Can Zimbabwe’s Independent Complaints Commission win civil society over?


Since
gaining
independence
in
1980,
Zimbabwe
has
grappled
with
an
unaccountable
and
secretive
security sector tarnished
by
decades
of
human
rights
violations.
The
new
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
(ZICC)
provides
a
valuable
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society.

Zimbabwe’s
government
has
traditionally
resisted
calls
for
security
sector
reform,
which
would
have
clashed
with
its
hardline
stance
against
opposition
political
activists
and
human
rights
defenders.
As
a
result,
the
army
and
police
have
– in
defence
of
the
ruling
party
– stifled
freedoms
of
speech,
assembly
and
political
participation
through
arbitrary
arrests,
detention
and
use
of
brute
force.

These
actions,
together
with
the
legacy
of
the
1983-87
Gukurahundi massacres and
continued
electoral violence since
2000,
have
deterred
civil
society
from
contributing
to
security
sector
governance.

Provisions
exist
in
law
to
rectify
the
situation,
but
progress
has
been
slow.
Section
210
of
Zimbabwe’s
2013
constitution
provides
for
an
independent
mechanism
to
receive
and
investigate
citizens’
complaints
against
misconduct
or
violations
caused
by
security
services
– including
the
police,
defence
forces,
intelligence
services,
and
prisons
and
correctional
services.

This
provision
was
however
only
activated
in
2022,
with
the
passing
of
the
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
Act.
A
five-member commission was
sworn
in
two
years
later,
enabling
the
ZICC
to
start
operating.
The
commission
is
led
by
Justice
Webster
Nicholas
Chinamora,
with
other
members
drawn
from
the
legal,
medical
and
policing
professions.

The
ZICC
is
an
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society

Chinamora
is
ambitious
in
his
outlook
for
what
the
commission
can
achieve.
He told The
Herald
 in
January
that
he
wanted
to
‘guide
the
commission
in
achieving
security
sector
reform
through
fostering
a
partnership
between
the
public
and
the
security
sector.’
Effective
collaboration
between
civil
society
organisations
(CSOs)
and
security
institutions
is
vital
to
achieve
this
goal.

But
already,
the
commission’s
independence
is
being
questioned
because
Chinamora
and
another
commissioner,
Oliver
Mandipaka,
have
strong links with
the
ruling party,
the
Zimbabwe
African
National
Union

Patriotic
Front (ZANU–PF).
Those
links
could
influence
how
they
dispense
their
duties,
which
would
erode
public
trust.

Chinamora
has
a
tainted past in
the
justice
system
and
is
perceived
as
too
close
to
President
Emmerson
Mnangagwa.
Mandipaka
is
a
former
Member
of
Parliament
elected
under
the
ZANU–PF
ticket.

As
the
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs
across
the
country
to
gain
public
trust
and
boost
its
impact.
This
could
be
achieved
through
joint
public
awareness-raising
activities
based
on
the
ZICC’s
mandate
to
enhance
citizens’
access
to
and
use
of
its
services.

Opportunities
must
be
created
for
dialogue
between
civil
society
and
the
security
sector
to
share
mutual
concerns
and
approaches
for
oversight
of
security
provision
and
management.
CSOs
can
help
the
ZICC
prevent
misconduct
and
harm
by
security
force
members
by
helping
to
train
police
and
soldiers
on
human
rights
and
security
sector
accountability
and
transparency.

Security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs

The
ZICC
could
draw
lessons
from
Kenya’s
Independent
Policing
Oversight
Authority
and
South
Africa’s
Independent
Police
Investigative
Directorate,
which
have
conducted
joint
awareness
programmes
and
policy
consultations
with
CSOs.

It
could
also
consider
the
African
Union
Policy
Framework
on
Security
Sector
Reform,
which
provides
guide on
how
CSOs
can
engage
in
security
sector
governance.
The
policy
identifies
awareness
raising,
research
and
analysis,
policy
development
and
evaluation,
and
fostering
dialogue
and
gender
equality
as
ways
to
promote
people-centred
security
and
inclusive
security
governance.
These
roles
for
civil
society
clearly
align
with
the
ZICC’s
mandate.

Despite
the
existence
of
laws,
lessons
and
guidance
on
the
issue,
building
productive
relations
with
civil
society
in
Zimbabwe
won’t
be
easy.
At
present,
security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs.
Security
forces
view
civil
society’s
demand
for
accountability
and
better
governance
as
a
threat
to
the
ruling
regime
and
national
security.

CSOs
also
mistrust
direct
engagement
with
security
institutions,
fearing
they
might
antagonise
them
through
public
media
advocacy.
As
an
oversight
body,
the
ZICC
could
help
prevent
this
mistrust
by
creating
platforms
for
ongoing
dialogue.

As
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs

However,
three
major
issues
will
make
collaboration
on
security
sector
governance
difficult.
First,
the
ZICC’s
primary
functions
are
limited
to
reactive,
remedial
actions

investigating
complaints
of
misconduct,
inspecting
detention
facilities
and
recommending
remedial
actions
against
misconduct.

Expanding
the
commission’s
mandate
to
include
proactive,
preventive
responsibilities
would
require
amending
the
ZICC
Act.
That
is
unlikely,
considering
that
the
government
is
already
suppressing
its
work,
as
evidenced
by
delays
in
getting
the
commission
operational.

Second,
the
Private
Voluntary
Organisations
Amendment
Bill
will inhibit civil
society’s
ability
to
function.
If
enacted
into
law,
the
bill
will
restrict
CSOs’
access
to
communities
and
funding
options
and
introduce
strict
registration
and
reporting
requirements,
especially
for
those
working
on
human
rights
advocacy,
peace
and
democracy
building.

Third,
the
ZICC
will
likely
be
under-resourced,
as
happened
with
the
National
Peace
and
Reconciliation
Commission
and
Zimbabwe
Human
Rights
Commission,
tasked
with
investigating
human
rights
violations
including
by
security
forces.
Under
the
provisional
2025 budget allocation,
the
ZICC
received
only
ZiG80
476
000
(US$3
041
869)

way
too
little
for
its
mandated
work
at
this
formative
phase.

The
ZICC
was
established
to
protect
citizens
from
security
services
violations
and
harm
by
fostering
transparency
and
accountability.
Doing
so
would
help
transform
Zimbabwe’s
security
sector
governance,
but
whether
the
ZICC
can
achieve
more
than
its
limited
reactive
mandate
seems
doubtful.
Collaborating
with
civil
society
would
set
it
in
the
right
direction.

Post
published
in:

Featured

Can Zimbabwe’s Independent Complaints Commission win civil society over?


Since
gaining
independence
in
1980,
Zimbabwe
has
grappled
with
an
unaccountable
and
secretive
security sector tarnished
by
decades
of
human
rights
violations.
The
new
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
(ZICC)
provides
a
valuable
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society.

Zimbabwe’s
government
has
traditionally
resisted
calls
for
security
sector
reform,
which
would
have
clashed
with
its
hardline
stance
against
opposition
political
activists
and
human
rights
defenders.
As
a
result,
the
army
and
police
have
– in
defence
of
the
ruling
party
– stifled
freedoms
of
speech,
assembly
and
political
participation
through
arbitrary
arrests,
detention
and
use
of
brute
force.

