Judging Your Work Ethic (Or Your Insanity) By Your Travel Plans

This struck me when I worked for a huge law firm, more than a decade ago.

We had to schedule some jury research.  We were inviting the whole world — a collection of lawyers from the firm and a collection of in-house lawyers.  The jury research was impossible to schedule.  We finally found a date that was good for everyone — a Friday some months off.

The lawyers at my firm were delighted that the jury research had been set for a Friday.  That would let you work all week and then fly home either late Friday night or early Saturday.  Everyone naturally preferred to travel during dead time on a weekend.

A couple of weeks later, one of the in-house lawyers called:  “I just noticed that we scheduled the jury research for a Friday.  That’s ridiculous.  We’d have to fly home late on a Friday night or on a Saturday.  I’m not going to miss a Friday night or a Saturday for work.  Please reschedule the jury research.”

We did.

But it got me to thinking.

Maybe a good way to test the work ethic (or the insanity) of an institution is to see whether people prefer to fly on weekdays or weekends.

If everyone is itching to fly on Sunday, to start work bright and early Monday morning, your place is on the industrious side.

Conversely, if everyone refuses to fly on Sunday — “Why would I fly on one of my days off?” — and plans to fly during the workweek, we’ll put your joint on the more leisurely side.

My test may not apply to an institution as a whole.  At a law firm, for example, the lawyers may prefer to fly on weekends, but the folks who don’t generate revenue — the IT staff, for example — may be weekday fliers.  Or maybe it depends whether the IT staff is paid on an hourly or annual basis.

At corporations, you may see differences between revenue-generators and non-revenue generators; between folks who are frantically busy at work and folks who are less busy; between people who are childless, rearing children, or whose kids are in college or beyond; and so on.

But the “when do you prefer to fly” test is a pretty good one, helping you to judge whether a person aggressively prefers to devote time to business or personal affairs.

Have I told you something about yourself?

Or maybe you could innocently work this question into your job interviews and get a sense of how institutions view work-life balance.


Mark Herrmann spent 17 years as a partner at a leading international law firm and is now deputy general counsel at a large international company. He is the author of The Curmudgeon’s Guide to Practicing Law and Inside Straight: Advice About Lawyering, In-House And Out, That Only The Internet Could Provide (affiliate links). You can reach him by email at inhouse@abovethelaw.com.

Morning Docket: 11.25.19

(Photo by MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images)

* Justice Ruth Bader Gisnburg has been released from the hospital after being admitted for chills and a fever. Wishing RBG a speedy recovery! [Wall Street Journal]

* A New York lawyer is seeking to break up his firm over his partner’s affairs with employees and other inappropriate conduct. [New York Post]

* A Canadian judge has dismissed Subway’s $150 million lawsuit against the CBC for claims relating to the percentage of actual chicken in Subway products. Guess they have free speech rights in Canada too. [Fox News]

* In-N-Out Burger has been accused in a lawsuit of starting a 2017 California wildfire. Never been there myself, but my West Coast friends tell me the place is on fire… [NBC News]

* A lawyer who criticized a Manhattan judge for not disclosing campaign donations made by his adversary Marc Kasowitz has been canned by his client. [New York Daily News]

* Damon Dash, a co-founder of Roc-A-Fella Records (I had to look this up!), has been sanctioned for unruly conduct at a deposition. [TMZ]


Jordan Rothman is a partner of The Rothman Law Firm, a full-service New York and New Jersey law firm. He is also the founder of Student Debt Diaries, a website discussing how he paid off his student loans. You can reach Jordan through email at jordan@rothmanlawyer.com.

SA worried about Zimbabwe – Zimbabwe Vigil Diary – The Zimbabwean

South Africa’s International Relations Minister Naledi Pandor identified Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis as being caused by the hostility between its political leaders. Addressing a symposium on Zimbabwe in Pretoria, he said: ‘We would be greatly assisted in playing a positive role if we knew there was a shared notion in Zimbabwe of what must be done.’

