On
8th
October,
an
unexpected cabinet
announcement laid
out
plans
for
a
completely
new
tenure
regime
in
the
land
reform
areas.
This
was
to
provide
a
secure
form
of
tenure
arrangement;
not
necessarily
title
but
with
an
arrangement
that
was
to
be
‘bankable’,
allowing
for
collateral
to
support
investment.
It
was
to
be
implemented
across
land
reform
areas,
with
war
veterans
and
women
prioritised.
The
registration
and
granting
of
tenure
rights
was
in
turn
expected
to
allow
for
sale
and
purchase
by
‘indigenous’
Zimbabweans.
Many
questions
raised
The
announcement
has
caused
a
huge
amount
of
debate,
raised
many
questions
and
quite
a
lot
of
consternation.
Given
its
provenance
(from
cabinet)
and
timing
(just
before
a
major
party
gathering)
it
has
been
seen
as
politically
significant,
but
the
details
remain
very
opaque.
Many
asked,
if
not
freehold
title,
what
would
the
secure
tenure
arrangement
entail?
Would
it
really
be
bankable
given
the
objections
that
the
bankers
had
made
about
even
the
revised 99-year
lease?
Would
all
prior
offer
letters,
permits
and
leases
become
null
and
void,
and
would
this
registration
and
allocation
process
have
to
start
from
scratch,
so
affecting
all
the
informal
and
semi-formal
rental,
lease
and
purchase
agreements
that
have
been
put
in
place
over
the
last
decades?
Would
purchase
be
allowed
for
only
a
single
farm,
or
many?
Should
the
proposal
be
applied
to
all
land
reform
land,
or
only
in
practice
A2
land?
Who
was
to
be
defined
as
‘indigenous’,
does
this
include
white
Zimbabweans?
How
would
the
process
guard
against
proxies
acting
on
behalf
of
others,
including
investors
from
South
Africa
and
beyond?
And
so
on.
Beyond
the
technical
questions
of
how
this
might
even
work,
there
were
other
political
questions
raised
about
the
process
and
its
timing.
Given
the
high
profile
of
this
announcement
and
its
timing
before
a ZANU-PF
congress and
in
advance
of
further
rounds
of AfDB-led
debt
negotiations,
who
was
it
being
aimed
at?
Was
it
disgruntled
war
veterans
who
have
been
criticising
the
party
elite?
Was
it
the
international
donors
who
wanted
to
see
progress
on
the
‘land
pillar’
in
advance
of
further debt
negotiations,
allowing
a
land
market
to
increase
efficiency
and
productivity
alongside
investment?
Was
this
a
deal,
aimed
at
further
accumulation
by
the
elite
beneficiaries
of
land
reform
in
the
A2
farms,
allowing
them
to
capitalise
on
the
assets
that
they
had
been
granted,
and
make
more
money?
Was
it
an
attempt
to
reduce
pressure
on
the
national
fiscus
given
the
government
is
broke,
allowing
private
funds
to
be
mobilised
for
investment
in
farming?
Or
was
it
some
combination
of
the
above?
The
various
discussions,
public
and
private,
that
took
place
in
the
immediate
aftermath
of
the
announcements,
showed
some
interesting
reactions.
Vocal
supporters
of
the
opposition
(at
least
in
the
past)
argued
that
this
was
just
another
example
of
a
corrupt
political
elite
cashing
in
on
the
land
reform.
Following
the
(long
disproved
but
still
persistent)
narrative
that
post-2000
land
reform
only
benefited
ZANU-PF
‘cronies’,
this
latest
move
was
seen
as
a
way
of
improving
their
position,
without
having
invested
anything
at
least
in
the
acquisition
of
land.
Even
if
not
linked
to
ZANU-PF
patronage,
many
questioned
the
idea
of
just
giving
a
national
asset
(land)
that
had
been
fought
for
during
the
liberation
war
to
a
select
group
of
individuals
for
free
and
allowing
them
to
cash
it
in
through
land
sales.
A
new
land
tenure
regime
or
a
better
land
administration
system?
I
must
say
that
I
remain
sceptical
of
the
proposal.