These
actions,
together
with
the
legacy
of
the
1983-87
Gukurahundi massacres and
continued
electoral violence since
2000,
have
deterred
civil
society
from
contributing
to
security
sector
governance.

Provisions
exist
in
law
to
rectify
the
situation,
but
progress
has
been
slow.
Section
210
of
Zimbabwe’s
2013
constitution
provides
for
an
independent
mechanism
to
receive
and
investigate
citizens’
complaints
against
misconduct
or
violations
caused
by
security
services
– including
the
police,
defence
forces,
intelligence
services,
and
prisons
and
correctional
services.

This
provision
was
however
only
activated
in
2022,
with
the
passing
of
the
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
Act.
A
five-member commission was
sworn
in
two
years
later,
enabling
the
ZICC
to
start
operating.
The
commission
is
led
by
Justice
Webster
Nicholas
Chinamora,
with
other
members
drawn
from
the
legal,
medical
and
policing
professions.

The
ZICC
is
an
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society

Chinamora
is
ambitious
in
his
outlook
for
what
the
commission
can
achieve.
He told The
Herald
 in
January
that
he
wanted
to
‘guide
the
commission
in
achieving
security
sector
reform
through
fostering
a
partnership
between
the
public
and
the
security
sector.’
Effective
collaboration
between
civil
society
organisations
(CSOs)
and
security
institutions
is
vital
to
achieve
this
goal.

But
already,
the
commission’s
independence
is
being
questioned
because
Chinamora
and
another
commissioner,
Oliver
Mandipaka,
have
strong links with
the
ruling party,
the
Zimbabwe
African
National
Union

Patriotic
Front (ZANU–PF).
Those
links
could
influence
how
they
dispense
their
duties,
which
would
erode
public
trust.

Chinamora
has
a
tainted past in
the
justice
system
and
is
perceived
as
too
close
to
President
Emmerson
Mnangagwa.
Mandipaka
is
a
former
Member
of
Parliament
elected
under
the
ZANU–PF
ticket.

As
the
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs
across
the
country
to
gain
public
trust
and
boost
its
impact.
This
could
be
achieved
through
joint
public
awareness-raising
activities
based
on
the
ZICC’s
mandate
to
enhance
citizens’
access
to
and
use
of
its
services.

Opportunities
must
be
created
for
dialogue
between
civil
society
and
the
security
sector
to
share
mutual
concerns
and
approaches
for
oversight
of
security
provision
and
management.
CSOs
can
help
the
ZICC
prevent
misconduct
and
harm
by
security
force
members
by
helping
to
train
police
and
soldiers
on
human
rights
and
security
sector
accountability
and
transparency.

Security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs

The
ZICC
could
draw
lessons
from
Kenya’s
Independent
Policing
Oversight
Authority
and
South
Africa’s
Independent
Police
Investigative
Directorate,
which
have
conducted
joint
awareness
programmes
and
policy
consultations
with
CSOs.

It
could
also
consider
the
African
Union
Policy
Framework
on
Security
Sector
Reform,
which
provides
guide on
how
CSOs
can
engage
in
security
sector
governance.
The
policy
identifies
awareness
raising,
research
and
analysis,
policy
development
and
evaluation,
and
fostering
dialogue
and
gender
equality
as
ways
to
promote
people-centred
security
and
inclusive
security
governance.
These
roles
for
civil
society
clearly
align
with
the
ZICC’s
mandate.

Despite
the
existence
of
laws,
lessons
and
guidance
on
the
issue,
building
productive
relations
with
civil
society
in
Zimbabwe
won’t
be
easy.
At
present,
security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs.
Security
forces
view
civil
society’s
demand
for
accountability
and
better
governance
as
a
threat
to
the
ruling
regime
and
national
security.

CSOs
also
mistrust
direct
engagement
with
security
institutions,
fearing
they
might
antagonise
them
through
public
media
advocacy.
As
an
oversight
body,
the
ZICC
could
help
prevent
this
mistrust
by
creating
platforms
for
ongoing
dialogue.

As
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs

However,
three
major
issues
will
make
collaboration
on
security
sector
governance
difficult.
First,
the
ZICC’s
primary
functions
are
limited
to
reactive,
remedial
actions

investigating
complaints
of
misconduct,
inspecting
detention
facilities
and
recommending
remedial
actions
against
misconduct.

Expanding
the
commission’s
mandate
to
include
proactive,
preventive
responsibilities
would
require
amending
the
ZICC
Act.
That
is
unlikely,
considering
that
the
government
is
already
suppressing
its
work,
as
evidenced
by
delays
in
getting
the
commission
operational.

Second,
the
Private
Voluntary
Organisations
Amendment
Bill
will inhibit civil
society’s
ability
to
function.
If
enacted
into
law,
the
bill
will
restrict
CSOs’
access
to
communities
and
funding
options
and
introduce
strict
registration
and
reporting
requirements,
especially
for
those
working
on
human
rights
advocacy,
peace
and
democracy
building.

Third,
the
ZICC
will
likely
be
under-resourced,
as
happened
with
the
National
Peace
and
Reconciliation
Commission
and
Zimbabwe
Human
Rights
Commission,
tasked
with
investigating
human
rights
violations
including
by
security
forces.
Under
the
provisional
2025 budget allocation,
the
ZICC
received
only
ZiG80
476
000
(US$3
041
869)

way
too
little
for
its
mandated
work
at
this
formative
phase.

The
ZICC
was
established
to
protect
citizens
from
security
services
violations
and
harm
by
fostering
transparency
and
accountability.
Doing
so
would
help
transform
Zimbabwe’s
security
sector
governance,
but
whether
the
ZICC
can
achieve
more
than
its
limited
reactive
mandate
seems
doubtful.
Collaborating
with
civil
society
would
set
it
in
the
right
direction.

Post
published
in:

Featured

Can Zimbabwe’s Independent Complaints Commission win civil society over?


Since
gaining
independence
in
1980,
Zimbabwe
has
grappled
with
an
unaccountable
and
secretive
security sector tarnished
by
decades
of
human
rights
violations.
The
new
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
(ZICC)
provides
a
valuable
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society.

Zimbabwe’s
government
has
traditionally
resisted
calls
for
security
sector
reform,
which
would
have
clashed
with
its
hardline
stance
against
opposition
political
activists
and
human
rights
defenders.
As
a
result,
the
army
and
police
have
– in
defence
of
the
ruling
party
– stifled
freedoms
of
speech,
assembly
and
political
participation
through
arbitrary
arrests,
detention
and
use
of
brute
force.

These
actions,
together
with
the
legacy
of
the
1983-87
Gukurahundi massacres and
continued
electoral violence since
2000,
have
deterred
civil
society
from
contributing
to
security
sector
governance.

Provisions
exist
in
law
to
rectify
the
situation,
but
progress
has
been
slow.
Section
210
of
Zimbabwe’s
2013
constitution
provides
for
an
independent
mechanism
to
receive
and
investigate
citizens’
complaints
against
misconduct
or
violations
caused
by
security
services
– including
the
police,
defence
forces,
intelligence
services,
and
prisons
and
correctional
services.