He continued: ‘This is an extremely important point for us because, while indeed as the South African government, we work very closely with the government of Zimbabwe, it would be difficult for us to be seen as playing a role only with the government . . . We need to be provided with a path that indicates that as we enter to provide support, all the parties, all groups and all stakeholders in Zimbabwe are at one with that assistance that support must be.’

MDC leader Nelson Chamisa said he was heartened by Dr Pandor’s ‘correct diagnosis of the major problem in Zimbabwe as toxic politics’. He said: ‘We, in the MDC, stand ready to welcome South Africa and SADC’s mediation in Zimbabwe to end the suffering that has gone on for far too long, and give our people hope. In the face of provocation and persecution, our commitment to a sustainable, peaceful outcome has not shrunk.’ (See: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/11/ed-chamisa-must-talk-sa/.)

Chamisa was speaking just hours after police used teargas to disperse party supporters who had gathered at the MDC’s headquarters in Harare. Many people were savagely beaten with baton sticks. A senior American official, Tibor Nagy condemned what he described as the ‘unprovoked use of force against peaceably assembled Zimbabweans’.

Other points

  • A report tabled in Parliament by the Public Accounts Committee said the government had taken US$3.2 billion from depositors’ bank accounts before introducing the bond notes in 2016. The Committee, chaired by former MDC Finance Minister Tendai Biti said the Central Bank used the money to finance government operations without parliament’s approval (see: https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/11/22/rbz-raids-us32bn-in-depositors-funds/).
  • In another embarrassment for the government, China has complained that the recent budget understated Chinese aid to Zimbabwe. The budget said China had provided US$3.6 million in the first 9 months of the year while the real figure was closer to US$137 million.
  • The government has decided to name roads in in all the provinces after President Mnangagwa. Other Zanu PF leaders are also being honoured. Tendai Biti tweeted: ‘The public hospital system has collapsed. Citizens are dying like flies. The power blackouts are now permanent. Hyperinflation has spiralled out of control. But they sat and named roads after themselves. Easily the worst government in the history of governments.’ (See: https://www.zimlive.com/2019/11/22/in-hurry-to-secure-space-in-history-mnangagwa-names-10-roads-after-himself/.)
  • Another week another demonstration. Thousands of people – many of them Chinese – staged a protest in London over China’s heavy-handed treatment of Hong Kong. Many of them stopped at the Vigil.
  • The Vigil gazebo arrived today and was put up without mishap. Thanks for further contributions from Alice Majola and Casper Nyamakura.
  • Thanks to those who came early to help set up the front table and put up the banners: Yvonne Jacobs, Alice Majola, Chido Makawa, Benjamin Molife, Richard Munyama, Esther Munyira, Fungisai Mupandira and Casper Nyamakura. Thanks to Alice and Benjamin for looking after the front table, to Fungisai for handing out flyers, to Chido for drumming and photos.
  • For latest Vigil pictures check: http://www.flickr.com/photos/zimb88abwevigil/. Please note: Vigil photos can only be downloaded from our Flickr website.

FOR THE RECORD: 13 signed the register.

EVENTS AND NOTICES:

  • ROHR Reading Christmas Party Fundraiser. Saturday 30th November from 6.30 – 11 pm. Venue: The Spice Oven Buffet Restaurant, 2 – 4 Church Street, Reading RG4 8AT. Theme: to restore dignity to the suffering people of ZimbabweTickets: £20 per adult, free entry for children under 5 years. For more information, contact: Deborah Harry 07578894896, Nicodimus Muganhu 07877386792, Joshua Kahari 07877246251, Josephine Jombe 07455166668.
  • ROHR fundraising dinner dance in aid of women living with HIV/AIDS in rural Zimbabwe. Saturday 7th December from 7 pm till late. Venue: Lee Chapel South Community Centre, The Knares, Basildon SS16 5SA. Formal dress code. Tickets £30. Contact organisers: Esther Munyira 07492058109, Simbarashi Jingo 07722998848, Rangarirai Chivaviro 07378429599 and Patience Chimba 07896496379.
  • The Restoration of Human Rights in Zimbabwe (ROHR) is the Vigil’s partner organization based in Zimbabwe. ROHR grew out of the need for the Vigil to have an organization on the ground in Zimbabwe which reflected the Vigil’s mission statement in a practical way. ROHR in the UK actively fundraises through membership subscriptions, events, sales etc to support the activities of ROHR in Zimbabwe. Please note that the official website of ROHR Zimbabwe is http://www.rohrzimbabwe.org/. Any other website claiming to be the official website of ROHR in no way represents us.
  • The Vigil’s book ‘Zimbabwe Emergency’ is based on our weekly diaries. It records how events in Zimbabwe have unfolded as seen by the diaspora in the UK. It chronicles the economic disintegration, violence, growing oppression and political manoeuvring – and the tragic human cost involved. It is available at the Vigil. All proceeds go to the Vigil and our sister organisation the Restoration of Human Rights in Zimbabwe’s work in Zimbabwe. The book is also available from Amazon.
  • Facebook pages:

    Vigil: https://www.facebook.com/zimbabwevigil
    ROHR: https://www.facebook.com/Restoration-of-Human-Rights-ROHR-Zimbabwe-International-370825706588551/
    ZAF: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Zimbabwe-Action-Forum-ZAF/490257051027515

The Vigil, outside the Zimbabwe Embassy, 429 Strand, London, takes place every Saturday from 14.00 to 17.00 to protest against gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe. The Vigil which started in October 2002 will continue until internationally-monitored, free and fair elections are held in Zimbabwe. http://www.zimvigil.co.uk.

Open Committee Meetings Monday 25th to Friday 29th November

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Open Committee Meetings Monday 25th to Friday 29th November – The Zimbabwean

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES SERIES 43/2019

Open Committee Meetings Monday 25th to Friday 29th November

There will be seven committee meetings open to the public.

The meetings will be held in Parliament Building, Harare, on the dates and at the times and venues indicated below.

Members of the public may attend these meetings – but as observers only, not as participants, i.e. they may observe and listen but not speak. If attending, please use the entrance to Parliament on Kwame Nkrumah Ave between 2nd and 3rd Streets. Please note that IDs must be produced.

The details given in this bulletin are based on the latest information from Parliament. But, as there are sometimes last-minute changes to the meetings schedule, persons wishing to attend should avoid disappointment by checking with the committee clerk that the meeting concerned is still on and open to the public. Parliament’s telephone numbers are Harare 2700181 and 2252940/1.

Reminder: Members of the public, including Zimbabweans in the Diaspora, can at any time send written submissions to Parliamentary committees by email addressed to [email protected] or by letter posted to the Clerk of Parliament, P.O. Box 298, Causeway, Harare or delivered at Parliament’s Kwame Nkrumah Avenue entrance in Harare.

Monday 25th November at 9.00 am

Public Accounts Committee [PAC]

Oral evidence from the Grain Marketing Board on payments made by Government for Command Agriculture and Presidential Input Support Scheme.

Venue: Committee Room No. 1.

The PAC is also due to meet on Friday to hear oral evidence from others on the same subjects [see below].

Tuesday 26th November at 10.00 am

Portfolio Committee: Foreign Affairs

Oral evidence from the Minister of Finance and Economic Development on ZIMTRADE funding status.

Venue: Committee Room No.  4.

Thursday 14th November at 10.00 am

Portfolio Committee: Energy and Power Development

Oral evidence from Independent Power Producers – Great Zimbabwe Hydro Power Ltd, Shilands Enterprises, Tsanga Power Station, Harava Solar Park – and ZERA, on the state of affairs in the Renewable Energy Sector.

Venue: Committee Room No.  311.

Portfolio Committee: Information, Media and Broadcasting Services

Oral evidence from the Zimbabwe Media Commission on the Zimbabwe Media Commission Bill and to discuss issues on working conditions of commissioners.

Venue: Senate Chamber.

