at Dentons, about Biglaw’s response to the violent deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery and the Black Lives Matter movement.

The Jabot podcast is an offshoot of the Above the Law brand focused on the challenges women, people of color, LGBTQIA, and other diverse populations face in the legal industry. Our name comes from none other than the Notorious Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the jabot (decorative collar) she wears when delivering dissents from the bench. It’s a reminder that even when we aren’t winning, we’re still a powerful force to be reckoned with.

Happy listening!

Kathryn Rubino is a Senior Editor at Above the Law, and host of The Jabot podcast. AtL tipsters are the best, so please connect with her. Feel free to email her with any tips, questions, or comments and follow her on Twitter (@Kathryn1).

Last summer we explained why it was a clear 1st Amendment and 5th Amendment violation for the White House to remove Playboy reporter Brian Karem’s press pass, with no warning, after he got into a small verbal tiff with former White House employee Seb Gorka. Lots of Trump supporting people, who seem wholly ignorant of how the Constitution actually works, were very mad at us for reporting on that, and insisted that it was somehow obvious that the White House could revoke a press pass like that, even in retaliation for a reporter’s statements. And yet, just as we predicted, the district court quickly ruled that the White House needed to restore Karem’s pass.

Now, nearly a year later, the DC Appeals court has affirmed that decision and made it quite clear that the White House’s removal of Karem’s pass was unconstitutional. The full ruling is worth reading, and, as with the district court, focuses more on the 5th Amendment due process problems, rather than the 1st Amendment retaliation problems. And just to respond to the same comment that came up multiple times in our comments, no, no one is saying that the White House has to automatically let anyone in to press events. Instead, as the court explains, if the White House is opening up an event to the press, it cannot bar people for “arbitrary” reasons (or for any reasons that violate the 1st Amendment, regarding retaliation for speech).

We began by emphasizing that Sherrill’s claim “[wa]s not premised upon the assertion that the White House must open its doors to the press, conduct press conferences, or operate press facilities.” Id. at 129. But given that “the White House has voluntarily decided to establish press facilities for correspondents who need to report therefrom” and given that “[t]hese press facilities are perceived as being open to all bona fide Washington-based journalists,” we held that “the protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment . . . requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons.” Id. at 129 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, “the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a White House press pass” is not only “protected by the first amendment” but also “undoubtedly qualifies as [a] liberty [interest] which may not be denied without due process of law under the fifth amendment.”

After reciting the details of the verbal encounter between Karem and Gorka, the court notes delves into the 5th Amendment due process problems with Karem’s suspension:

Applying that test, we think Karem’s due process claim is likely to succeed because, on this record, nothing put him on notice of “the magnitude of the sanction”—a month-long loss of his White House access, an eon in today’s news business—that the White House “might impose” for his purportedly unprofessional conduct at the non-press-conference event. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574. True, the Acosta Letter set forth “rules governing future press conferences,” but in that very same letter, the White House expressly declined to adopt “specific provisions for journalist conduct in the open (non-press room) areas of the White House” “in the hope that professional journalistic norms” would “suffice to regulate conduct in those places.” Acosta Letter 1, J.A. 693 (emphasis added). What’s more, although the White House made clear that “failure to abide by” the newly articulated press-conference rules “may result in suspension or revocation of the journalist’s hard pass,” it declined to adopt analogous sanctions for unprofessional conduct at non-press-conference events. Id. Instead, the White House stated that “[i]f unprofessional behavior occur[red] in those settings,” then it would “reconsider this decision”—that is, the lack of formally articulated standards and sanctions—not that it would suspend journalists’ hard passes.

Even assuming the Acosta Letter provided Karem some notice of behavioral expectations “in the open . . . areas of the White House,” id., it failed to put him on notice of “the magnitude of the sanction that [the White House] might impose” for his purported failure to heed any such expectations, Gore, 517 U.S. at 574. To the extent Karem’s “irreverent, caustic” attempts at humor (to use the district court’s language) crossed some line in the White House’s view, those transgressions were at least arguably similar to previous journalistic misbehavior that elicited no punishment at all, let alone a month’s exile. Karem, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 215. In the context of a White House press corps described as an “unruly mob,” id. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted), Karem’s behavior was not so outrageous as to bring into fair contemplation the unprecedented sanction visited on him.