This
provision
was
however
only
activated
in
2022,
with
the
passing
of
the
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
Act.
A
five-member commission was
sworn
in
two
years
later,
enabling
the
ZICC
to
start
operating.
The
commission
is
led
by
Justice
Webster
Nicholas
Chinamora,
with
other
members
drawn
from
the
legal,
medical
and
policing
professions.

The
ZICC
is
an
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society

Chinamora
is
ambitious
in
his
outlook
for
what
the
commission
can
achieve.
He told The
Herald
 in
January
that
he
wanted
to
‘guide
the
commission
in
achieving
security
sector
reform
through
fostering
a
partnership
between
the
public
and
the
security
sector.’
Effective
collaboration
between
civil
society
organisations
(CSOs)
and
security
institutions
is
vital
to
achieve
this
goal.

But
already,
the
commission’s
independence
is
being
questioned
because
Chinamora
and
another
commissioner,
Oliver
Mandipaka,
have
strong links with
the
ruling party,
the
Zimbabwe
African
National
Union

Patriotic
Front (ZANU–PF).
Those
links
could
influence
how
they
dispense
their
duties,
which
would
erode
public
trust.

Chinamora
has
a
tainted past in
the
justice
system
and
is
perceived
as
too
close
to
President
Emmerson
Mnangagwa.
Mandipaka
is
a
former
Member
of
Parliament
elected
under
the
ZANU–PF
ticket.

As
the
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs
across
the
country
to
gain
public
trust
and
boost
its
impact.
This
could
be
achieved
through
joint
public
awareness-raising
activities
based
on
the
ZICC’s
mandate
to
enhance
citizens’
access
to
and
use
of
its
services.

Opportunities
must
be
created
for
dialogue
between
civil
society
and
the
security
sector
to
share
mutual
concerns
and
approaches
for
oversight
of
security
provision
and
management.
CSOs
can
help
the
ZICC
prevent
misconduct
and
harm
by
security
force
members
by
helping
to
train
police
and
soldiers
on
human
rights
and
security
sector
accountability
and
transparency.

Security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs

The
ZICC
could
draw
lessons
from
Kenya’s
Independent
Policing
Oversight
Authority
and
South
Africa’s
Independent
Police
Investigative
Directorate,
which
have
conducted
joint
awareness
programmes
and
policy
consultations
with
CSOs.

It
could
also
consider
the
African
Union
Policy
Framework
on
Security
Sector
Reform,
which
provides
guide on
how
CSOs
can
engage
in
security
sector
governance.
The
policy
identifies
awareness
raising,
research
and
analysis,
policy
development
and
evaluation,
and
fostering
dialogue
and
gender
equality
as
ways
to
promote
people-centred
security
and
inclusive
security
governance.
These
roles
for
civil
society
clearly
align
with
the
ZICC’s
mandate.

Despite
the
existence
of
laws,
lessons
and
guidance
on
the
issue,
building
productive
relations
with
civil
society
in
Zimbabwe
won’t
be
easy.
At
present,
security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs.
Security
forces
view
civil
society’s
demand
for
accountability
and
better
governance
as
a
threat
to
the
ruling
regime
and
national
security.

CSOs
also
mistrust
direct
engagement
with
security
institutions,
fearing
they
might
antagonise
them
through
public
media
advocacy.
As
an
oversight
body,
the
ZICC
could
help
prevent
this
mistrust
by
creating
platforms
for
ongoing
dialogue.

As
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs

However,
three
major
issues
will
make
collaboration
on
security
sector
governance
difficult.
First,
the
ZICC’s
primary
functions
are
limited
to
reactive,
remedial
actions

investigating
complaints
of
misconduct,
inspecting
detention
facilities
and
recommending
remedial
actions
against
misconduct.

Expanding
the
commission’s
mandate
to
include
proactive,
preventive
responsibilities
would
require
amending
the
ZICC
Act.
That
is
unlikely,
considering
that
the
government
is
already
suppressing
its
work,
as
evidenced
by
delays
in
getting
the
commission
operational.

Second,
the
Private
Voluntary
Organisations
Amendment
Bill
will inhibit civil
society’s
ability
to
function.
If
enacted
into
law,
the
bill
will
restrict
CSOs’
access
to
communities
and
funding
options
and
introduce
strict
registration
and
reporting
requirements,
especially
for
those
working
on
human
rights
advocacy,
peace
and
democracy
building.

Third,
the
ZICC
will
likely
be
under-resourced,
as
happened
with
the
National
Peace
and
Reconciliation
Commission
and
Zimbabwe
Human
Rights
Commission,
tasked
with
investigating
human
rights
violations
including
by
security
forces.
Under
the
provisional
2025 budget allocation,
the
ZICC
received
only
ZiG80
476
000
(US$3
041
869)

way
too
little
for
its
mandated
work
at
this
formative
phase.

The
ZICC
was
established
to
protect
citizens
from
security
services
violations
and
harm
by
fostering
transparency
and
accountability.
Doing
so
would
help
transform
Zimbabwe’s
security
sector
governance,
but
whether
the
ZICC
can
achieve
more
than
its
limited
reactive
mandate
seems
doubtful.
Collaborating
with
civil
society
would
set
it
in
the
right
direction.

Post
published
in:

Featured

Can Zimbabwe’s Independent Complaints Commission win civil society over?


Since
gaining
independence
in
1980,
Zimbabwe
has
grappled
with
an
unaccountable
and
secretive
security sector tarnished
by
decades
of
human
rights
violations.
The
new
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
(ZICC)
provides
a
valuable
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society.

Zimbabwe’s
government
has
traditionally
resisted
calls
for
security
sector
reform,
which
would
have
clashed
with
its
hardline
stance
against
opposition
political
activists
and
human
rights
defenders.
As
a
result,
the
army
and
police
have
– in
defence
of
the
ruling
party
– stifled
freedoms
of
speech,
assembly
and
political
participation
through
arbitrary
arrests,
detention
and
use
of
brute
force.

These
actions,
together
with
the
legacy
of
the
1983-87
Gukurahundi massacres and
continued
electoral violence since
2000,
have
deterred
civil
society
from
contributing
to
security
sector
governance.

Provisions
exist
in
law
to
rectify
the
situation,
but
progress
has
been
slow.
Section
210
of
Zimbabwe’s
2013
constitution
provides
for
an
independent
mechanism
to
receive
and
investigate
citizens’
complaints
against
misconduct
or
violations
caused
by
security
services
– including
the
police,
defence
forces,
intelligence
services,
and
prisons
and
correctional
services.

This
provision
was
however
only
activated
in
2022,
with
the
passing
of
the
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
Act.
A
five-member commission was
sworn
in
two
years
later,
enabling
the
ZICC
to
start
operating.
The
commission
is
led
by
Justice
Webster
Nicholas
Chinamora,
with
other
members
drawn
from
the
legal,
medical
and
policing
professions.

The
ZICC
is
an
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society

Chinamora
is
ambitious
in
his
outlook
for
what
the
commission
can
achieve.
He told The
Herald
 in
January
that
he
wanted
to
‘guide
the
commission
in
achieving
security
sector
reform
through
fostering
a
partnership
between
the
public
and
the
security
sector.’
Effective
collaboration
between
civil
society
organisations
(CSOs)
and
security
institutions
is
vital
to
achieve
this
goal.