Portfolio Committee: Youth, Sports, Culture and Recreation

Oral evidence from the  Minister of Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation on progress made in drafting the National Youth Bill.

Venue: Committee Room No.  2

Thematic Committee: Indigenisation and Empowerment

Oral evidence from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Women Affairs, Community, Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development on Empowerment Policies and Programmes for SMEs and Cooperatives in Zimbabwe.

Venue: Committee Room No.  3.

Friday 29th November at 9.30 am and 11.30 am

Public Accounts Committee
Venue: Committee Room No.  4

At 9.30 am

Oral evidence from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development on payments made by Government for Command Agriculture and Presidential Input Support Scheme.

At 11.30 am

Oral evidence from Sakunda Holdings on payments made by Government for Command Agriculture and Presidential Input Support Scheme.

Veritas makes every effort to ensure reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied.

SA worried about Zimbabwe – Zimbabwe Vigil Diary
ZANU-PF versus MDC-A : Chairing of Parliamentary Committees

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ZANU-PF versus MDC-A : Chairing of Parliamentary Committees – The Zimbabwean

ZANU-PF versus MDC-A : Chairing of Parliamentary Committees

Neither House has been sitting since the Budget was presented on Thursday the 14th, but MPs had a full programme of post-Budget meetings for last week.  The post-Budget Seminar was on Monday 18th November and for the rest of the week there were Portfolio Committee meetings.  These were for post-Budget consultations with relevant Ministries and stakeholders in preparation for the debate on the 2020 National Budget, which is due to resume in the National Assembly on Tuesday 26th November.

The scheduled Portfolio Committee meetings were, however, interrupted by further moves in the ZANU PF campaign against MDC-A MPs in retaliation for absenting themselves from Parliamentary events at which the President was present – such as the opening of Parliament and the Budget Speech.

As noted in Bill Watch 62/2019 [link], after the Budget presentation in the National Assembly on 14th November, a resolution was passed in the absence of MDC-A members, to establish a Committee of Privileges to look into alleged contempt of Parliament by MDC-A MPs.

The next day, ZANU PF committee members forced the abandonment of an important Public Accounts Committee  [PAC] meeting because they objected to the PAC chairperson, MDC-A MP Tendai Biti.

ZANU PF Chief Whip Pupurai Togarepi was later reported as warning that what happened at the PAC meeting was “just a teaser to what they should expect, I can guarantee you that no committee which is being chaired by an MDC-A member will proceed until they recognize President Mnangagwa”.

Targeting of MDC-A Committee Chairpersons is Continuing

Last week the same tactics were employed by ZANU PF committee members against MDC-A committee chairpersons, not always successfully.

On 20th November, in the Environment and Tourism Portfolio Committee meeting, ZANU PF members objected to MDC-A Consilia Chinanzvavana presiding and voted for Robson Mavenyengwa of ZANU PF to preside in her stead; MDC-A committee members present were outvoted 15-3.

Also on the 20th, in the Health and Child Care Portfolio Committee meeting, ZANU PF committee members objected to MDC-A’s Dr Ruth Labode chairing the meeting, but were outvoted by MDC-A members.

On Friday 22nd November a PAC meeting was hearing evidence from Mr Morland, head of Fertiliser, Seed and Grain Ltd, on payments for the Command Agriculture Programme when two ZANU-PF MPs Hon Nduna and Zhou, arriving late, caused such a disturbance that the committee was unable to proceed with its hearing.

Can a Committee Remove its Chairperson? – No

After her ouster from the chair of her committee, Hon Chinanzvavana commented that her ouster had been unconstitutional, not procedural and contrary to Parliament’s Standing Rules and Orders.

Hon Chinanzvavana was correct.

Section 139 of the Constitution states that Parliamentary proceedings must be regulated by Standing Rules and Orders which are drawn up by the Houses on the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders [CSRO].

According to the National Assembly’s Standing Rules and Orders, the chairpersons of all Portfolio Committees must be appointed by the CSRO – Standing Order 18.  The chairing and composition of Committees must take into account the number of MPS from each party in Parliament and also gender representation.