The White House’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.

In rejecting each of the White House’s arguments, the appeals court even calls one such argument “absurd.”

Finally, raising the specter of the absurd, the White House argues that it cannot be the case that “the Press Secretary would be powerless to take action even were a reporter to ‘moon’ the President, shout racial epithets at a foreign dignitary, or sexually harass another member of the press corps.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 4. But just as “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others,” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, the White House cannot defend the thirty-day suspension here on the ground that some other, egregious conduct might justify the same sanction. And even if the White House could impose that sanction for such egregious conduct consistent with due process, Karem’s behavior as reflected in the preliminary injunction record fell below that threshold. Notions of professionalism are, after all, context-dependent. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“[A]n act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.”). “[W]ithin the context of such an unruly event” as the Summit, “where jocular insults had been flying from all directions,” Karem, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 215–16, Karem’s statements were not so egregious as to justify suspending his hard pass for thirty days without prior notice.

Of course, the White House was still able to keep Karem suspended for 18 days before the original decision came down, and even this alone might be intimidating to the White House press corps, which was undoubtedly the key reason behind this in the first place.

Appeals Court Again Says That The White House Can’t Just Remove A Press Pass Because It Didn’t Like A Reporter Mocking Seb Gorka

New York Legislators Dump Law That Allowed PDs To Withhold Officers’ Disciplinary Records
The DOJ’s Plan To ‘Fix’ The T-Mobile Merger Is Already A Hot Mess
Another 91 Cases Linked To Lying Houston Cop Involved In A Botched Drug Raid Have Been Dismissed

Do you like money? Of course you do, you’ve got student loans to pay off. Do you like prestige? Obviously, you’re a Type A law student. If you’re like the majority of your colleagues and you’d like to embark upon upon a career path that’ll pad your wallet and get you in on the ground floor at a prestigious firm, then you’ll probably want to compete for a job at a large firm.

Law.com produced several helpful charts based on law school employment data for the class of 2019. Today, we will take a look at one of the more interesting charts, the law schools that sent the highest percentage of their most recent graduating class into large firms with 100 or more lawyers. On this list, you’ll find a dazzling array of law schools from the T14, but we’re not here to tell you what you already know — that graduates of top law schools get top jobs. That being said, we’re going to dive a little deeper into the list and highlight the schools you may not realize are some of the top large-firm contenders. Here they are for your viewing pleasure:

26. Howard: 30.08 percent
37. Pittsburgh: 23.33 percent
40. Brooklyn: 22.63 percent
43. Saint Louis: 21.34 percent
50. Loyola-Chicago: 19.80 percent
53. Chicago-Kent: 18.53 percent
54. Case Western: 18.18 percent
65. Albany: 16.18 percent
67. Wayne State: 15.79 percent
70. Seton Hall: 15.00 percent

Click here to see the rest of the law schools with the highest percentage of graduates employed in Biglaw jobs, plus other informative charts detailing the law schools with the highest percentage of graduates working in government and public interest, federal and state clerkships, as well as the law schools with the most unemployed and underemployed graduates.

Are you a recent law school graduate who landed a job at a large firm? What did your law school do to help you? We’re interested in learning about your experiences — good or bad — and may anonymously feature some of your stories on Above the Law. You can email us, text us at (646) 820-8477, or tweet us @atlblog. Thanks!

Law Grads Hiring Report: Job Stats for the Class of 2019 [Law.com]

Staci Zaretsky is a senior editor at Above the Law, where she’s worked since 2011. She’d love to hear from you, so please feel free to email her with any tips, questions, comments, or critiques. You can follow her on Twitter or connect with her on LinkedIn.