In
the
past
–
together
with
Sam
Moyo
and
others
and
following
the
work
of Mandi
Rukuni on
President
Mugabe’s
Land
Tenure
Commission
of
the
early
1990s
–
I
have
argued
for
the
retention
of
a multiform
tenure
system,
with
different
approaches
suited
to
the
context.
I
have
argued
against
creating
a
completely
free
land
market
because
of
the
risks
of
land
concentration
and
elite
capture,
a
theme
picked
up
by
Freedom
Mazwi
and
George
Mudimu
in
a
recent Agrarian
South journal
blog.
In
line
with
others,
I
have
also
made
the
case
that
offer
letters,
permits
and
leases
–
the
existing
mechanisms
–
could
easily
provide
the
basis
for
secure
tenure
if
effectively
implemented,
with
records
updated.
‘Freehold
title‘
for
some
strange
reason
is
seen
as
the
gold
standard
in
Zimbabwe
(by
former
farmers
and
war
vets
alike),
but
has
so
many
flaws,
not
least
the
implications
for
equity
and
justice.
I
have
argued
in
particular
that
what
is
(still)
absent
is
an
effective,
transparent
and
functioning land
administration
system that
provides
for
low-cost
registration,
regular
audit
and
the
collection
of
land
tax
and
other
revenues.
Revised
forms
of
land leases in
particular
I
believe
offer
the
potential
for
collateral
security
to
guarantee
bank
loans,
and
all
existing
forms
of
recognised
tenure
can
and
should
guard
against
land
grabbing
and
speculation
by
outsiders
if
properly
recognised.
The
growth
of
informal
land
markets
and
the de
facto existence
of
land
sales/purchases
on
quite
a
large
and
growing
scale,
alongside
increasing
numbers
of
cases
of
‘land
grabs’
for
commercial
agriculture,
mining
and
others
uses
especially
in
the
communal
areas,
makes
this
even
more
imperative.
Offering
a
bankable
lease
that
can
be
exchanged
through
sales/purchases
for
A2
farms
may
be
part
of
this
solution
if
a
cheap
registration
and
audit
system
can
be
devised,
allowing underutilised
land to
be
brought
into
production.
My
long-held
view
is
that
such
A2
farmers
should
pay
at
least
for
the
‘improvements’
on
their
land
through
a
land
tax,
and
so
contribute
to
the compensation
funds offered
to
former
owners,
and
so
offering
leases
for
such
land
allocated
by
the
state
should
not
be
‘free’.
By
contrast,
the
possibility
of
implementing
the
current
cabinet
proposal
in
A1
areas
is
slim.
This
land
should
in
my
view
remain
state
land,
but
with
provisions
for
rental/leasing
as
exists
in
the
informal
system,
and
discussed
in
the last
blog.
This
is
the
same
for
communal
lands,
which
are
acknowledged
to
be
out
of
the
scope
of
the
proposal.
In
the
A1
areas,
as
discussed
in
the
previous
blogs
in
this
series,
a
system
of
land
authority
has
emerged
that
is
quite
similar
to
the
communal
areas.
There
is
a
more
dynamic
land
market
because
of
there
being
more
land
to
exchange,
and
the
value
of
it
for
commercial
investment,
but
trying
to
box
this
incredible
complexity
and
the
multiple
informal
systems
at
play
into
a
simple
farm-based
registration
and
tenure
recognition
process
allowing
for
commercial
sales
seems
incredibly
unwise.
As
I
have
argued
before,
there
are
other
ways
of
providing agricultural
finance in
these
areas,
with
different
collateral
loan
arrangements
backed
by
the
state,
and
by
retaining
state
ownership
even
if
individual
usufruct,
these
national
assets
would
not
be
up
for
sale.
While land
registration
systems are
certainly
needed,
these
need
not
be
incredibly
complex
or
costly
and
should
not
prevent
the
informal
systems
that
have
been
evolving.
Land
markets
can
provide
for
a
healthy
exchange
of
land
through
rental
and
leasing
systems,
even
purchase,
and
help
farmers
make
use
of
their
land
more
effectively,
as
the
discussion
of
‘new
entrants’
in
the
previous
two
blogs
have
shown.
The
trouble
is
that
nearly
25
years
after
land
reform
there
remains
confusion
over
tenure
rights.