It is only if no chairperson has been appointed [which is not applicable in present circumstances] or if the appointed chairperson is absent, that committee members may elect a temporary chairperson for themselves [Select Committee Rules, rule 8].

It follows that only the appointing authority [the CSRO] may remove a chairperson from office, whether temporarily or permanently.

Veritas makes every effort to ensure reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied.

Open Committee Meetings Monday 25th to Friday 29th November
What does pro-poor rural development mean for Zimbabwe?

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What does pro-poor rural development mean for Zimbabwe? – The Zimbabwean

Any rural policy must take a more differentiated view, and these blogs have offered some data from four communal areas in Masvingo province, contrasting them with their A1 resettlement neighbours. Given the insights offered, what are the implications for rural development policy?

The previous blogs have shown that, on average, communal area households across Masvingo province are asset and income poor, with little surplus produced on-farm, and with limited engagement in agricultural markets, even in relatively good years. Reliance on remittances, off-farm informal work and hand-outs from the state and NGOs is central. There are a few who are making it, but very few; most people are very poor, and with limited land areas and a lack of money circulating locally, no prospects for local level accumulation. For the next generation, without jobs and with no land, the prospects are bleak. This means that focused social protection measures on those most vulnerable will remain a priority for the communal areas.

What should development agencies focus on in the communal areas?

Given this, what then should the state and development agencies do? Should they simply be a site for humanitarian aid, keeping people alive, hoping that there will be an exit to other areas, ‘liquidating’ these areas in favour of the urban economy?

I am not so pessimistic about rural development, but communal areas’ futures rely centrally on the prospects of the wider economy. If this takes off again and jobs are created, money will flow back to the rural areas to support elderly relatives and younger children, and the need for external aid will decline. Even with aid, reliance on external sources of income, including remittances, is far more important, as our data show.

This has been the pattern since when the communal areas were created as ‘reserves’ through colonial legislation. They were never meant to be vibrant, productive places for entrepreneurship and accumulation; they were meant to be providers of adult (usually male) labour, and a cheap route to providing social security for those not in the workforce. But of course since the economic reforms of the 1990s, the labour market has changed, and there are no longer ‘jobs’ available, just work, often temporary, informal and precarious. Currently, there is very little even of that, as the economy tanks further. Turning the economy around is the most significant rural development intervention of all.

Rethinking rural development: a territorial approach

Beyond this, how to think about rural development? As mentioned in previous blogs, the land reform got rid of the divisive dualism of the old order, creating a new more mixed agrarian structure, with a mixture of land sizes and ownership arrangements. Communal areas must be thought of as part of this; indeed in area and population terms, the dominant part.

With A1 (smallholder) and A2 (medium-scale) resettlements next to or nearby all our communal area sites, their presence is felt. This is in relation to exchanges of food, labour, grazing, technology, skills and so on. There are much more fluid boundaries than before (although of course conflicts exist) and links to urban areas are often less to the large metropolitan centres of Harare, Bulawayo and Masvingo, but more to the smaller towns and growth centres embedded in rural areas, such as Mvurwi, Mazowe, Chatsworth, Gutu Mpandawanda, Ngundu and Chikombedzi.

It’s in the rural small towns where labour is being employed, crops are being sold, processing is taking place, services are supplied and shops and businesses are expanding. The growth is intermittent and fragile, and faltering currently with the latest turn in the on-going economic crisis. But looking to these areas is vital, along with the A1 and A2 areas where labour is employed, tractors hired and grazing and other contracts are issued.

Rural development investment that benefits the communal areas may have to be focused on these areas, supplying credit and finance, support entrepreneurs and training in new skills, as part of a wider territorial plan. Our data show that, in particular, the A1 areas are richer, more productive, investing and accumulating more, but, crucially, they can also drive development elsewhere through providing employment, services, natural resources, equipment and so on.