But
already,
the
commission’s
independence
is
being
questioned
because
Chinamora
and
another
commissioner,
Oliver
Mandipaka,
have
strong links with
the
ruling party,
the
Zimbabwe
African
National
Union

Patriotic
Front (ZANU–PF).
Those
links
could
influence
how
they
dispense
their
duties,
which
would
erode
public
trust.

Chinamora
has
a
tainted past in
the
justice
system
and
is
perceived
as
too
close
to
President
Emmerson
Mnangagwa.
Mandipaka
is
a
former
Member
of
Parliament
elected
under
the
ZANU–PF
ticket.

As
the
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs
across
the
country
to
gain
public
trust
and
boost
its
impact.
This
could
be
achieved
through
joint
public
awareness-raising
activities
based
on
the
ZICC’s
mandate
to
enhance
citizens’
access
to
and
use
of
its
services.

Opportunities
must
be
created
for
dialogue
between
civil
society
and
the
security
sector
to
share
mutual
concerns
and
approaches
for
oversight
of
security
provision
and
management.
CSOs
can
help
the
ZICC
prevent
misconduct
and
harm
by
security
force
members
by
helping
to
train
police
and
soldiers
on
human
rights
and
security
sector
accountability
and
transparency.

Security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs

The
ZICC
could
draw
lessons
from
Kenya’s
Independent
Policing
Oversight
Authority
and
South
Africa’s
Independent
Police
Investigative
Directorate,
which
have
conducted
joint
awareness
programmes
and
policy
consultations
with
CSOs.

It
could
also
consider
the
African
Union
Policy
Framework
on
Security
Sector
Reform,
which
provides
guide on
how
CSOs
can
engage
in
security
sector
governance.
The
policy
identifies
awareness
raising,
research
and
analysis,
policy
development
and
evaluation,
and
fostering
dialogue
and
gender
equality
as
ways
to
promote
people-centred
security
and
inclusive
security
governance.
These
roles
for
civil
society
clearly
align
with
the
ZICC’s
mandate.

Despite
the
existence
of
laws,
lessons
and
guidance
on
the
issue,
building
productive
relations
with
civil
society
in
Zimbabwe
won’t
be
easy.
At
present,
security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs.
Security
forces
view
civil
society’s
demand
for
accountability
and
better
governance
as
a
threat
to
the
ruling
regime
and
national
security.

CSOs
also
mistrust
direct
engagement
with
security
institutions,
fearing
they
might
antagonise
them
through
public
media
advocacy.
As
an
oversight
body,
the
ZICC
could
help
prevent
this
mistrust
by
creating
platforms
for
ongoing
dialogue.

As
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs

However,
three
major
issues
will
make
collaboration
on
security
sector
governance
difficult.
First,
the
ZICC’s
primary
functions
are
limited
to
reactive,
remedial
actions

investigating
complaints
of
misconduct,
inspecting
detention
facilities
and
recommending
remedial
actions
against
misconduct.

Expanding
the
commission’s
mandate
to
include
proactive,
preventive
responsibilities
would
require
amending
the
ZICC
Act.
That
is
unlikely,
considering
that
the
government
is
already
suppressing
its
work,
as
evidenced
by
delays
in
getting
the
commission
operational.

Second,
the
Private
Voluntary
Organisations
Amendment
Bill
will inhibit civil
society’s
ability
to
function.
If
enacted
into
law,
the
bill
will
restrict
CSOs’
access
to
communities
and
funding
options
and
introduce
strict
registration
and
reporting
requirements,
especially
for
those
working
on
human
rights
advocacy,
peace
and
democracy
building.

Third,
the
ZICC
will
likely
be
under-resourced,
as
happened
with
the
National
Peace
and
Reconciliation
Commission
and
Zimbabwe
Human
Rights
Commission,
tasked
with
investigating
human
rights
violations
including
by
security
forces.
Under
the
provisional
2025 budget allocation,
the
ZICC
received
only
ZiG80
476
000
(US$3
041
869)

way
too
little
for
its
mandated
work
at
this
formative
phase.

The
ZICC
was
established
to
protect
citizens
from
security
services
violations
and
harm
by
fostering
transparency
and
accountability.
Doing
so
would
help
transform
Zimbabwe’s
security
sector
governance,
but
whether
the
ZICC
can
achieve
more
than
its
limited
reactive
mandate
seems
doubtful.
Collaborating
with
civil
society
would
set
it
in
the
right
direction.

Post
published
in:

Featured

Can Zimbabwe’s Independent Complaints Commission win civil society over?


Since
gaining
independence
in
1980,
Zimbabwe
has
grappled
with
an
unaccountable
and
secretive
security sector tarnished
by
decades
of
human
rights
violations.
The
new
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
(ZICC)
provides
a
valuable
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society.

Zimbabwe’s
government
has
traditionally
resisted
calls
for
security
sector
reform,
which
would
have
clashed
with
its
hardline
stance
against
opposition
political
activists
and
human
rights
defenders.
As
a
result,
the
army
and
police
have
– in
defence
of
the
ruling
party
– stifled
freedoms
of
speech,
assembly
and
political
participation
through
arbitrary
arrests,
detention
and
use
of
brute
force.

These
actions,
together
with
the
legacy
of
the
1983-87
Gukurahundi massacres and
continued
electoral violence since
2000,
have
deterred
civil
society
from
contributing
to
security
sector
governance.

Provisions
exist
in
law
to
rectify
the
situation,
but
progress
has
been
slow.
Section
210
of
Zimbabwe’s
2013
constitution
provides
for
an
independent
mechanism
to
receive
and
investigate
citizens’
complaints
against
misconduct
or
violations
caused
by
security
services
– including
the
police,
defence
forces,
intelligence
services,
and
prisons
and
correctional
services.

This
provision
was
however
only
activated
in
2022,
with
the
passing
of
the
Zimbabwe
Independent
Complaints
Commission
Act.
A
five-member commission was
sworn
in
two
years
later,
enabling
the
ZICC
to
start
operating.
The
commission
is
led
by
Justice
Webster
Nicholas
Chinamora,
with
other
members
drawn
from
the
legal,
medical
and
policing
professions.

The
ZICC
is
an
opportunity
to
break
a
history
of
mistrust
and
antagonism
between
security
forces
and
civil
society

Chinamora
is
ambitious
in
his
outlook
for
what
the
commission
can
achieve.
He told The
Herald
 in
January
that
he
wanted
to
‘guide
the
commission
in
achieving
security
sector
reform
through
fostering
a
partnership
between
the
public
and
the
security
sector.’
Effective
collaboration
between
civil
society
organisations
(CSOs)
and
security
institutions
is
vital
to
achieve
this
goal.

But
already,
the
commission’s
independence
is
being
questioned
because
Chinamora
and
another
commissioner,
Oliver
Mandipaka,
have
strong links with
the
ruling party,
the
Zimbabwe
African
National
Union

Patriotic
Front (ZANU–PF).
Those
links
could
influence
how
they
dispense
their
duties,
which
would
erode
public
trust.