As
a
Lands
officer
explained,
“We
can’t
keep
up.
We
have
no
transport
in
the
district,
so
we
have
not
been
able
to
issue
final
A1
permits
except
in
very
few
places.
They
are
nearly
all
temporary,
most
with
different
names.
There
are
now
so
many
disputes,
so
many
different
‘offer
letters’.
When
we
issue
final
permits,
we
only
select
those
few
A1
schemes
without
disputes,
ones
that
have
respected
boundaries
and
carrying
capacities”.
Commenting
on
‘illegals’,
he
went
on
“It’s
a
complicated
web.
Illegal
settlers
are
too
many
in
the
resettlement
areas.
They
do
what
they
want.
They
know
that
Lands
officers
do
not
visit
farms
regularly,
and
if
they
do
pass
through
the
farms,
it
will
take
another
two
years
or
so
before
they
return
to
the
farm.
So,
they
are
doing
whatever
they
want.
And
when
you
are
trying
to
evict
those
illegal
settlers,
politicians
tells
us
to
leave
them
because
they
voted
for
them”.
The
frustration
of
those
charged
with
addressing
land
issues
across
the
country
is
palpable.
But
will
a
brand-new
tenure
system
make
things
better
or
worse?
Most
people
think
the
latter.
In
the
words
of
one
local
official:
“if
in
the
A1
areas,
it
will
be
chaos,
real
chaos”.
Instead,
what
is
needed
more
than
anything
is
a
low-cost,
transparent
and
efficient land
administration
system that
can
keep
on
top
of
transfers,
inheritance
bequests
and
other
changes
of
use,
while
limiting
the
operations
of
‘land
barons’
and
others.
Currently
the
system
is
not
keeping
up.
As
another
official
commented,
“Land
seekers
are
being
defrauded
by
scammers.
People
are
buying
land
from
land
barons.
These
land
barons
are
better-informed
than
us
in
terms
of
what
is
happening
on
the
farms.
They
know
where
spaces
are.
They
are
more
networked
than
us.
Some
land
barons
have
even
set
up
offices
in
towns.
They
print
very
nice
offer
letters.
If
you
compare
offer
letters
from
the
Ministry
of
Lands
and
the
ones
that
they
print,
you
would
think
that
the
land
barons’
offer
letters
are
genuine
and
ours
are
fake!”
Suggesting
a
totally
new
system
will
I
fear
cause
even
more
delays
and
confusion.
Instead
of
changing
tenure
regime,
a
focus
on
boosting
the
capacity
for
basic land
administration is
therefore
essential,
and
long
overdue.
Watch
this
space:
time
for
some
more
deliberation
Let’s
see
how
this
debate
unfolds.
The
African
experience
of
formalising
land
tenure
systems
through
the
offering
of title (of
some
equivalent)
has
not
been
positive.
The
Rwanda
experience,
often
promoted
by
donors
and
others,
does
not
always
stand
up
to
the
hype,
as
discussed
in
an earlier
blog.
The
post-Independence
experience
of
Kenya
has
not
been
positive,
as
a
process
of
land
concentration
ensued
following
titling
programmes,
with
many
becoming
disenfranchised,
with
major
political
and
economic
consequences.
The
Zimbabwe
Land
Commission
has
been
deliberating
on
the
future
of
land
tenure
and
seeking
expert
advice.
Before
rushing
into
a
new
set
of
tenure
arrangements
based
on
a
vague,
politically-driven
announcement,
more
reflection
and
deliberation
on
what
makes
sense
in
Zimbabwe
is
urgently
needed.
Let’s
hope
that
the
technical
implementation
committee
has
the
opportunity
to
come
up
with
a
workable
approach.
Suggesting
a
totally
new
system
will
I
fear
cause
even
more
delays
and
confusion.
Instead
of
changing
tenure
regime,
a
focus
on
boosting
the
capacity
for
basic land
administration is
therefore
essential,
and
long
overdue.
The
final
blog
in
this
series
will
be
a
reprise
of
a
blog
from
2017,
which
laid
out
some
of
the
key
issues.
This
blog
is
the
third
in
this
series
and
was
written
by
Ian
Scoones
and
first
appeared
on Zimbabweland
Post
published
in:
Agriculture