For development agencies, this means getting beyond the communal area project focus to a wider rural development strategy. There are too many chicken or nutrition garden projects in communal areas that are going nowhere. They may alleviate poverty at the margins, but are more palliative than transformative, and most collapse when the donor leaves. Beyond the clearly-needed social protection support for extremely vulnerable groups, and some of the basic infrastructure investment that’s sorely needed in the absence of state support, much communal area agricultural development is a waste of resources.

I say this reluctantly as I was involved in many communal area projects in the 1980s and 90s, but having seen how agricultural development can occur following redistribution of land, I now believe we were operating in such a constrained setting that it could never have made a difference. A wider view, with a post-land reform economic geography, however, opens up many opportunities.

The role of the state and donors has to be enabling: encouraging enterprises, facilitating linkages and improving basic infrastructure (roads, mobile phone signals and so on) that economic development relies on. Fewer chicken projects, more road building, and then let people get on with it. External assistance can also help with planning, and particularly the revitalisation of capacity in the local state.

This must link economic development to land administration and governance, for example, and focus especially on economic facilitation of hubs and growth poles where success is already bubbling up. This will allow local government, together with line ministries, to move from a role currently restricted to limited regulation, taxation and the running of beer halls to one with a greater economic role at a territorial level.

Moving to a local economic development focus however means allowing donor funds to be used in the new resettlements (currently prevented by ‘restrictive measures’ – aka ‘sanctions’). This would mean donors could engage in a wider, more meaningful approach to local economic development that connects areas and economies in new ways. This will create sustainable opportunities for poor people as part of a wider economic transformation. This is what pro-poor rural development means for Zimbabwe; not keeping people poor in the communal areas, trapped in a colonially-defined land-use and economic framework, and with development opportunities currently constrained by a narrow focus on projects in communal areas.

This post is the last in a series of nine and was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

This field research was led by Felix Murimbarimba and Jacob Mahenehene. Data entry was undertaken by Tafadzwa Mavedzenge

ZANU-PF versus MDC-A : Chairing of Parliamentary Committees
Lifting sanctions won’t solve Zimbabwe’s woes

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Lifting sanctions won’t solve Zimbabwe’s woes – The Zimbabwean

A resolution at the recent SADC Summit chose October 25 as the day for regional governments to articulate and mobilise support for the sanctions imposed two decades ago on Zimbabwe to be lifted.

SADC has claimed that sanctions against Zimbabwe have ultimately been damaging to the region’s economy. The direct link between sanctions and Zimbabwe’s economic crisis has not, however, been made.

October 20 was declared a national holiday in Zimbabwe to encourage citizens to protest against the continued imposition of sanctions, although only 3000 turned out at the national march and the stadium was not even half full.

While the lifting of sanctions would certainly provide economic relief to targeted individuals and entities, they certainly will not serve as a panacea to Zimbabwe’s economic crisis.

Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s claim that “sanctions are slowing down our progress, inhibiting our economic recovery and punishing the most vulnerable”, is not borne out by expert research.

Neither is the assertion of the government of Zimbabwe that sanctions have caused untold misery to ordinary Zimbabweans.

Sanctions seem to be used by politicians as a scapegoat for Zimbabwe’s economic decline that is largely the result of years of economic mismanagement, pilfering of state resources, endemic corruption, entrenched state capture, and poor governance.

The fact that basic services are not available to many Zimbabweans, and the cost of essential goods and staple food items are beyond the reach of millions, cannot be blamed primarily on targeted sanctions.

Political instability has also been a factor in Zimbabwe’s poor economic performance.

As Minister for International Relations Naledi Pandor said in her opening remarks at a symposium on Zimbabwe in Pretoria this week: “The political dynamics are inextricably linked to the economic and thus should be confronted simultaneously.”

Pandor also acknowledged an inescapable truth about discussions on the situation in Zimbabwe: “We have all become very competent at addressing and adopting resolutions, yet far too inadequate in informed reflection on what solutions or approaches may be practicable.”

A good starting point is to understand exactly what sanctions have been imposed on Zimbabwe, what economic effect they have had, and whether they remain relevant after two decades.