Chinamora
has
a
tainted past in
the
justice
system
and
is
perceived
as
too
close
to
President
Emmerson
Mnangagwa.
Mandipaka
is
a
former
Member
of
Parliament
elected
under
the
ZANU–PF
ticket.

As
the
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs
across
the
country
to
gain
public
trust
and
boost
its
impact.
This
could
be
achieved
through
joint
public
awareness-raising
activities
based
on
the
ZICC’s
mandate
to
enhance
citizens’
access
to
and
use
of
its
services.

Opportunities
must
be
created
for
dialogue
between
civil
society
and
the
security
sector
to
share
mutual
concerns
and
approaches
for
oversight
of
security
provision
and
management.
CSOs
can
help
the
ZICC
prevent
misconduct
and
harm
by
security
force
members
by
helping
to
train
police
and
soldiers
on
human
rights
and
security
sector
accountability
and
transparency.

Security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs

The
ZICC
could
draw
lessons
from
Kenya’s
Independent
Policing
Oversight
Authority
and
South
Africa’s
Independent
Police
Investigative
Directorate,
which
have
conducted
joint
awareness
programmes
and
policy
consultations
with
CSOs.

It
could
also
consider
the
African
Union
Policy
Framework
on
Security
Sector
Reform,
which
provides
guide on
how
CSOs
can
engage
in
security
sector
governance.
The
policy
identifies
awareness
raising,
research
and
analysis,
policy
development
and
evaluation,
and
fostering
dialogue
and
gender
equality
as
ways
to
promote
people-centred
security
and
inclusive
security
governance.
These
roles
for
civil
society
clearly
align
with
the
ZICC’s
mandate.

Despite
the
existence
of
laws,
lessons
and
guidance
on
the
issue,
building
productive
relations
with
civil
society
in
Zimbabwe
won’t
be
easy.
At
present,
security
institutions
prioritise
national
security
over
human
security,
and
avoid
engaging
with
CSOs.
Security
forces
view
civil
society’s
demand
for
accountability
and
better
governance
as
a
threat
to
the
ruling
regime
and
national
security.

CSOs
also
mistrust
direct
engagement
with
security
institutions,
fearing
they
might
antagonise
them
through
public
media
advocacy.
As
an
oversight
body,
the
ZICC
could
help
prevent
this
mistrust
by
creating
platforms
for
ongoing
dialogue.

As
ZICC
begins
operating
publicly,
it
must
proactively
work
on
building
relations
with
CSOs

However,
three
major
issues
will
make
collaboration
on
security
sector
governance
difficult.
First,
the
ZICC’s
primary
functions
are
limited
to
reactive,
remedial
actions

investigating
complaints
of
misconduct,
inspecting
detention
facilities
and
recommending
remedial
actions
against
misconduct.

Expanding
the
commission’s
mandate
to
include
proactive,
preventive
responsibilities
would
require
amending
the
ZICC
Act.
That
is
unlikely,
considering
that
the
government
is
already
suppressing
its
work,
as
evidenced
by
delays
in
getting
the
commission
operational.

Second,
the
Private
Voluntary
Organisations
Amendment
Bill
will inhibit civil
society’s
ability
to
function.
If
enacted
into
law,
the
bill
will
restrict
CSOs’
access
to
communities
and
funding
options
and
introduce
strict
registration
and
reporting
requirements,
especially
for
those
working
on
human
rights
advocacy,
peace
and
democracy
building.

Third,
the
ZICC
will
likely
be
under-resourced,
as
happened
with
the
National
Peace
and
Reconciliation
Commission
and
Zimbabwe
Human
Rights
Commission,
tasked
with
investigating
human
rights
violations
including
by
security
forces.
Under
the
provisional
2025 budget allocation,
the
ZICC
received
only
ZiG80
476
000
(US$3
041
869)

way
too
little
for
its
mandated
work
at
this
formative
phase.

The
ZICC
was
established
to
protect
citizens
from
security
services
violations
and
harm
by
fostering
transparency
and
accountability.
Doing
so
would
help
transform
Zimbabwe’s
security
sector
governance,
but
whether
the
ZICC
can
achieve
more
than
its
limited
reactive
mandate
seems
doubtful.
Collaborating
with
civil
society
would
set
it
in
the
right
direction.

Post
published
in:

Featured

The next generation is redefining what is meant by a ‘farm’ and ‘home’ in Zimbabwe’s land reform areas


This
may
be
around
the
nature
of
a
‘farm’
and
what
place
is
called
‘home’.
These
themes
are
explored
in
this
blog,
as
they
have
big
implications
for
how
young
people
are
reinventing
Zimbabwe’s
agricultural
landscape.


What
is
a
farm?

Ideas
of
land
ownership
no
longer
follow
the
old
pattern
of
having
a
single
farm,
with
a
homestead
plot.
Since
land
is
not
available,
then
more
hybrid
arrangements
have
to
be
adopted.
As
previous
blogs
have
discussed,
young
people
must
make
use
of
subdivided
plots,
lease,
borrow,
share,
even
purchase
parcels
of
land
through
various
levels
of
formalisation,
putting
together
land
portfolios
for
living
in
ways
that
their
parents
who
acquired
substantial,
single
plots
through
land
reform
could
not
imagine.

For
example,
it
may
be
that
a
young
person
may
get
a
stand
to
build
a
home
perhaps
on
a
parent’s
plot,
but
have
no
field,
or
only
a
small
piece
of
home
garden.
They
then
must
find
other
land,
using
land
by
rivers
or
streams
illegally,
or
finding
a
patch
to
rent.
A
complex
bricolage
is
thus
constructed,
reconfiguring
standard
patterns
of
ownership.
As
a
result,
the
idea
of
‘a
farm’
is
no
longer
the
ideal
envisioned
by
planners
and
extension
agents,
from
the
colonial
era
onwards.
The
idea
of land
registration
and
titling
 in
such
variegated
land
use
settings
in
A1
areas
is
simply
pie-in-the-sky.

During
land
reform
around
2000,
land
areas
were
planned
and
pegged
with
a
particular
notion of
a
‘viable’
farm
 in
mind.
Boundaries
were
vague
and
plots
were
not
well
demarcated.
However,
despite
all
the
revolutionary
rhetoric
of
the
time,
the
‘fast-track’
villagised
A1
settlements
bore
a
strong
resemblance
to
the
plans
instituted
under
the
much-detested Native
Land
Husbandry
Act
.
Villages
were
often
pegged
in
‘lines’,
with
fields
and
grazing
areas
allocated
in
other
areas.
Since
this
formalisation
in
the
early
2000s,
land
use
is
much
changed,
and
with
this
the
idea
of
a
‘farm’.
Many
people
have
extended
home
fields
beyond
the
original
stands
so
that
labour
can
be
deployed
on
a
limited
area
(see
previous
blogs).