The newly arrived US Ambassador to South Africa, Lanna Marks, told the press on her first official day in the job last week that the only sanctions being maintained by the US on Zimbabwe were against Grace Mugabe, as well as an arms embargo.

But the US is still maintaining targeted sanctions on 83 individuals who face financial and travel restrictions.

There is some confusion around the exact figures as some individuals are listed a number of times under different aliases, such as Chinese businessman Sam Pa.

The US list of specially designated individuals on the Zimbabwe sanctions list is particularly problematic as it has little relevance 20 years on, and has not been updated. Some of those listed are now deceased, and others no longer have political relevance.

New names have been added, however. For example, after the October 20 march against sanctions, the US slapped sanctions on Zimbabwe’s State Security Minister Owen Ncube for alleged gross human rights violations, such as the torture of civil society activists, and the recent spate of abductions.

The US is maintaining sanctions against 53 large companies and organisations, which can specifically be broken down into 21 farm enterprises and 32 other business entities.

Of the 32 entities listed, 17 are linked to businessman John Bredenkamp as a result of his alleged involvement in mining deals in the DRC and arms dealing. Some of those are also on the list for having been implicated in the exploitation of the Marange diamonds.

Two Zanu-PF party companies are on the list.

In addition to the US targeted sanctions, the US has imposed a ban on arms exports to Zimbabwe.

As for the EU, it imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2002 due to the escalation of violence and intimidation of political opponents and the harassment of the independent press.

The sanctions comprised an arms embargo as well as an asset freeze and travel ban on targeted individuals and entities.

In 2008 there were 200 individuals and 40 entities on the list, but by 2016 only then-president Robert Mugabe and his wife remained on the list, as well as Zimbabwe Defence Industries.

The list of targeted individuals has since been updated and currently only former first lady Grace Mugabe remains on the list. While the Commanders of the Defence Force are on the updated list, they have been suspended. There remains a ban on the export of military equipment to Zimbabwe as well as technical military assistance.

As far as the effect of EU sanctions goes, it can hardly be argued that an asset freeze and travel ban directed at Grace Mugabe, and a ban on exporting military equipment to Zimbabwe have caused “untold misery to ordinary Zimbabweans”.

US sanctions against Zimbabwe, which are more comprehensive and also outdated, have had greater indirect economic ramifications for the country. The reason being that as a result of US sanctions, companies find it difficult to move US dollars into Zimbabwe as banks can be fined for dealing with sanctioned countries.

Just as companies have shied away from investing in other countries under US sanctions (Iran, for example), it is also true that companies have shied away from investing in Zimbabwe.

The state of the Zimbabwean economy with runaway inflation at 97.9% in June, and other factors such as entrenched corruption, political instability, poor governance and weak export competitiveness are real impediments to Zimbabwe becoming an attractive investment destination.

It is also important to note that it is not as a result of sanctions that Zimbabwe has failed to access lines of credit from international financial institutions.

This is because the international financial institutions (IFI) require Zimbabwe to repay prior loans before accessing further funding. Zimbabwe is indebted to all IFIs except for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is why it has not been eligible for loans in the past two decades.

In 2016 Zimbabwe cleared its debt to the IMF, although it still has an outstanding debt of US$2.3billion (R33.8bn) to the World Bank, US$680m to the African Development Bank, and US$308m to the European Investment Bank.

While it is true that the lifting of US sanctions may assist Zimbabwe in attracting some forms of investment, and may make it easier for companies to transfer US dollars to Zimbabwe, it will not serve as the solution to Zimbabwe’s massive economic challenges or lead to the recovery of the agriculture, health and education sectors.

What Zimbabwe most needs at this juncture to improve its economic outlook is political stability and transparency, an end to the impunity of the security forces for human rights abuses, measures to stamp out corruption at all levels, consistent economic policies, a cash injection of hard currency into the economy, restructured debt with the IFIs, and ultimately debt relief.

It is a catch-22 situation, however, as the US is likely to vote against any new lines of credit or debt relief from the IFI’s for Zimbabwe unless reforms are undertaken.

* Shannon Ebrahim is Independent Media’s foreign editor.

Zimbabwe’s Chiwenga returns after 4 months in China receiving medical treatment – The Zimbabwean

FILE: Zimbabwe vice-president Constantino Chiwenga. Picture: AFP

HARARE – Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga returned home on Saturday after spending four months in China receiving medical treatment for an unknown illness, state-owned media reported.

Chiwenga, the 63-year-old former general who led a coup against the late Robert Mugabe two years ago, has spent a large part of the year away from work, also receiving treatment in South Africa and India.

His health is of great interest to Zimbabweans as he is widely seen as the driving force behind the country’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the front-runner to succeed him. His absence from public duties had stoked speculation about the gravity of his illness, which authorities have sought to play down.

The Herald, a government-owned newspaper, showed images of Chiwenga arriving at Harare’s airport in the early hours of Saturday, looking healthier than when he was last seen in public in June. He was welcomed by relatives and China’s deputy ambassador to Zimbabwe Zhao Baogang, the newspaper said.

Local private media have reported that Chiwenga’s health deteriorated in July and that he underwent two operations following a suspected poisoning.

Chiwenga and government officials were not available to comment on Saturday.

Government officials in Zimbabwe routinely seek medical treatment abroad while the country’s public health system has collapsed and hospitals struggle to provide medicines to patients.

Many Zimbabweans are angry that top government officials continue to travel abroad for treatment while state hospitals are turning away patients because doctors have been on a pay strike since September.

The government has so far fired 435 doctors for participating in the strike

Lifting sanctions won’t solve Zimbabwe’s woes
Mnangagwa visits general Chiwenga at home

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Mnangagwa visits general Chiwenga at home – The Zimbabwean

24.11.2019 16:51

 …..as Mrs Mnangagwa kneels before the general. Zimbabwe says determined to successfully de-dollarize

…..as Mrs Mnangagwa kneels before the general.

Zimbabwe says determined to successfully de-dollarize

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Zimbabwe says determined to successfully de-dollarize – The Zimbabwean

Mthuli Ncube

Addressing a press conference, the minister acknowledged that de-dollarizing was not an easy task, but vowed that enforcement and compliance will be pursued to ensure no use of the U.S. dollar for unauthorized transactions.

The Zimbabwe government abandoned the hyperinflation-ravaged national currency in 2009 in favor of multiple currencies that included the U.S. dollar, British Pound, Euro, Australian dollar, Chinese Yuan and Japanese Yen.

However, of all the foreign currencies, the U.S. dollar became the dominant currency of trade and transacting in the country.

But in June this year, government suddenly re-introduced the Zimbabwe dollar as part of currency reforms.

The local currency is currently made up of electronic money known as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS), bond notes and coins and new dollar notes that were introduced last week.

But as the new notes remain in short supply and continue to depreciate against the U.S. dollar, most businesses are reportedly continuing to charge their goods and services in the U.S. dollar.

Ncube said Zimbabweans had become used to the green back such that it will not be easy for them to quickly forget it.

“It is not correct that the local currency has been rejected. People are desperately looking for the money. It’s not also easy to de-dollarize. There are too few cases around the world where they have de-dollarized successfully,” Ncube said.

Meanwhile, deputy minister of finance Clemence Chiduwa told the same press conference that the government was considering coming up with tight measures to deal with the thriving black market for foreign currency.

He said one such measure would be designating a few commercial banks that allow depositors to freely withdraw their money from Nostro foreign currency accounts to purchase goods abroad.

But upon return, the individuals would be requested to declare the source of foreign currency and if it’s not from official sources, such goods would be forfeited to the State.

He lamented the current scenario where businesses are now indexing the price of goods and services against movements of the exchange rate on the parallel market.

“Our inflation rate at the moment is now being driven by expected movements in the parallel market rate.

“What is just needed is to ensure that all the laws that are supposed to guide the operations of economic agents are in place. What is needed on our part is compliance and enforcement,” he added.

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Post published in: Business