Meanwhile,
the
dryland
outfields
are
often
under-used
and
sometimes
allocated
for
homesteads
and
subdivided
for
fields
for
children
or
rented
out
to
others.
Grazing
areas
have
contracted
too,
as
more
people
have
been
offered
land,
often
illegally,
within
the
resettlement
areas.
As irrigation
has
become
an
increasing
feature
of
agriculture
,
with
reduced
costs
of
equipment
and
as
an
adaptation
to
climate
change,
gaining
access
to
water
is
crucial.
For
this
reason,
farms
are
reconfigured
around
where
water
is
or
can
be
drilled
for,
with
irrigated
plots
near
boreholes
at
homesteads
or
by
rivers,
streams
and
small
dams.

Thus,
the
conventional
pattern
of
homestead,
main
make-controlled
outfield
and
a
small
garden
managed
by
women
has
been
refashioned
dramatically.
‘Farms’
are
now
a
variegated
patchwork
of
land
uses,
spread
across
an
area
and
responding
to
water
availability
and
are
very
far
from
the
standard
plans.
Young
people

both
men
and
women

must
be
responsive
to
this
and
develop
their
land-based
activities
within
these
new
settings,
often
moving
between
sites,
shifting
plots
and
adapting
to
opportunities
in
ways
unimaginable
before.



Where
is
home?

All
this
has
implications
for
what
is
understood
as
‘home’.
Immediately
following
the
land
invasions,
the
land
reform
areas
were
not
regarded
as
‘home’.
Many
maintained
their
original
homesteads
and
fields
in
the
communal
areas,
fearing
that
the
land
reform
would
be
temporary
and
that
they
would
be
evicted.
Homes
are
where
ancestors
come
from,
where
spirits
reside,
and
the
new
invaders
could
not
imagine
this
happening
on
what
was
a
‘white’
farm,
even
though
ancestral
claims
were
mobilised
during
the
invasions.
This
insecurity
has
long
disappeared
and
most
have
abandoned
the
strategy
of
straddling
across
sites,
and
most
regard
the
resettlements
as
‘home’,
where
people
are
buried,
spirits
reside
and
where
families
will
live
for
generations.
That
said,
connections
with
the
communal
areas
persist
and
some
have
‘homes’
in
these
areas
too,
even
if
used
only
by
a
caretaker.

Having
multiple
places
that
can
be
called
‘home’
presents
a
challenge
for
the
next
generation.
Can
they
gain
access
to
land
in
the
land
reform
areas
where
they
were
born,
or
should
they
seek
options
in
the
communal
areas,
where
their
parents
came
from?
The
‘traditional’
system
of
land
allocation
to
young
people
was
that
homes
were
established
upon
marriage
with
land
allocated
by
a
village
headman
in
the
area
where
a
young
man’s
parents
lived.

This
was
classically
a
patrilocal
system
of
residence,
where
wives
followed
husbands
on
marriage.
This
old-style
communal
area
system
of
land
allocation
was
the
expectation
of
many
in
the
resettlement
areas,
but
officially
there
were
no
more
plots
available
and
new
offer
letters
could
not
be
issued
without
the
intervention
of
the
land
officer
and
the
approval
of
the
District
Land
Committee.
Instead,
different
authorities
competed,
and
people
could
only
get
land
by
‘forum
shopping’
across
jurisdictions.

The
real
challenges
of
getting
land
and
establishing
homes
in
the
A1
areas
have
encouraged
many
young
people
to
seek
land
outside
the
strictures
of
the
resettlements
and
avoiding
being
behoven
to
parents
for
allocating
subdivisions,
which
many
feel
is
not
‘their’
land.
For
this
reason,
some
are
moving
back
to
communal
areas,
making
use
of
land
for
their
lineage
(perhaps
abandoned
by
their
parents
when
they
joined
the
land
invasions
in
the
early
2000s).
This,
some
comment,
offers
more
independence
and
security
than
trying
to
make
deals
in
the
A1
areas
where
many
rules
apply.
‘Stands’,
often
just
for
homesteads,
are
available
for
purchase
in
the
communal
areas,
even
if
illegal
(see
earlier
blog
on land
markets
),
so
establishing
a
home
is
a
first
step
to
get
a
foothold
in
the
area;
thereafter
people
can
seek
land
through
leasing,
borrowing
or
further
purchase.
Some
continue
to
make
use
of
the
connections
in
both
places
and
continue
businesses
in
the
A1
areas
where
opportunities
are
greater.

‘Home’
therefore
may
not
be
where
they
grew
up
(in
the
A1
areas),
but
in
areas
where
parents
or
uncles
had
or
have
connections
(in
the
communal
areas),
or
in
combinations
of
the
two,
where
straddling
between
sites
allow
livelihoods
to
be
generated.
The
cases
below
illustrate
these
dynamics.

Case
1,
NM,
Wondedzo
Wares,
Masvingo


I
was
born
in
2004
and
grew
up
here.
My
grandparents
acquired
land
here
before
I
was
born.
I
completed
Form
4
in
2023
and
got
married
the
same
year.
My
husband
is
originally
from
Renco
but
has
been
working
as
a
labourer
for
various
people
here.
Last
year,
we
bought
a
‘stand’
(acre
in
size)
in
Chimedza
area
in
Serima
communal
areas
from
a
war
veteran
for
US$450
using
income
from
my
husband’s
wages.
We
are
still
in
the
process
of
building
our
homestead,
so
we
are
still
based
here
as
my
husband
works
for
Mrs
M
who
is
in
the
A1
area.

Case
2,
NM,
Vimbi,
Matobo


I
was
born
in
1999
and
grew
up
here.
I
did
Form
4
in
2016,
but
I
did
not
write
the
final
exams
as
I
got
pregnant.
After
falling
pregnant,
I
realised
that
the
man
was
married
with
a
family
elsewhere.
I
remarried
in
2023
again.
My
husband
and
I
then
decided
to
look
for
a
place
to
build
our
own
homestead.
Here,
you
can’t
build
a
homestead
wherever
you
want
as
the
rules
are
very
strict
here.
So,
my
uncle
who
has
a
homestead
in
Chapo
area
in
Kumalo
communal
areas
then
allocated
us
a
piece
of
land
behind
his
homestead.
We
only
have
a
homestead,
but
no
arable
fields.
It’s
very
hard
to
do
crop
farming
in
Chapo
as
there
are
too
many
baboons
that
raid
crops,
and
the
soils
are
very
infertile.
My
mother
has
since
given
us
1ha
to
do
farming
here
in
the
A1
farm.
We
currently
straddle
the
two
places,
as
I
have
also
set
up
a
tuckshop
here
at
the
A1
farm.

Others
try
their
luck
in
the
A1
areas,
cobbling
together
a
bricolage
of
land
parcels
linked
to
a
homestead.
Others
have
abandoned
traditions
of
patrilocal
land
allocation
with
husbands
following
wives
to
resettlement
areas
where
land
is
available,
with
men
living
together
with
their
wives’
families,
following
‘money’
(and
land)
rather
than
traditional
ways
of
using
it,
as
we
explore
further
in
the
next
blog.


A
new
rural
landscape

In
sum,
the
conventional
ways
of
thinking
about
land
and
its
use
are
being
up-ended
as
the
struggles
to
make
a
livelihood
by
the
next
generation
refashion
how
a
‘farm’
is
thought
about
and
what
‘home’
means.
Due
to
the
demands
of
combining
land
parcels
and
different
forms
of
production
across
time
and
space
with
off-farm
work
in
complex
combinations
and
sequences,
the
standard
patterns
that
existed
amongst
previous
generations
have
been
disrupted.

As
we
try
and
understand
what
land,
agriculture
and
farming
look
like
in
the
next
generation
of
land
reform,
old
assumptions
have
to
be
unravelled.
Today
it
is
much
more
complex
and
dynamic,
but
through
incredible
ingenuity
and
much
hard
work
(and
hardship)
today’s
young
people
are
creating
a
new
rural
landscape
25
years
after
land
reform.


This
is
the
fourth
blog
in
a
series
exploring
young
people
and
land
in
post-land
reform
Zimbabwe.
The
blog
has
been
written
by
Ian
Scoones
and
Tapiwa
Chatikobo,
with
inputs
from
Godfrey
Mahofa
(data
analysis),
Felix
Murimbarimba
(field
lead)
and
Jacob
Mahenehene
(field
assistant),
amongst
others.
This
blog
first
appeared
on 
Zimbabweland

Post
published
in:

Agriculture

Bringing HIV services to hard-to-reach people in Victoria Falls


Desire
is
a
former
barman
and
sex
worker
who
was
born
and
brought
up
in
Victoria
Falls.
When
he
found
out
from
a
friend
that
there
was
a
job
opening
at
the
clinic
he
readily
applied.
His
boundless
energy
and
social
skills
meant
that
he
was
quickly
hired
and
trained
to
become
a
peer
educator.

North
Star
Alliance
clinics
are
located
in
areas
with
high
HIV
prevalence.
They
offer
primary
health-care
services,
services
for
sexually
transmitted
infections
and
malaria,
HIV
counselling
and
testing
and
screening
for
tuberculosis.
Through
the
clinic,
essential
health
services
are
brought
closer
to
the
people
who
need
them
most
in
a
comfortable
environment
without
prejudice.

“Owing
to
stigma
and
discrimination,
most
sex
workers
and
men
who
have
sex
with
men
don’t
attend
public
health
facilities.
Instead,
they
go
to
private
clinics
or
nongovernmental
organizations
for
condoms,”
Desire
explained.

Stepping
up
HIV
prevention
efforts
in
Zimbabwe
has
had
impressive
results.
In
2015,
there
were
64
000
new
HIV
infections,
down
from
87
000
in
2005
and
220
000
in
1992.
However,
HIV
prevalence
among
sex
workers
remains
extremely
high—at
more
than
57%
in
2015.

“Since
I
started
working
as
a
peer
educator
I
have
seen
what
importance
the
clinic
has
in
a
city
like
Victoria
Falls,
where
we
see
a
high
demand
for
our
services,”
Desire
explained.

Victoria
Falls
is
a
tourist
destination,
a
transit
town
between
Zimbabwe
and
Zambia
and
a
major
truck
stop.
On
average,
the
clinic
sees
about
35
female
sex
workers,
10
to
15
male
sex
workers
and
45
to
50
truck
drivers
a
week.

Desire
is
most
proud
of
his
outreach
and
community
mobilization
work,
which
builds
on
a
strong
community
empowerment
foundation
for
sex
workers
and
men
who
have
sex
with
men.
“What
I
want
is
for
everyone
to
keep
themselves
healthy,”
he
said.

Zimbabwe
is
taking
a
leading
role
in
efforts
to
increase
HIV
prevention
across
the
region.
On
23
and
24
March,
Zimbabwe
will
host
a
regional
expert
meeting
on
revitalizing
HIV
prevention
in
the
eastern
and
southern
Africa
region
at
Victoria
Falls.
The
meeting
will
seek
to
set
national
HIV
prevention
targets
as
part
of
the
implementation
of
the
2016
United
Nations
Political
Declaration
on
Ending
AIDS.
UNAIDS
Deputy
Executive
Director
Luiz
Loures
will
be
among
the
attendees
of
the
meeting.

“This
meeting
will
be
an
excellent
opportunity
for
partners
from
across
the
region
to
come
together,
to
develop
capacity,
to
create,
replicate
and
scale-up
effective
programmes
to
advance
efforts
towards
ending
the
AIDS
epidemic
in
eastern
and
southern
Africa,”
said
Mr
Loures.

UNAIDS
continues
to
advocate
strongly
for
the
scale-up
of
HIV
prevention
and
is
working
with
countries
to
ensure
that
90%
of
people
in
high
HIV
prevalence
countries,
including
Zimbabwe,
who
are
at
risk
of
HIV
infection
are
reached
by
comprehensive
HIV
prevention
services,
as
outlined
in
the
2016
United
Nations
Political
Declaration
on
Ending
AIDS.

Post
published
in:

Featured

U.S. increasingly disappointed with Zimbabwe government -U.S. official

“The
disappointment
just
keeps
getting
worse
and
worse,
unfortunately,”
said
the
official,
speaking
on
background
to
reporters.
“The
government
seems
to
be
getting
even
more
violent
in
their
response
to
any
form
of
opposition.”

The
official
said
Washington
had
made
clear
to
the
government
of
President
Emmerson
Mnangagwa
what
it
would
take
to
improve
relations
between
Zimbabwe
and
the
United
States.
U.S.
officials
have
previously
called
on
Mnangagwa
to
change
Zimbabwe’s
laws
restricting
media
freedom
and
allowing
protests.

Mnangagwa’s
government
last
week
banned
anti-government
protests
by
the
opposition
Movement
for
Democratic
Change,
which
accuses
the
authorities
of
political
repression
and
mismanaging
the
economy.
Police
fired
tear
gas
to
disperse
crowds
and
barred
access
to
the
MDC’s
Harare
offices.

Anger
among
the
population
has
mounted
over
triple-digit
inflation,
rolling
power
cuts
and
shortages
of
U.S.
dollars,
fuel
and
bread.

In
March,
President
Donald
Trump
extended
by
one
year
U.S.
sanctions
against
100
entities
and
individuals
in
Zimbabwe,
including
Mnangagwa,
saying
his
government
had
failed
to
bring
about
political
and
economic
changes.

Zimbabwe Vigil Diary 8th March 2025


10.3.2025


17:45

Another
virtual
Vigil
today
continues
our
protest
against
the
human
rights
abuse
and
lack
of
democracy
in
Zimbabwe. 



https://www.flickr.com/photos/zimbabwevigil/54377748268/sizes/m/

Our
virtual
Vigil
activists
today
were
Kudzwai
Madhodha
and
Munashe
Madziyauswa.
They
carried
a
placards
expressing
their
dissatisfaction
with
ZANU
PF,
Zimbabwe’s
ruling
regime.  Photos:

https://www.flickr.com/photos/zimbabwevigil/albums/72177720324341488
.

For
Vigil
pictures
check: http://www.flickr.com/photos/zimbabwevigil/.
Please
note:
Vigil
photos
can
only
be
downloaded
from
our
Flickr
website.


 


Events
and
Notices:  


  • Next
    Vigil
    meeting
    outside
    the
    Zimbabwe
    Embassy. 
    Saturday
    15th March
    from
    2

    5
    pm.
    We
    meet
    on
    the
    first
    and
    third
    Saturdays
    of
    every
    month.
    On
    other
    Saturdays
    the
    virtual
    Vigil
    will
    run.

  • The
    Restoration
    of
    Human
    Rights
    in
    Zimbabwe
    (ROHR)
     is
    the
    Vigil’s
    partner
    organisation
    based
    in
    Zimbabwe.
    ROHR
    grew
    out
    of
    the
    need
    for
    the
    Vigil
    to
    have
    an
    organisation
    on
    the
    ground
    in
    Zimbabwe
    which
    reflected
    the
    Vigil’s
    mission
    statement
    in
    a
    practical
    way.
    ROHR
    in
    the
    UK
    actively
    fundraises
    through
    membership
    subscriptions,
    events,
    sales
    etc
    to
    support
    the
    activities
    of
    ROHR
    in
    Zimbabwe.

  • The
    Vigil’s
    book
    ‘Zimbabwe
    Emergency’
     is
    based
    on
    our
    weekly
    diaries.
    It
    records
    how
    events
    in
    Zimbabwe
    have
    unfolded
    as
    seen
    by
    the
    diaspora
    in
    the
    UK.
    It
    chronicles
    the
    economic
    disintegration,
    violence,
    growing
    oppression
    and
    political
    manoeuvring

    and
    the
    tragic
    human
    cost
    involved. It
    is
    available
    at
    the
    Vigil.
    All
    proceeds
    go
    to
    the
    Vigil
    and
    our
    sister
    organisation
    the
    Restoration
    of
    Human
    Rights
    in
    Zimbabwe’s
    work
    in
    Zimbabwe.
    The
    book
    is
    also
    available
    from
    Amazon.


  • Facebook
    pages:   


        Vigil : 
https ://www.facebook.com/zimbabwevigil 


        
ROHR: https://www.facebook.com/Restoration-of-Human-Rights-ROHR-Zimbabwe-International-370825706588551/

ZAF: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Zimbabwe-Action-Forum-ZAF/490257051027515

The
Vigil,
outside
the
Zimbabwe
Embassy,
429
Strand,
London
meets
regularly
on
Saturdays
from
14.00
to
17.00
to
protest
against
gross
violations
of
human
rights
in
Zimbabwe.
The
Vigil
which started
in
October
2002
will
continue
until
internationally-monitored,
free
and
fair
elections
are
held
in
Zimbabwe.

Post
published
in:

Featured

Biglaw Firm Scrubs Pronouns From Attorney Signatures Without Telling Anyone – Above the Law

Earlier
this
month,
DLA
Piper
attorneys
in
the
U.S.
discovered
that
their
signature
blocks
had
been
edited,
without
any
warning
or
notice,
to
scrub
any
mention
of
personal
pronouns.
In
an
unintentionally
fitting
memorialization,
the
firm’s
“global
search
and
replace”
effort
apparently
failed
to
account
for
formatting,
deleting
the
pronouns
and,
for
some
attorneys,
leaving
empty
parentheses
in
the
blocks
to
mark
the
erasure.

It
appears
to
be
the
latest
“obey
in
advance”
streak
afflicting
the
legal
industry.
Already,
Biglaw
firms
have

deleted
diversity
language
from
their
websites

and
embarked
on
a

chilling
silence
campaign

in
the
wake
of
the

administration’s
retaliatory
strike
on
Covington
.
With
Trump
raising
the
stakes
in
the
assault
on
lawyers,

weaponizing
the
EEOC
against
private
law
firm
diversity
efforts
,
it’s
probably
not
the
end
of
the
cowering.

And
it’s
not
just
law
firms
because
for
every

inspiring
Georgetown
dean
letter

telling
the
administration’s
lackeys
to
pound
sand,
there
are
cowardly
administrations
like

Vanderbilt
or
Cornell
deleting
diversity
from
their
websites
.

However,
this
seems
to
be
the
first
universal
effort
to
police
individual
email
signatures.
It
marks
a
bold
departure
for
DLA
Piper,
a
firm
that

historically
touted
its
pronoun
policy
.
And
it’s
a
move
that
seems
tailored
to
appease
the
Trump
administration
because
tipsters
report
that
international
attorneys
have
not
seen
their
signatures
adjusted
behind
their
backs.

We
reached
out
to
DLA
for
comment
but
have
not
heard
back.

The
problem
with
a
strategy
of
preemptive
compliance
with
Trump
is
that
it
doesn’t
actually
matter.
Consider

Trump’s
cancellation
of
hundreds
of
millions
in
grants
to
Columbia
,
ostensibly
over
pro-Palestinian
protests
on
campus,
even
though
Columbia’s
administration
invited
the
NYPD
to
make
a
brutal
public
spectacle
of
clearing
out
the
protest
and
all
they
got
in
return
was

vilified
by
attention-seeking
Federalist
Society
judges

and
its
funding
attacked.

If
this
game
of
avoiding
the
“Eye
of
Dumb
Sauron”
is
so
rarely
fruitful,
why
even
play?
Firms
may
argue
that
they
aren’t
even
trying
to
play
games
and
that
this
is
not
about
rolling
over
for
the
administration
as
much
as
an
adjustment
to
reflect
a
shifting
public
consensus
in
light
of
the
election.
Or,
perhaps
more
accurately,
to
reflect
what
their
business
community
clients
assume
is
a
public
consensus.

But
this
is,
as
they
say,
bullshit.
The
private
sector
doesn’t
have
to
care
about
the
electoral
college,
just
the
people.
Donald
Trump
has
run
for
president
on
this
platform
three
times
and
not
ONCE
managed
to
get
more
people
to
vote
for
him
than
vote
against
him.
Indeed,
until
last
year’s
49
percent
plurality,
he’d
never
even
managed
to
get
more
people
to
vote
for
him
than
for
his
highest
profile
opponent.

Law
firms
have
no
need
to
radically
alter
their
human
resources
to
meet
the
demands
of
49
percent
of
the
public
that
are
never
going
to
own
a
major
Wall
Street
bank.
In
fact,
law
firms
can
keep
billing
clients
like
fiends
while
standing
up
for
the
better
angels
of
our
nature.

Which
really
makes
you
wonder
why
so
many
of
them
aren’t.

Standing
up,
I
mean.
I
trust
they’re
still
billing
like
fiends.


Earlier
:

Biglaw
Firm
Quietly
Begins
Purging
Diversity
Language
From
Website


Law
Schools
Respond
To
The
Executive
Threatening
To
Cut
Federal
Funding
Over
DEI


Trump
Signs
Executive
Order
Calling
Out
Top
50
Biglaw
Firm,
With
Intent
To
Wage
War
Against
Other
‘Leading
Law
Firms’
Over
Their
DEI
Policies


Covington
Must
Wait
Behind
Putin
To
See
Classified
Documents
Like
Everyone
Else




HeadshotJoe
Patrice
 is
a
senior
editor
at
Above
the
Law
and
co-host
of

Thinking
Like
A
Lawyer
.
Feel
free
to email
any
tips,
questions,
or
comments.
Follow
him
on Twitter or

Bluesky

if
you’re
interested
in
law,
politics,
and
a
healthy
dose
of
college
sports
news.
Joe
also
serves
as
a

Managing
Director
at
RPN
Executive
Search
.